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I, INTRODUCTION 
The phenomenon of the "revolution of rising expectations" 
among the less developed nations is a fundamental fact of 
international life in the mid-twentieth century. More and 
more people of the less developed nations are refusing to be­
lieve that their poverty is inevitable. They are increasing­
ly aware of man's great power over nature and of the fact that 
they can have at least some control over their own destiny. 
The desire for change in Latin America has encouraged its 
leaders to analyze the restraints to more rapid economic and 
social development and to consider the means through which the 
desired change can be achieved. This desire for change, which 
President Frei of Chile has termed the "Latin American revolu­
tion" has the following objectives; "the participation of the 
people in the government and the destruction of the oligarch­
ies; the redistribution of land and the ending of feudal or 
semi-feudal regimes in the countryside; the securing of equal 
access to cultural and educational facilities and wealth, thus 
putting an end to inherited privilege and artificial class 
divisions. Finally, a main objective of the revolution is to 
secure economic development, coupled with a fair distribution 
of its products and the utilization of international capital 
for the benefit of the national economy," (30, p, ^ 38), 
2' 
To the United States Government, the question of vital 
concern is the means through which the desired change in Latin 
America will be affected. The commitment to change does not 
appear to be reversible. Yet, can Latin America achieve its 
desired change by evolutionary means or will frustration with 
the resistance of entrenched vested interests in the status 
quo force the desire for change iMto violent, revolutionary 
channels? The alternative of violently overthrowing the exist­
ing socio-politico-economic institutions and supplanting U,,S,, 
influence and support with the succor of the Communist Bloc 
has been illustrated by the Cuban example. Such an alternative 
implies a ready threat to the security and economic interests 
of the United States, Furthermore, the attractiveness of a 
revolution with Communist support is enhanced by the strides 
which have been made by the Soviet Union from an underdevel­
oped to a developed state through a centralized economic sys­
tem. 
In view of this situation, the United States has firmly 
endorsed the evolutionary path to economic and social develop­
ment, The launching of the Alliance for Progress in 1961, two 
years after the Cuban Revolution, marked the determination of 
the United States to demonstrate that the evolutionary path 
need not meet with frustration. It set out to provide sub­
stance to the belief that achievement of rapid economic and 
social development need not be incompatible with the mainten­
ance and fostering of free institutions under political 
3 
democracy. It was recognized that the success of the evolu­
tionary path depends greatly on the efforts taken towards in­
ternal reform, or "self-help", made by the individual member 
nations of the Alliance for Progress, Although it was real­
ized that vested interests would resist structural changes, 
which in fact would reduce their economic and political power, 
it was hoped that the creation of the Alliance for Progress 
would exert" substantial pressure for change on the vested 
interests through international and domestic public opinion. 
In the words of Lincoln Gordon* 
"It is true that, in 196I, its founders hoped that 
it might generate a mystique of peaceful democratic 
revolution which would sweep political leadership 
and Latin American public opinion on a tide suffi­
cient to overcome the resistance of vested interests 
and the obstacles of traditional political rival­
ries", (14, p, 635). 
To aid the process of change an increased program of techni­
cal assistance and loans was offered by the United States 
which could be used as incentives to encourage Internal struc­
tural reforms, and indeed were to be conditioned by the 
achievement of "self-help" measures on the part of the recipi­
ent country, 
Peru, under the administration of President Prado, became 
a member of the Alliance for Progress, By so doing, Peru com­
mitted herself to the evolutionary path to economic and social 
development. The question of central Importance, was at that 
time, whether Peru would be able to achieve rapid economic and 
social development following the evolutionary path of the 
4" 
Alliance for Progress? The prospects for rapid, economic and 
social development are influenced by a multitude of factors 
some of which are in the domain of competence of the economist 
and others which are in that of other social and technical 
scientists, such as the receptivity of the population to 
change, the capacity for effective organization, and the abil­
ity to adapt technology to local productive conditions. It is 
the objective of this study jto analyze some of the economic 
factors which influencing Peru's potential to develop over the 
medium-term. 
The conventional measure of economic development is the 
level of income per capita, even though the limitations of the 
measure are well recognized, A less conventional, but perhaps 
a more accurate, measure could be visualized as the result of 
the application of a social welfare function that includes 
other objectives of economic policy in addition to the level 
of income, such as balance of payments equilibrium, monetary 
stability, employment, income distribution, and regional bal­
ance, In this study the analysis and evaluation is performed 
with reference to the latter multidimensional measure of the 
level of economic development, 
! 
In multi-objective social welfare functions for economic 
policy decision-making, whether linear or quadratic in form, 
the individual objectives enter with assigned weights which 
reflect the marginal rates of substitution among the objec-
I 
tives. As the medium-term prospects for economic development 
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are influenced by the initial conditions, it is interesting to 
ascertain the implicit marginal rates of substitution among the 
multiple objectives that attain currently and did attain in the 
recent past. Chapter II of this study is an attempt to pro­
vide an initial specification of the relative importance as­
signed to the various economic policy objectives under the 
post-19^5 presidential administrations of Peru, Such an anal­
ysis yields insight into the success and failure elements of 
recent economic policy with respect to the process of Peruvian 
economic development. This Insight may provide some guidance 
in the effort to formulate development policy over the medium-
term. 
The analysis of the medium-term economic development 
prospects of Peru is carried out with the aid of a macroeco-
nomic econometric model of the Peruvian economy. Chapter III 
I 
presents a summary statement of the elements of econometric 
model building. It also presents of discussion of the theory 
of quantitative economic policy as an elementary form of the 
theory is applied in the analysis of the economic development 
prospects of Peru, In connection with the discussion of the 
theory of quantitative economic policy, a treatment of the 
formulation of multiple-objective social welfare functions is 
presented. Chapter III also contains a discussion of the ap­
plicability of macroeconomic econometric models to under­
developed economics in support of the methodological approach 
employed in the study, 
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Chapter IV presents the macrbeconomic econometric model 
that is employed in order to aid the analysis of the economic 
development prospects of PerUe The conceptual framework of 
the model is discussed first and is followed by the descrip­
tion of the system of equations which constitute the model. 
Subsequently, the formal properties of the model are presented. 
The problem of the stability of the "reduced form" over the 
projection period is discussed in Section E, The acceptance 
of the basic stability of the "reduced form" leads to using 
the model for projection purposes over the 1966-1972 period. 
In the final section of the chapter, a qualitative analysis of 
the impact of the September 196? devaluation of the Peruvian 
currency on the macroeconomic projection is carried out. The 
macroeconomic data used in estimating the model, the exogenous 
projections used in the projection procedure, and the result­
ing projections of the model are presented in Appendices A, B, 
and C, respectively. 
The analysis of the macroeconomic projections obtained in 
Chapter IV is presented in Chapter V, The analysis is con­
ducted in terms of the multiple economic policy objectives. 
The initial section of the Chapter analyses the economic per­
formance of the Peruvian economy over the 1950-1965 period in 
terms of the multiple economic policy objectives in order to 
provide the appropriate background information for an under­
standing of the implications of the projections obtained in 
Chapter IV, 
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The projections obtained In Chapter IV are passive In the 
sense that they assume Implicitly a continuation of existing 
economic policy, A study of the major alternatives available 
for the Improvement of the medium-term growth performance of 
the Peruvian economy Is presented In Chapter VI, Three major 
alternatives are studied; (1) potential growth gains via ex­
port promotion, (2) potential growth gains via Increased public 
sector participation in the economy, and (3) potential growth 
gains from the private sector which produces for the domestic 
market, 
The analysis of the implications of the macroeconomic 
projections obtained in Chapter IV indicates that the major 
objective of economic policy over the next five years ought to 
be Income expansion, A provisional target rate of Income 
expansion was set at S% per year on a cumulative basis over 
the 1966-1972 period, The level of total savings required to 
achieve the income growth target can be obtained from the 
projections of the model through the application of the nation­
al Income accounting identities. In order to Investigate the 
feasibility of attaining the Indicated levels of total savings, 
however, appeal is made to a disaggregated estimation of 
savings over the projection period. The disaggregation permits 
the Identification of the sources of savings and the estimation 
of a behavioral savings function for private national savings. 
i 
8 
The conclusions obtained from the study and their 
implications for the conduct of Peruvian economic policy and 
for international aid policy with respect to Peru are present­
ed in Chapter VIII, 
9 
II. THE OBJECTIVES OF PERUVIAN ECONOMIC 
POLICY SINCE 19^5 
A, Introduction 
It is the objective of this chapter to provide an initial 
specification of the relative importance assigned to the var­
ious objectives of Peruvian economic policy during the post-
World War II administrations. The policy objectives which will 
be considered are (1) income growth, (2) balance of payments, 
equilibrium, (3) employment, (4) personal income distribution, 
and '5) regional' balance. The methodological procedure is to 
draw inferences concerning the relative weights of the various 
policy objectives from the interaction of the recorded perfor­
mance of the economy over the period under consideration with 
the statements regarding economic policies and objectives 
expressed by the several presidential administrations, "The 
administrations considered are (1) the Bustamante y Rivero 
administration, (2) the Odria administration, (3) the Prado 
administration, and (4) the Belaunde administration, 
B, The Administration of Bustamante y Rivero 
(July 19^5-00tober 1948) 
Perhaps, the primary determinant of the economic policy 
objectives of the Bustam'ante y Rivero administration was the 
severe adjustment problem facing the Peruvian economy in the 
immediate post-World War II period. 
10 
The bàsib problem fating the new administration was the 
tremendous decline in export earnings due to the slacking off 
of war-time demands for her raw materials. The sensitivity of 
Peruvian economic performance to the behavior of the export 
sector translated the decline in export earnings into a severe 
economic crisis. The pressure on the limited supply of foreign 
exchange had induced President Prado to introduce foreign ex­
change controls in June of 19^5# The severity of the foreign 
exchange problem is illustrated by the fact that Peru has tra­
ditionally maintained a free trade policy and that the only 
exception was the system of controls during 19^5-19^9 (11, P. 
6 ) .  
According to Bustamante y Rivero* the chief economic 
problems of 1945-1948 were (1) a food scarcity, (2) inflation­
ary control, and (3) the lack of foreign exchange (4, pp, 188-
245), Given the dominant role of the export sector, it is not 
surprising to discover that these three economic problems were 
inter-related. The lack of foreign exchange, which derived 
from the drop in export earnings, meant that the supplementing 
of domestic food production with imports could be less freely 
used. The resulting reduction in the supply of food created a 
definite upward pressure on the price of food contributing 
further to the existing inflationary pressures derived from the 
deficit financing of public expenditures during the Prado ad­
ministration, Exchange controls were maintained by Bustamante 
y Rivero in an effort to provide the required food imports at 
11 
relatively low prices. Hence, the official rate of exchange 
was controlled at S/,6,50 to the U, S, dollar while the free 
market rate climbed to S/,1^,05 to the U, S, dollar. Further­
more, the effort to keep food prices low through a controlled 
exchange rate and food imports reduced the price incentive to 
ddTiestic agriculture for increasing production. 
In view of this situation, Bustamante y Rivero had to 
place stabilization as the prime economic objective of his ad­
ministration, The two policy objectives with the heaviest 
relative weights were price stability and balance of payments 
equilibrium. Economic policy also had to contribute to a re­
duction in social tension as extensive social unrest was 
evident throughout Peru which was reflected in the attempts to 
limit the rise in the cost of living. The situation was fur­
ther complicated by the Inability to obtain external financial 
support, largely due to the default on the servicing of the 
Leguia bonds. Hence, long-term policies designed to foster 
social and economic development had no chsnce to be realized 
amidst the short-run struggle for economic stabilization and 
domestic peace, 
C, The Military Coup of October 19^8 
/ 
The military coup led by General Odria which overthrew 
President Bustamante y Rivero in October of 1948, the so-called 
Movimiento Restaurador de Arequipa, appears to have had two 
I 
major motivating factory one political and the other economic ; 
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the political factor being the military's view of APRA (Alianza 
Popular Revolucionaria Americana) and the economic factor being 
the traditional economic elite's view of the management of 
Peru's export economy under Bustamante y Rivero, 
The most prominent motivating factor of the October 1948 
/ 
coup in the official pronouncements of Odria was the political 
/ 
i'actor, Odria held the APRA party responsible for the serious 
civil disturbances during Bustamante y Rivero's administration. 
Indeed, Odria led the coup against APRA and not against 
/ 
Bustamante y Rivero although Odria disagreed with his policy 
toward APRA, Odria saw Peru menaced by a marxist dictatorship 
under APRA which would suppress all liberties and threaten the 
traditional values of Peruvian life. The coup was designed, 
therefore, to restore and guarantee the traditional values of 
Peruvian life. In Odria's words, 
/ 
"Surgi0 el Movimiento Restaurador de Arequipa en 
mementos historicos" "una dictadura marxista 
amenazaba aherrojar todas las libertades" ,,,,,, 
"La Revolucion respondio pues a un sentido anhelo 
nacional a'la necesidad de restaurar los valores 
tradicionales de la Peruanidad", (31, P, 1) 
In February of 1948 President Bustamante y Rivero created 
a cabinet composed entirely of military officials. The reason 
for the military cabinet according to Bustamante y Rivero was 
to foster a respect for authority and institutions in an at­
tempt to preserve Peruvian democracy in face of the serious 
civil disturbances of the period (7, p, 131), The central 
point of contention between the military cabinet and President 
13 
Bustamante y Rlvero was over what policy the government should 
follow with respect to APRA which both the cabinet and the 
president believed to be responsible for the civil disturbanc­
es, The issue came to a head in June of 1948 when the cabinet, 
led by Odria, wanted to outlaw the APRA party while the presi­
dent refused to do so, Bustamante y Rlvero argued that the 
most effective policy would be to maintain a strong government 
accompanied by a program of effective social reform that would 
demonstrate that others besides ÀPRA were concerned with the 
public welfare rather than to follow a policy of persecution 
of APRA, Quoting Bustamante y Rlvero, 
"Una polltica gubernativa fuerte, correctiva y 
perseverante, acompanada de un programa de reformas 
sociales efectivas, que demuestren que el^APRA no 
tlene el patrimonio exclusivo de la emocion por la 
justicla ni de la preocupaciôn solicita por el blenes-
tar del pueblo, puede ser mas eficaz que una polltica 
de persecuslôn y drasticlsmo", (7, p, 138) 
The military cabinet, however, decided to resign and a new 
cabinet with military and civil ministers was created. How­
ever, soon after the uprising in Callao of October 19^8 Odria 
announced the revolt of the military in Arequipa and proceeded 
to consolidate his power through the military junta. One of 
the first measures of the military junta was the outlawing of 
the APRA party. 
The role of the economic factor in motivating the October 
19^8 coup has a much less prominent position in Odria official 
pronouncements, Nevertheless, it is argued that the economic 
factor was an important factor in motivating the Odria coup. 
14 
The management of the esonomy under Bustamante y Rivero 
appears to have greatly antagonized the influential exporting 
groups of Peru which belonged to the traditional economic and 
political elite of Peru, The rapid internal inflation posed 
against the background of foreign exchange controls which arti­
ficially held the official exchange rate at S/,6,50 to the 
U, S, dollar while the free rate rose to S/,l4,05 severely re­
duced the profit margin on exports. The imposing of even more 
stringent foreign exchange controls in September of 19^8 drew 
intense criticism from exporters. The exporters considered the 
granting of only 35^ of total export earnings to be used under 
the free exchange rate as too low and strongly urged the re­
turn to a completely free exchange system through the suppres­
sion of all "controls"'. According to ^ Bustamante y Rivero, 
"Pero pese a las indudabl-es ventajas del nuevo 
sistema de cambios y a la aceptacion que, después 
de examinado a fondo, merecib por parte de diverses 
sectores economicos, se desencadenô contra él una 
intensa y airada ofensiva de ciertos exportadores 
metidos a p'oliticos, quienes encontraron demasiado 
baja la cuota de 35% que se les habîa asignado en 
divisas libres y preconizaban la libertad integral 
y absoluta del mercado de cambios, con supresion de 
todos los "contrôles", La actitud no era nueva ,,," 
(7, P. 230) 
The strength of the traditional exporters in the export-
dominated economy of Peru is reflected in the attitude of the 
Gildermeister sugar enterprise to the new system of foreign 
exchange controls of September 19^8, The Gildermeister enter­
prise officially expressed its intention not to recognize the 
new foreign exchange controls and to use its foreign exchange 
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earnings to finance merchandise imports over and above the 
official system for controlling international transactions. 
According to Bus^amante y Rivero, 
la campana de los exportadores - politicos 
contra el gobiemo, ya muy viva antes del 6 de 
Setiembre de 1948 se hizo a partir de entonc£s en-
conada y rebelde", Desde abril de ese ano, la 
firma Gildermeister, propietar^a del mayor lati-
fundio azucarero del Peru, habia planteado oficial-
mente su determinaciôn de desconocer las disposicio-
nes vigentes sobre el "control" de cainbios y proce-
dido por propia autoridad a aplicar las divisas re-
tenidas de sus exportaciones al pago de ciertas mer-
caderfas pendientes de licencia de importacion, 
pasando por alto a las oficinas del gobiemo", 
(7, P. 235) 
The attitude of the exporters to the new foreign exchange 
controls of September 1948, their endorsement of a free ex­
change system, the occurrence of the Odria coup in October of 
1948, the rescinding of the September 1948 exchange controls 
in December 1948, and the subsequent endorsement of a free 
exchange system by Odria are difficult to attribute to mere 
coincidence, particularly in view of the apparent informal 
alliance between Peru's economic elite and the Armed Forces 
leaders (34, p, 22), Certainly the principles by which the 
Odria administration guided the economy, which represented a 
sharp break with economic policy under Bustamante y Rivero, 
conformed closely to the desires of the exporters. Further­
more, various leaders of the opposition to Bustamante y Rivero 
among the traditional economic elite occupied extremely impor­
tant economic posts under Odria - for example, Pedro Beltran 
as president of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru, In view of 
16 
these facts, bredence is lent to the clalm_of Bustamante y 
Bivero that the Odria coup of October 19^8 was the result of 
collusion between the military and the conservatives as led by 
Pedro Beltran in the Allanza Naclonal party (7, p, l4l). 
Further investigation would be required to determine the 
exact relative importance of the political and the economic 
• 
factorsi in motivating the Odria coup of October 1948, However, 
the analysis herein presented is sufficient to state that the 
economic factor was a crucial motivating factor, 
% 
D, The Administration of Odria 
(October 1948-July 1956) 
The central tenet of the Odria administration appears to 
have been the revitallzatlon of the Peruvian export economy. 
This objective had two major facets; (1) re-establishing the 
basic Incentives for the stimulation of export expansion, and 
(2) the restoration of domestic peace in the urban areas. As­
suredly, these two facets of the Odria program were interdepen­
dent, The achievement of both facets was essential to the suc­
cessful management of the Peruvian export economy, 
Odria realized, no doubt with the substantial tutoring of 
Beltran's Allianza Naclonal, that the performance of the export 
sector Is the key to the successful operation of the Peruvian 
economy, Odria, in a statement to the Peruvian Congress (?), 
explained that the performance of the export sector largely 
depended upon the profit margin in exporting which was direct­
ly influenced by the rate of internal inflation. Furthermore, 
17 
he stated that the cldsing of profit margins in exporting 
would restrict exporta which Would reduce public revenues and 
restrict the ability of the country to Import that which it 
required. Due to the economic crisis derived from the poor 
/ 
performance of exporte, Odria stated that substantial urban 
unemployment would result which would provoke a grave social 
and political crisis. In the words of Odria, 
"El Peru es un pais exportador, vendemos en dolares 
y pagamos los costos de produccion en soles. La 
utilldad que se obtiene se deduce la diferencla 
entre el preclo de venta en dolares con los gastos 
de producciôn en 'soles. Si èl costo de produccion 
se eleva, debido al aumento de salarios y otras 
causas y si, como ha sucedido con muchos de nuestros 
articulos de exportacion, su precio en el mercado 
mundlal se ha depreciado, entonces la diferencla a 
que acabo de referirme puede llegar a ser pequena, 
nula y hasta negatlva, es decir, que no arrpje 
utllidad. En tal caso el productor no podrïa vender, 
no podrà colocar sus articulos en el mercado exterior, 
el Estado no perclbirâ los impuestps y nuestro mercado 
de divisas recibirâ menos dolares, que dia a dia 
disminuirân en forma alarmante, hasta no tener los 
suficlentes para las necesidades mas,primordiales del 
pais, A esta situacion funesta habria que agregar 
otra, no menos grave, la desocupaclôn y la cons^guiente 
pobreza en la clase trabajadora, Esto provocarla 
una grave crisis social y politica que todo Gobierno 
tiene el deber primordial de evitar," (32, p, 10), 
Although this statement by Odria was made in 195^, it 
accurately reflects the view of Odria and his supporters at the 
time of the "coup" of 1948, Given this view of the economy, 
the central tenet of Odria's economic policy was, qulte.^ natu­
rally the revltalizatlon of the export sector. The first con­
cern of the Odria administration was the removal of the system 
of foreign exchange controls and price controls Introduced 
18 
under President Prado and Bustamante y Rivero, Economic con­
trols were held responsible for the lack of foreign exchange 
and were criticized for their negative impact on production 
incentives. Particularly, Odria argued that economic controls 
had limited domestic agricultural production and thereby 
created the necessity to import large quantities of agricul­
tural products, such as wheat, meat rice, milk and oils (32, 
P. 8). 
• 1 
The Odria administration recognized the value of foreign 
Investment to the Peruvian export economy. The desire to 
eliminate economic controls, in this case particularly foreign 
exchange control, was only one instrument of a set which was 
designed to increase foreign capital inflow into Peru, Odria 
pushed through a settlement of the outstanding dispute over 
the defaulted Leguia bonds in order to improve the investment 
climate in Peru, The Odrïa administration adopted a policy of 
exchange rate stability in a free market which entailed a com­
mitment to restrain the rate of internal Inflation to further 
improve the investment climate. As a further incentive, leg­
islation was enacted which provided attractive conditions to 
foreign capital in the exploitation of Peru's natural resourc­
es, such as the Mining Code of 1950, 
In terms of the major economic policy objectives, it 
appears that the Odria administration placed heavy weight on 
income growth and monetary stability. The structure of the 
Peruvian economy, being export dominated, determined that income 
19 
growth was to be derived from export expansion which also pro-
/ 
vided for "strenfeth" in the balance of payments. The Odria 
administration, however, faced with substantial social unrest 
could not afford to ignore more socially oriented economic 
objectives such as employment creation and an improved income 
distribution. 
It'was realized that the achievement of domestic peace 
was essëntial to the creation of conditions which would permit 
/ 
a successful operation of Peru's export economy, Odria held 
the APRA party responsible for the serious civil disturbances 
of the early post-War years. His policy to achieve domestic 
tranquility went one step beyond the policy recommended by 
Bustamante y Rivero in June of 1948, Besides instituting a 
y 
strong government and effective social reforms, Odria outlawed 
y 
the APRA party and persecuted its leaders. Nevertheless, Odria 
firmly endorsed a policy of effective social reforms in order 
to undercut the appeal of APRA to the urban working class, 
/ 
The Odria administration obtained extensive social legislation 
in favor of the urban worker which took the form of creating a 
social security system and the building of hospitals and hous­
ing by the Fondo Nacional de Salud y Bienestar, 
/ 
Odria has been frank in the exposition of his reasons for 
fomenting legislative measures in the interests of the urban 
working class. He has stated that domestic peace could only 
have been obtained through extensive social reforms which were 
necessary in order to undercut the power of APRA within the 
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urban working class. In the words of Odria, 
"Kl odlo y la lucha de clases serabrado en nuestrc 
medio social por la acclon nefasta del aprismo 
solo ha podido ser superado y desterrado medlante 
la firme polltlca democratlca y las transcendontaleu 
reformas sociales realizadas por la Reyolucion 
Restauradora,,, La obra de la Revolucion Restauradora 
ha sido fecunda en el orden politico, porque puso 
définitive atajo al sectarismo que amenazaba a 
nuestra democracia, y el orden social en el que 
se han operado Importantes reformas que constituyen 
conquistas aun no alcanzadas en otms pal s es, 
Estas^fueron implantadas para establecer la 
armonia entre el Capital y el Trabajo a fin de 
desterrar a la acci&n esteril y nefasta del 
aprismo,,," (31, p. 13O) 
Odria maintained a substantial public expenditure program 
which served to provide a high level of employment. His pro­
gram of social reform, however, did not extended to the campe-
/ 
sino, Odria identified himself with the campesinos' ideal of 
land ownership, but refused to undertake land reform, Odria's 
policy was: 
"Mo se trata ni de dlvidir la gran propiedad 
costena ni de desposeer a los propietarlos del 
predio and1no," (31) 
Odria suggested that the campesino could achieve his ideal of 
land ownership by the expansion of the Sierra land base by 
means of irrigation. It is noted, however, that although Odria 
referred to the Sierra as the potential granary of Peru, only 
lacking modern technology (31), agricultural policy concen­
trated on coastal industrial agriculture because of its foreign 
exchange earning potential (33), The campesino, however, did 
not have an important role to play in the revitalization of the 
export economy. Rural peace was required, but the campesino 
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appeared willing to remain orderly without social reform while 
the urban working class, under the leadership of APRA, was not 
willing to remain orderly without reform. Hence, social leg­
islation for the urban working class was a high priority for 
Odria while rural reform was not seriously considered. 
The performance of the Peruvian economy under the manage­
ment of the Odria administration can be analyzed through the 
behavior of major economic variables in the recorded national 
income accounts. 
The fundamental shift In economic policy after the Odria 
coup of 1948 did not bring immediate improvement in the per­
formance of the economy. According to Carey (8, p, 119), Peru 
found the period from 19^6 to the outbreak of the Korean War 
to be a very difficult time. The return to the free exchange 
rate in 19^9 in addition to the certificate rate raised the 
Sol price of the dollar to S/,18,10, but neither devaluation 
nor incentives to foreign capital can generate the required 
exports for economic expansion in a raw material exporting 
country in the short-run, unless substantial idle capacity is 
on hand. The development of natural resources into commodity 
exports requires favorable world market conditions and a sub­
stantial gestation lag between the decision to Invest and the 
inception of marketable exports. 
World market conditions for Peruvian exports improved 
dramatically with the outbreak of the Korean War in June of 
1949, The impact of the Korean War on the Peruvian economy 
can be appreciated from its performance, during the early 
1950*8, The recorded data in the national income accounts for 
1950 already include part of the impact, however, in 1951 the 
foreign exchange earnings of all major export products increas­
ed over their respective 1950 levels, except for crude petro­
leum, Export earnings rose from 198,4 millions of U, S, dol­
lars in 1950 to 259.1 millions in 1951» predominantly through 
increased export prices which increased the terms-of trade 
effect from S/,1737.5 millions of 1963 soles in 1951 to 
S/,3229,9 millions in 1952, Urider such substantial stimula­
tion from the export sector. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
increased 6,9% during 1951 while Gross Domestic Income (GDI), 
influenced by the rise in export prices, rose 9.9^» as record­
ed in Table 1, Likewise, the termination of the Korean War in 
1952 initiated a reduction in world demand for Peru's raw 
material exports which is reflected in the sharp decline in the 
terms-of-trade effect in 1952, Foreign exchange earnings, in 
spite of export volume increases, declined* in 195% and yet 
again in 1953 due to export price declines. The end of 1953 
/ 
brought an economic and financial crisis to Odria's adminis­
tration, which was fomented by both external and internal 
factors. Although production and the terms-of-trade improved 
in 1954', the last years of the Odria administration marked the 
beginning of a further economic crisis which led to the severe 
economic problems of 1958-1959 under the second administration 
of President Prado, 
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Table 1, Gross domestic product, the terms-of-trade effect 
and gross domestic income under the administration 
of Odria 195.0-1956 (in millions of 1963 Soles 
Gross domestic Annual Terms of- Gross domestic Annual 
product growth trade income growth 
(GDP) rate effect (GDI) rate 
1950 44110,5 1737.5 45848,0 
1951 • 47148,3 6,9# 3229.9 50378,2 9.9# 
1952 49798.1 5.6 1655.5 51453.6 2,1 
1953 52210,? 4.8 1938.1 53248,8 3.5 
1954 55128,6 5.6 1296,2 56424,8 6 , 0  
1955 57257.0 3.9 1475.1 58732,1 4,1 
1956 59231.6 3.5 1839.3 61070,9 4,0 
Average 5.1 4,9 
^Source: (18), 
The economic expansion derived from the export growth 
under the stimulus of the Korean War constituted a revitaliza-
tion of Peru's export economy; output expanded, employment 
conditions improved and public revenues increased. To a large 
degree the Odria administration succeeded in restraining cur­
rent public expenditures while expanding capital expenditures. 
Table 2 records the relation of public consumption and public 
Investment expenditures to the total budget of the public sec­
tor and the relation of the total public budget to GDI, It 
can be appreciated from Table 2, that the portion of total 
public expenditures used for public consumption declined from 
a high of 48,7# in 1950 to a low of 37,1^ in 1956 while the 
incidence of public investment rose from 15,6% in 1950 to a 
Table 2. Total public expenditures, public consunç>tion, and public investment under the Ordia 
administration 1950-1956 {in millions of 1963 Soles)® 
Total public Relation of Public Relation of Public Relation of 
expenditures G to gross 
domestic income 
consumption C9 to G investment to G 
G G/GDI C9 C9/G l9 I^/G 
1950 6254.0 13.6% 3046.3 48.7% 973.6 15.6% 
1951 7425.4 14.7 3132.6 42.2 1931.3 26.0 
1952 8438.5 16.4 3515.8 41.7 2355.6 27.9 
1953 8635.7 16.2 , 3581.9 41.5 2528.1 29.3 
1954 8708.9 15.4 4117.5 47.3 1796.3 20.6 
1955 10871.6 18.5 4107.3 37.8 3248.6 29.9 
1956 11587.6 19.0 4304.2 37.1 2656.3 22.9 
^Sources (20). 
hl%h of 29.92 in 1955._ 
The financing of Odrla's investment program came pre­
dominantly from savings on current account which were made 
possible by the large increase of public revenue in the rapid 
economic growth of the early 1950's. It is clear from Table 3 
that savings on current account, S®, represented a much great­
er part of the financing of public investment than did public 
foreign capital inflow. The rapidly accelerating public 
expenditure program, in view of the deteriorating economic 
situation in 1952 and 1953, outran the capacity to finance it 
from non-inflationary sources in 1953 when the Central Govern­
ment sustained a deficit which derived from extra expenditures 
for a government salary increase, the meat subsidy, and public 
works which was financed by internal bond sales (31, P. 17). 
Nevertheless, the rate of Inflation increased slightly from 
3,8# in 1952 to 4,4# In 1953 which did not help to alleviate 
the crucial balance of payments difficulties facing the econ­
omy. 
On eliminating foreign exchange control, the official 
exchange rate rose to the free market rate of S/,l8,10 to the 
U, S, dollar in 1949. Under the export expansion due to the 
improvement in world demand conditions at the time of the 
Korean War, the Peruvian Sol had appreciated to S/,14,85 to 
the U, S, dollar. The strong expansion of foreign exchange 
earnings permitted a large increase of Imports in 1952 as well 
as an Increase in international monetary reserves of 6,5 
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Table 'j, The relation of savings on current account and 
public foreign capital Inflow to the level of 
investment under the Odria administration (in 
millions of 1963 Soles)®' 
Public 
investment 
I« 
Current 
savings 
38 ' 
Total foreign public 
capital inflow 
mk 
^2 
S^/I® Tp/l® 
1950 973.6 1370.6 117,0 141.0# : 12,1# 
1951 1931.3 1793.3 54.0 93.0 2,8 
1952 2355.5 1819.8 87.0 77.4 3.7 
1953 2528.1 1572,4 186.0 66.2 7.4 
1954 1796,3 1392.4 138,0 77.5 7.7 
1955 3248,6 2280,6 990,0 80.3 30,5 
1956 2656,3  2303.2 407,0 86.9 15.3 
^'Source; (20), 
million U, 3, dollars. The decline in foreign exchange earn­
ings, principally due to declining export prices in the post-
Korean War period reduced the capacity-to-import while import 
demand continued to rise. It is clear from Table 4 that 
import demand exceeded the capacity-to-import in 1952 and 1953 
engendering losses in the level of international monetary re­
serves of 1,5 millions of U, 3, dollars in 1952 and 6,3 mil­
lions in 1953. Faced with this situation, the Odria adminis­
tration allowed the Peruvian Sol to devalue to S/,19,53 at the 
end of 1953. In order to reduce the rate of inflation which 
would be exacerbated by the devaluation, Odria opted for a 
temporary stabilization program which involved a sharp reduc­
tion in the rate of Increase in public expenditures. 
Table 4. The balance of payments and the capacity-to-import under the Odria administration 
1950-1956 (in thousands of current dollars)® 
Categories 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
1. Exports (FOB) 198,448 259,075 245,677 228,274 254,294 281,184 320,178 
2. Net financial 
services -26,618 -16,500 -16,601 -11,169 31,970 -52,247 -45,754 
3, Net non-financial 
services -12,268 -20,859 -24,833 -27,988 -22,947 -37,206 -50,980 
4, Net transfers 1,332 1,448 3,694 4,821 7,802 7,713 11,304 
A. Current caoacitv 
to irroort 160.894 223.164 207.937 193.938 207,179 199.444 234,748 
5. Net long-term 
capital -3,186 23,850 42,473 62,411 -6,833 72,562 68,262 
6. Net short-term 
capital 13,676 10,857 -11,684 323 536 3,368 41,495 
B. Total caoacitv 
to imoort 171,384 257.871 238.726 256.672 200,882 275.374 344.505 
C, Import (FOB) 149,323 223,037 257.235 257,487 225,362 294,559 342.453 
D. Errors & omissions -19,692 28,381 16,920 -5,477 31,093 15,505 12,826 
E. International 
monetary reserves -2,369 -6,453 1,539 6,292 -6,613 3,680 -14,878 
^Source : (18). 
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The level of public Investment was reduced from S/,25?,8,1 
million^ In 1953 to 3/.1796.3 millions of 1963 soles in 1954. 
The Incidence of total public expenditures to GDI decreased 
from 16,2 in 1953 to 15.4% in 1954, while public investment as 
a percentage of G decreased from 29.3# in 1953 to 20.6# in 
1954 and public consumption Increased from 41,5# in 1953 to 
47,3# in 1954 of total public expenditures. Although a 
deficit in the Central Government budget was avoided in 1954, 
the rate of Inflation rose from 4,4# in 1953 to 10,2# in 1954 
due to the impact of the devaluation on the "cost of living". 
The devaluation of late 1953, the inception of iron ex­
ports from the new Marcona mines, the improvement in the export 
prices, a renewed public Investment effort and an increase in 
the Inflow of private foreign investment were factors that 
contributed to the continued Income growth of 1954-1957. The 
major economic difficulty in the management of the export 
economy when Odria left office and President Prado initiated 
his administration in July of 1956 was the condition of the 
public accounts, Odria's heavy program of public investment 
in 1955 and 1956 resulted in Central Government deficits which 
were financed, basically, by loans from the Central Reserve 
Bank of Peru, Furthermore, Odria's inception of public works 
and the raising of government salaries by decree prior to 
leaving office imposed an initial budget rigidity on the Prado 
regime, 
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The success elements of the management of the Peruvian 
export economy by the Odria administration are substantial. 
The realization that the key to continued economic growth Its 
the performance of the export sector fostered the enactment of 
legislation which would enhance the prospect of rapid develop­
ment of Peru's extensive, but latent natural resources. The 
capital and technological requirements of exploiting her 
natural resources meant that foreign capital would be required, 
i 
Seizing the potential complementary relation between the 
interests of Peruvian income growth and those of foreign capi-
/ 
tal, the Odria administration reversed the policy measures of 
the Bustamante y Rivero administration by eliminating economic 
controls and proceeded to enact measures that would make Peru 
an attractive environment for foreign capital. According to 
Ferrero, the factors primarily responsible for the sustained 
economic growth of Peru during 1950-1964 were; 
(1) The maintenance of a free economy, of prices, of 
foreign trade, of International payments, and of the 
exchange rate; 
(2) Limited rates of internal inflation and relative 
exchange rate stability; 
(3) Moderate taxation which does not discriminate 
against foreign enterprise; 
(4) Investment incentives for national and foreign 
capital, such as the Mining Code and laws for stimu­
lating industrial and electrical development; 
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(5) The contribution of foreign investment as a conse­
quence of the foregoing policies (11, p, 23), 
It is clear, from the preceding discussion, that the economic 
policy of the Odria administration laid the foundations for 
the factors considered uy Perrero as the primary inducements 
to Peru's economic growth during 1950-1964. 
The success of the Odria administration in achieving 
considerable income growth while maintaining balance of pay­
ments equilibrium and limiting the rate of inflation was com­
plemented by the successful achievement of domestic peace 
which was essential to the creation of a satisfactory environ­
ment for foreign capital inflow and economic progress. The 
maintenance of a strong central authority combined with ef­
fective social reform and ample employment via a public 
investment program was sufficient to attain civil peace in 
Peru. The economic effects of these policies are subject to 
criticism, but the necessity of achieving domestic peace for 
the successful operation of Peru's export economy is unques­
tionable, 
/ 
The most basic criticism of Odria's economic objectives is 
that he placed such a heavy weight on the export dominated 
modern sector of the economy that the weight placed on the 
evolution of the large traditional economy became bearly per­
ceptible, The decision to forego land reform and to focus 
agricultural policy on coastal industrial agriculture implies, 
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at best, the assumption chat the comparative rural peace would 
continue without requiring government sponsored reform. Fur­
thermore, it could be argued that Odria gave insufficient 
attention to the development of an internal market which would 
act to induce the expansion of the domestic industrial manu­
facturing sector. Economic policy was directed towards the 
effective generation of income within traditional socio-econo­
mic structures with little attention given to the task of 
achieving long-term economic and social development. Such 
policy orientation has contributed to the lack of expansion in 
domestic industrial activities as opposed to the dynamic growth 
of processed raw material exports, Ferrero has attributed the 
comparatively poor growth performance of domestic market 
industrial activities' to the low purchasing power of the 
population which is aggravated by a highly skewed distribution 
of income (11, p, 22), Although Odria enacted some basic re­
form legislation to improve the economic position of the urban 
worker, his preoccupation with the successful operation of the 
production aspects of the traditional export economy led to a 
neglect of those structural reforms which were required to 
improve the development prospects of Peru, 
{ 
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E, The administration of Prado 
(July 1956-June 1962) 
Manuel A, Prado, president of Peru from 1939 to the in­
ception of the Bustamante y Rivero administration in July of 
1945, was re-elected in the presidential election of 1956. 
Economic policy objectives do not appear to have played a 
significant part in the election. The two principal contenders 
in the election were Prado and Belaunde, Belaunde campaigned 
for a program of decentralization and help for the Sierra areas 
while Prado did not appear to have any clear program, Belaunde 
was a political newcomer whereas Prado was a familiar political 
entity with the record of a conservative yet accommodating 
regime to his credit, Prado, with the backing of Odria and 
APRA, m'anaged to defeat Belaunde without great difficulty. 
The economic policy objectives of the Prado administra­
tion appear to have been determined largely by circumstances. 
The Prado administration can be divided into three definite 
time periods, each period having distinct economic policy ob­
jectives, From July of 1956 through 1957, the principal policy 
objective appears to have been the strengthening of the public 
accounts in view of the commitments made by Odria with respect 
to government salary increases and public works projects. 
During 1958-1960 the major policy objective was stabilization 
which implied Inflation control and the restoration of balance 
of payments equilibrium. During I96I-I962 the stated objec­
tives of economic policy came to bear on the requirements of 
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long-term economic and social development. 
The lack of a clear program on the part of Prado and the 
condition of the public accounts on the departure of Odria 
appears to have placed inflation control via a reduction in 
public expenditures as a priority. Total public investment 
expenditure for 1956 was reduced from S/,3,248.6 millions of 
1963 soles in 1955 to S/,2,656,3 millions in 1956, As record­
ed in Tablé 5, public investment declined slightly to 
2,633.3 millions in 1957. The level of public consumption 
f 
increased from S/,4,303,2 millions in 1956 to 3/,5,167,0 mil­
lions in 1957, raising its incidence from 37.1^ to 42,6% of 
total public expenditures, reflecting the government salary 
increase decreed by Odria prioi^to leaving the presidency. 
Under public expenditure restraint, the rate of inflation de­
creased from 7*3% in 1956 to 4,0% in 1957 even though the 
Central Government budgetary deficit continued. 
The economic recovery in 195^ continued through 1957 as 
export earnings continued to increase, A 5,9% growth of Gross 
Domestic Product was achieved in 1957. However, import demand 
continued its rapid growth which was reinitiated after a tem­
porary "set-back" due to the late 1953 devaluation. Heavy 
private foreign capital inflow, much of it destined for the 
Toquepala copper mines, greatly expanded the capacity-to-
import in 1956 and 1957 although heavy contingent capital im­
ports reduced its net Contribution, After experiencing a 
l4,9 million U, S, dollar gain in International monetary 
Table 5. Total public expenditures, public consumption, and public investment under the Prado 
administration 1956-1962® 
Total puDlic Relation of Public Relation of Public Relation of 
expenditures G to gross consunption C9 to G investment l9 to G 
domestic income 
G G/GDI C9 C9/G l9 19/G 
1956 11,587.6 19.0% 4,303.2 37.1% 2,656.3 22.9% 
1957 12,141.1 18.9 5,167.0 42.6 2,633.3 21.7 
1958 12,420.2 19.6 5,099.4 41.1 1,931.3 15.6 
1959 10,975.7 16.8 5,631.6 51.3 1,027.1 9.4 
1960 13,416.8 18.4 6,577.5 49.0 1,235.9 9.2 
1961 17,828.3 23.5 7,981.5 44.8 2,709.4 15.2 
1962 17,105.8 21.2 8,531.8 49.9 2,025.4 11.8 
a 
Sources (18). 
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reserves in 1956,  a loss of 33.6 million was sustained in 1957 
as imports substantially exceeded the capacity-to-import. 
Export prices declined in 1957 to further complicate the bal­
ance of payments difficulty. The 1957 weakening of export 
prices was the initial indication of a phenomenal decline in 
export prices, due to the decline in world demand for Peru's 
raw material export stemming from the 1958 recession in the 
United States economy, which plunged Peru into the severe eco­
nomic crisis of 1958-1959. 
The sharp 1958 recession in the Peruvian economy forced a 
clear economic policy on the Prado administration, that is 
stabilization. The principal features of the stabilization 
effort, under the guidsince of the International Monetary Fund, 
were a reduction in public expenditures and the restoration of 
external equilibrium. As Table 5 indicates, the initial impact 
of stabilization on the public accounts was the reduction in 
the level of public investment and the "leveling-off"'of public 
consumption expenditures. The principal means used to restrict 
public expenditures was to restrict the granting of loans from 
the Central Reserve Bank to the Central Government and to limit 
the Central Reserve Bank financing of the state davelopment 
banks. In spite of efforts to restrict the level of credit, 
the rate of inflation reached 13.2# in 1958 and 13,4% in 1959 
principally due to the impact of the initial devaluation in 
1959 and the further devaluation of 1959.  
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Prado, realizing the need for an austerity program, in­
vited Pedro G, Beltran to direct the effort. After refusing 
in 1958, Beltran entered the cabinet in July of 1959. The 
entrance of Beltran into the cabinet as Premier and Minister 
of Finance had a significant psychological impact, Beltran 
had been very influential in the economic management of Peru's 
export economy under Odria, In the early years of the Prado 
administration, Beltran had been the leading figure in criti­
cizing the financial operation of the Central Government, The 
identification of Beltran with the desire to restrict govern­
ment expenditures, reduce Central Bank loans to the Central 
Government, and to reduce taxation inspired confidence in 
financial circles that the stabilization program would be suc­
cessful (5, P. ?•). 
The most severe year of the crisis was 19^8, Kxport 
earnings fell by 39,6 millions of U, S, dollars, GDP increased 
only 0,8# and GDI decreased by -1,6% due to the impact of de­
clining export prices, the rate of inflation jumped to 13,2# 
and a 13,4 million,U,^, dollar decline in the level of inter­
national monetary reserves, was sustained. In 1959 the econom­
ic outlook brightened considerably. Although export prices 
continued to fall, the volume of exports turned sharply upwards 
as the initial impact was felt of what was to become a spec­
tacular rise in exports through the bringing of the Toquepala 
copper mine into production and the phenomenal growth of the 
Peruvian fishmeal industry. The Peruvian Sol was devalued to 
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3/,27,00 to the U, 3, dollar which acted to sustain a 13,4^ 
rate of inflation in spite of the sharp reduction in public 
expenditures, Neverthëless,; GDP expanded at 3.9^, the budget­
ary deficit was closed via expenditure cuts and tax increases, 
such as an increase in Import duties and in gasoline taxes, 
and the level of international monetary reserves Increased by 
17,4 million IJ, 3, dollars. The combination of import duty 
Increases and devaluation sharply reduced the level of imports 
which when balanced against the Increase in export earnings 
yielded an excess of the capacity-to-import over the level of 
imports, as recorded in Table 6, 
In i960 the Peruvian economy recovered spectacularly. As 
recorded in Table 7, the rate of GDP growth jumped to 10,2^, 
while an improvement in export prices allowed an 11,4% increase 
In GDI, The fundamental determining factor in the recovery, 
as indicated above, was the large increase in export produc­
tion, Export earnings leapt from 322,6 million U, 3, dollars 
in 1959 to 444,3 million in i960. The rate of Inflation de­
clined to 8,1# and the level of international monetary reserves 
Increased by 32,7 million U, S, dollars. The level of public 
expenditures, however, did not respond to the Improved economic 
situation until 196I, 
As recorded in Table 8 the level of public sector current 
savings (3®), had declined to S/,848,9 millions in 1959 In 
spite of the effort to reduce expenditures. The major explan­
atory factor for the decline in current saving is that the tax 
Table 6. The balance of payments and capacity-to-inç>ort under the Prado administration 
(in thousands of current dollars)® 
Categories 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 
1. Exports (FOB) 320,178 331,468 291,839 322,615 444,347 510,152 555,994 
2. Net financial 
services -45,754 -46,241 -35,199 -47,788 -65,876 -66,652 -67,075 
3. Net non-financial 
services -50,980 -55,978 -49,011 -44,194 -50,210 -54,082 -65,920 
4. Net transfers 11,304 17,503 14,732 9,866 20,612 26,837 18,179 
A. Current caoacitv 
to imoort 234,748 246.752 222.361 240.499 348.853 416.255 441.178 
5. Net long-term 
capital 68,262 118,361 93,417 48,871 13,772 1,683 36,748 
6. Net short-term 
capital 41,495 9,074 9,242 320 8,999 13,647 26,987 
B. Total caoacitv 
to injDort 344.505 374.187 325.020 289.690 371.624 431.585 504.913 
C. Imports (FOB) 342.453 402.127 344.674 280.534 340.990 428.613 478.371 
D. Errors & omission 12,826 -5,623 6,284 8,287 2,089 31,311 -20,265 
E. International 
monetary reserves -14,878 33,563 13,370 -17,443 -32,723 -34,283 -6,277 
^Sources (18). 
Table 7. Gross domestic product, the terms-of-trade effect, and gross domestic income under the 
Prado administration (in millions of 1963 Soles)® 
Gross domestic 
product GDP 
Annual 
growth rate 
Terms-of 
trade effect 
Gross domestic 
income GDI 
Annual 
growth rate 
1956 59,231.6 3.5% 1,839.3 61,070.9 4.0% 
1957 62,747.8 5.9 1,542.2 64,290.0 5.3 
1958 63,244.2 0.8 24.1 63,268.3 —1.6 
1959 65,768.8 3.9 -403.0 65,365.8 3.3 
1960 72,453.7 10.2 347.1 72,800.8 11.4 
1961 76,674.1 5.8 -828.9 75,845.2 4.0 
1962 80,933.4 5.6 -428.6 80,504.8 6.1 
^Sources (18). 
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Table 8, The relation of savings on current account and 
public foreign capital inflow to the level of public 
investment under the Prado administration (in 
millions of 1963 .'joles)^ 
Public 
investment 
Current 
savings 
Total foreign public 
capital inflow 
rpk 
Tkyi% 
1956 2,656.3 2,303.2 407,0 86,9# 15.3# 
1957 2,633.3 1,834.8 618.0 69.8 23.5 
1958 1,931.3 1,166.7  531.0 60,4 27.5 
1959 1,027.1 848,9 369.0 82,7 35.9 
i960 1,235.9 2,517.2 378,0.  203.7 30.6 
1961 2,709,4 2,494.0 715.4 92.0 26.4 
1962 2,025.4 1,792.2 1,435.6 88.5 70.8 
*aource: (20), 
revenue receipts of the public sector are sensitive to the 
decline of overall economic activity. In particular, the 
reliance on import duties for a large part of the public 
revenue means that the effort to achieve balance of payments 
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equilibrium through Increased Import duties and devaluation 
reduces the revenue to the public sector substantially. 
Indeed, indirect tax revenue fell from S/,5,387,8 millions of 
1963 soles in 1957 to S/,4,852,4 millions in 1958 and rose 
slightly to S/,5,014,4 millions in 1959. Beltran continued to 
restrain the level of public investment in I96O in spite of 
the recovery of public revenues which resulted in the achieve­
ment of S/,2,517.2 millions in public sector current savings. 
With economic recovery achieved, largely due to the be­
havior of the private sector rather than through the stabili­
zation efforts of the Prado Administration, the stage was set 
for another shift in the economic policy objectives of the 
Prado Administration, 
In 1961 the relative priorities among the major economic 
policy objectives shifted. During the 1958-1959 crisis, the 
highest priority was given to monetary stability and balance 
of payments equilibrium. With the recovery of the economy in 
i960 led by a strong export expansion which alleviated the 
balance of payments situation and inflationary pressure (i.e., 
through the ability to supplement domestic supply with Imports 
under conditions of ample foreign exchange earnings) the ob­
jective of attaining a high rate of income growth received 
highest priority. Indeed, the drive to attain income expan­
sion was placed within the context of accelerating economic 
and social development via a coordinated, or planned, approach. 
Although Beltran, with future presidential aspirations, entered 
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the Prado administration with a program of "Techo y Tierra" 
(i,e,, "Roof and Land") which was designed to emphasize that 
his concern was not only to combat inflation but also to pro­
mote general social welfare, the appearance of the term of 
i 
reference, "a coordinated,, or planned, approach to economic 
and social development" appears to have origins other than 
Beltran. 
Yet, in spite of the conservative nature of the Prado 
administration, it initiated the process of economic and social 
development planning in Peru» The explanation of this apparent 
anomaly is the influence of international factors on the Prado 
administration. 
Apparently, from the end of 1959, when the recovery of the 
economy was evident, international agencies, such as the Inter­
national Monetary Fund and the World Bank, counselled Peru on 
the advantages of instituting a development planning process; 
the original concept being that such a process would Improve 
the effectiveness of Peru's public expenditures program and 
allow more rational selection of development projects for 
international financial support. This initial inroad was 
strongly reinforced by the formation of the Alliance for Pro­
gress in 1961, of which Peru was a charter member. Under the 
Alliance for Progress, Peru became obligated to undertake eco­
nomic and social planning the results of which in the form of 
a national plan were to be submitted to the Alliance for Pro­
gress representatives. Thus it was under the stimulus of 
4] 
external influence that Peru initiated the process of national 
economic and social development planning which led to the 
formation of the National, Planning System in 146%, 
The Prado administration, scheduled to leave office in 
July of 1962, did not have time to achieve any significant 
alterations ih the Peruvian economic and social structure under 
the Alliance for Progress, except for the initiation of the 
planning process. Economic expansion continued during 1961 
and 1962 under the export boom, led by fishmeal, in spite of a 
deterioration in the overall terms-of-trade. Two features of 
1961-1962 were prophetic of the future: 1) the rapid rise of 
public expenditures which for the first time exceeded 20% of 
GDI in 1961 and 2) the record level of public foreign capital 
inflow in 1962, The Prado administration, of course, did not 
complete its full term in office as the military under General 
Perez Godoy annulled the presidential election of 1962 and 
forced Prado from office in July of I962, only weeks before 
the completion of his term of office. The motivating factor 
of the military coup, however, was political rather than eco­
nomic, The military junta charged that the 196P. election was 
fraudulent and arranged for new elections in 1963, 
lilconomic policy under Prado can be viewed as an extension 
of economic policy under Odria, It is subject, therefore, to 
approximately the same success and failure elements as the 
Odria administration. The fundamental success element being 
the maintenance of an attractive investment climate for foreign 
capital which enabled the realization of the Toquepala copper 
mines and aided the rapid expansion of the fishmeal industry, 
which in turn allowed the recovery of the economy in i960. The 
fundamental failure element was the overwhelming attention paid 
to the successful operation of the traditional economic and 
social system which led to indifference to structural reform, 
F, The Administration of Belaunde 
(July 1963- ) 
The military junta of July I962 to July 196] was a "care­
taker" government. The issue at hand was the election of 1962, 
not the conduct of government policy. Hence, no fundamental 
changes occurred under the military junta. One factor of note 
is that the National Planning System was established under the 
junta, but this achievement was the culmination of the post-
1960 concern with the establishment of an economic and social 
development planning process in Peru, It did not represent a 
break with the trend of events deriving from the Prado adminis­
tration. 
As promised, the military junta held presidential elec­
tions In June of 1963. Belaunde won the election, defeating 
Haya de la Torre and Odria, 
Belaunde entered the presidency during the period of rapid 
economic growth. The spectacular recovery of the economy 
turned Into a period of sustained rapid expansion as fishmeal 
exports continued to increase rapidly. Table 9 records that 
in 1964, GDP expanded by 6,0% while GDI grew by 9,1# due to a 
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Table 9, Gross domestic product, the terms-of-trade effect 
and gross domestic income (in millions of 1963 
soles) 
Gross domestic 
product 
• GDP 
Annual 
growth 
rate 
Terms-of 
trade 
effect 
Gross domestic 
Income 
GDI 
AnnuaJ 
growth 
rate 
1963 85,031.0 85,031.0 
1964 90,166,2 6.0% 2,571.6 92,737.8 9.1% 
1965 95,641,4 6.1 1,710,2 97,551.6 5.2 
1966 101,591.9 6,2 3,783.8 105,375.7 8.1 
substantial improvement in export prices. The following year, 
1965, a 6,1% growth in GDP and a 5,2% expansion of GDI was 
attained as the terms-of-trade deteriorated. The INP estimate 
for 1966 is that GDP grew at 6,2% and GDI expanded at 8,1% due 
to a substantial rise in export prices, especially for copper. 
Besides•spurring income growth, export earning brought strength 
to the balance of payments (see Table 10), The leveling off 
of export earning in 1963 while import demand continued to grow 
resulted in imports exceeding the capacity-to-import, although 
the level of international reserves increased by 18,5 million 
U, S, dollars due to a large error in the recorded value of 
foreign exchange Inflow, An increase in import duties In 
1964', which retarded the expansion of demand for imported 
goods, combined with the strong rise in export earnings kept 
the level of imports within the capacity-to-import and gener­
ated a 25,0 million U, S, dollar rise in the level of 
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Table 10, "Strength of balance of payments" under the Belaunde 
administration (in millions of current dollars) 
Categories 1963 1964 1965 1966 
1, Exports (FOB) 555.1 684,6 686,6 786,5 
?!. Net financial services -73.0 -72,3 -86,3 -117.8 
3. Net non-financial service -64,9 -59.3 -107.3 -112,8 
4, Net transfers 19,0 l4,8 24,1 28,5 
A, Current capacity to import 4?6,2 567,8 517,1 584,4 
5. Net long-term capital 56.3 86,0 128.6 219.1 
6. Net short-term capital 
-9.7 -45.6 44,3 -27.9 
Be Total capacity to import 482.8 608.2 690,0 775,6 
c. Imports (FOB) 217,9 517,7 659,7 746,2 
D. Errors & omissions 53.7 -29.5 
\ 
-25.0 
-15.6 -51,6 
E. International monetary 
reserves -18.5 -14,7 22,2 
international monetary reserves. In I966, however, a large in­
crease in imports resulted in the loss of 22,2 million U, S, 
dollars in international monetary reserves in spite of a sub­
stantial increase in export earnings and a high level of net 
long-term capital inflow. The rapid increase in government 
expenditures which resulted in the fifth consecutive deficit 
in the Central Government budget and the rapid increase of 
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commercial bank credit led'to'rapid inflation in 1965 which, 
in view of a constant exchange rate, accelerated import demand. 
As recorded in Table 11 the incidence of total government 
expenditures on the level of GDI increased from in I963 
to 25.3/^ in 1965, in spite of rapid GDI growth. Indeed, dur­
ing the 1960-1965 period, total government expenditures in­
creased about two-and-a-half times as fast as GDI, Although 
heavy emphasis has been placed on a high level of public in­
vestment, the level of public consumption expenditures has also 
increased rapidly under the Belaunde Administration, The fi­
nancing of a strong public investment program under Belaunde 
represents a sharp contrast to prior Peruvian experience. The 
level of public foreign capital inflow has come to participate 
more heavily in the financing of public investment than at any 
time in the post-1945 period. The complete statement of the 
1 
public accounts for 1966 is not yet available , however, the 
most recent balance of payments data from the Central Reserve 
Bank of Peru Indicates that total public foreign public capital 
inflow reached the record high of S/,5,912,1 in 1963 soles. 
Public investment in I966 definitely exceeded the 1965 level 
while savings on current account may have become negative dur­
ing 1966, These factors indicate that the participation of 
foreign public capital inflow in the level of public investment 
increased substantially in 1966, Under the pressure of 
^September 1967, 
Table 11. Total public expenditures, public consunption, and public investment under the 
Belaunde administration 1963-1965 (in millions of 1963 Soles 
Total public 
expenditures 
G 
Relation of 
G to gross 
domestic income 
G/GDI 
Public 
consunption 
C9 
Relation of 
eg to G 
C^ /G 
Public 
investment 
Relation of 
l9 to G 
l9/G 
1963 19,957.9 
1964 23,049.d 
1965 25,104.7 
23.5% 
24.9 
25.3 
9,715.2 
10,870.4 
12,085.0 
48.7% 
47.2 
49.0 
2,855.2 
4,069.6 
3,861.0 
14.4% 
17.6 
15.7 
^Sources (18). CO 
1 
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continuous Central Government deficits and rapid expansion of 
commercial bank credit, the rate of inflation increased from 
Q,Qfo in 1964 to 15.2% in I965. In 1966 the rate of inflation 
was reduced to below 10^ by a restriction on public and private 
credit, although the Belaunde administration's concept of the 
role of the public sector as a dynamic force in the development 
effort led to a more severe restriction of private credit than 
of public credit. The economic policy objectives of the 
Belaunde administration, as expressed in Belaunde's 1966 pres­
idential address to the National Congress are 1) the mainten­
ance of a constant exchange rate,^ 2) a high level of employ­
ment, and 3) the expansion of production (13, P. %IV), Through 
1966, the Belaunde administration met with considerable suc­
cess in terms of the stated objectives. As discussed above, 
GDP expanded rapidly during I963-1966 and a constant exchange 
rate was maintained. Furthermore, a high level of employment 
was maintained due to the combination of rapid growth within 
the private sector, the acceleration of public employment and 
the employment effects of public investment projects. 
^The devaluation of the Peruvian Sol in September 196? 
marked the failure of this economic policy objective. It is 
clear, however, that the maintenance of a constant exchange 
rate is a means rather than an objective of economic policy. 
In a sense, Belaunde's objective with regard to the exchange 
rate was a "proxy variable" for an income distribution objec­
tive, which was to avoid a shift in the distribution of income 
in favor of the Peruvian exporters. 
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The success of the Belaiipide administration through I966 
was founded on three essential factors; (1) the strong expan­
sion of export earnings, (2) the availability of public foreign 
capital, and (3) the maintenance of the traditional free econ­
omy that fostered investment activity. Of these three factors, 
the strong expansion of export earnings was the most important. 
The rapid expansion of export earnings provided the fundamental 
thrust to Peru's rapid income growth in the post-1960 period. 
Besides contributing heavily to output expansion and consider­
able employment expansion, high export earnings greatly expand­
ed Peru's foreign debt servicing capacity which encouraged 
extensive public foreign capital inflow, gave strength to the 
balance of payments, acted to restrain the rate of inflation by 
permitting substantial imports to supplement domestic supply, 
and provided the large required foreign exchange component for 
the high level of investment activity attained during the 
/ 
Belaunde administration. The major positive contribution of 
the Belaunde administration with respect to the management of 
the Peruvian export economy has been its defense of the bene-
1 fits of private foreign capital to Peruvian economic growth. 
Incentives have been given for encouraging investment, exchange 
2 
controls have been avoided', tax measures have not been 
^The continuing controversy with the International Petro­
leum Company might constitute an exception, 
2 Jixchange control in the form of a foreign exchange cer­
tificate system was imposed after the September I967 devalua­
tion. 
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discriminatory toward foreign capital, and Belaunde has resist­
ed political pressure to expropriate foreign enterprises. Such 
policies have maintained the factors which have been stated to 
be primarily responsible for the sustained economic growth of 
Peru during 1950-1964 (il, p, 23). The main criticism of 
y 
Belaunde's management of the export economy is the substantial 
degree of inflation incurred during 1963-1966. Rapid internal 
inflation, by Peru's standards, in view of a constant exchange 
rate has brought strong import demand and has reduced export 
profitability. Consequently, cotton production, a major 
Peruvian export product, has declined and the fishmeal indus­
try has suffered from declining profit margins. In effect, 
the policies of the Belaunde administration which have encour­
aged a high rate of inflation have undermihed the objective of 
maintaining a stable exchange rate,^ 
A major source of inflation has been the continuing defi­
cits in the public budget. Furthermore, the contracting of 
short-term loans from foreign commercial banks to partially 
offset the deficits has burdened the balance of payments with 
the corresponding financial charges. 
Outside of the concern with the management of Peru's ex­
port economy, the Belaunde administration appears to have made 
^The devaluation of the Peruvian Sol in September of 196? 
was largely brought about by this failure element of Belaunde»s 
management of the export economy. 
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progress towards the achievement of rapid economic and social 
development via the evolutionary path of the Alliance for Pro­
gress, Indications of such progress are the implementation of 
the development planning process via the National Planning 
System, the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1964, the 
formation of Cooperacion Popular, rapid increase in educational 
expenditures, the building of infrastructure so as to bring 
Peru's "forgotten provinces" into the market economy, and the 
expansion of the domestic industrial sector. However, it may 
be that to these indications of progress are more apparent 
than real. 
The Belaunde administration has emphasized the role of the 
public sector in the developmental process. The increased par­
ticipation of the state in the developmental process is consid­
ered necessary in order to complement the effort of the private 
sector through the mobilization of basically non-competitive 
resources for the pursuit of activities with a high social 
marginal productivity, but an insufficient private marginal 
productivity to attract private enterprise. Indeed, the rapid 
Increase In public expenditures under Belaunde has increased 
its incidence with respect to GDI from 23,5% in 1963 to 2.5,3% 
in 1965, In spite of rapid GDI growth. However, it should be 
noted that the expanded role of the public sector under 
Belaunde is a continuation of a post-1950 trend. It is noted 
that the incidence of public expenditures to GDI rose from a 
low 13.6^ in 1950 to 23.5# in I961, 
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The continued expansion of the incidence of public expen­
ditures to GDI under Belaunde therefore does not appear to con­
stitute a structural change in the Peruvian economic environ­
ment, However, the financing of the expansion does represent 
a structural change. 
Two significant factors with respect to the financing of 
the public sector under Belaunde are noted in Table 13; (1) the 
rapid décline of savings on current account and the rapid in­
crease in'foreign public capital inflow. The strong expansion 
of public consumption expenditures and other current expendi­
tures, such as transfers to the private sector, combined with 
a tax structure that is unresponsive to increases in GDI has 
led to the virtual disappearance of savings on current account, 
in spite of increases in tax rates. The financing of public 
Investment has come, therefore^ to depend heavily on public 
foreign capital inflow as well as internal deficit financing. 
In contrast, the heavy public investment expenditures of the 
/ 
Odria regime were overwhelmingly financed by savings on cur­
rent account. The increasing international concern with the 
problems of economic and social development during the decade 
of the 1950's which led to the formation of the Alliance for 
Progress and the availability of International development cap­
ital from other sources presented the Belaunde administration 
with the opportunity to undertake public investment projects 
with public foreign loans, an opportunity which was not avail-
/ 
able to the same extent to the Odria administration. By taking 
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advantage of the availability of public foreign capital, the 
Belaunde administration has been able to expand the role of 
the public sector without being faced by the necessity of re­
forming the Peruvian tax structure. Under this set of circum­
stances, it is difficult to accept the position that the in­
creased role of the public sector in the development process 
under Belaunde constitutes the achievement of a structural 
change in the Peruvian environment that improves the prospects 
of a successful Peruvian effort to achieve rapid economic and 
social development via the evolutionary path endorsed by the 
Alliance for Progress, Rather, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that the increased availability of public foreign 
capital has allowed Peru to postpone a needed tax reform, 
which. Indeed, Is one of the structural changes emphasized as 
urgent In the Charter of Punta del Este, 
Another structural change which may be more apparent than 
real is the implementation of the National Planning System 
which was conceived as a means to improve the effectiveness of 
the public sector in fostering economic and social development. 
The influence of the National Planning System on the economic 
decision-making process appears to be negligible. The tradi­
tional decision-making role of the Central Heserve Bank and 
the Ministry of Finance continues without significant modifica­
tion. Perhaps the fundamental difficulty in effectively imple­
menting the National Planning System is the lack of understand­
ing of what role It should have in the decision-making process. 
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With respect to the National Planning Institute (Institute 
Nacional de Planificacion), Belaunde has stated that an under­
standing of the exact function of the institution is lacking 
(4, p. 18?,), The lack of appreciation of the potential con­
tribution of the National Planning System to Peru's development 
effort may have greatly influenced its deficient performance. 
The enactment of the Agrarian Reform Law in 1964 appeared 
to constitute the achievement of a significant structural re­
form that also received priority in the Charter of Punta del 
Este, However, the agrarian reform effort has never received 
the degree of financial support provided by the Agrarian Re­
form Law, 
Currently, the agrarian reform process continues, parti­
cularly in the politically sensitive areas of the Central 
Sierra, Puno, and the La Convencion valley, although under­
financed and receiving low-priority. 
The industrial sector has grown rapidly since the enact­
ment of the Industrial Promotion Laws in 1959. Although indus­
trial value added has expanded substantially during the 
Belaunde administration, industrial progress has been less than 
the growth rate indicates. The most dynamic industrial activ­
ities have been fishmeal production and mineral refining, both 
basic export activities. The domestic-market industrial pro­
duction has lagged well behind the industrial export activi­
ties, The high rates of effective tariff protection have en­
couraged high cost, low volume production which reaches the 
56 
consumer at correspondingly high prices. Furthermore, the 
development of the industrial sector has been restrained by 
the smallness of the domestic market due to a limited popula­
tion on market size is magnified by the fact that virtually 
one-half of the Peruvian 'population remains outside of the mar-
' i 
ket economy. In addition, a nighly skewed income distribution, 
I 
with the higher income consumers biased in favor of imported 
products, maghifles the effect of a low per capita income on 
domestic market size. The lack of incentives to increase the 
productive efficiency of industrial production for the domestic 
market has led to production costs out of line with interna­
tionally competitive cost standards and, therefore, closes the 
export market to the majority of the industrial activities. 
Furthermore, the industrial sector lacks vertical integration. 
High protective tariffs have encouraged the establishment of 
assembly and packaging plants which are predominately depen­
dent on imported raw materials. The reduced size of the in­
dustrial capital good producing activities makes the industrial 
sector heavily dependent on capital good imports. In addition, 
domestically produced capital goods require substantial im­
ports of inputs (l.e,, in I963, 76,3^ of the inputs used in 
the production of capital goods was imported). In addition, 
the Integration of the industrial sector with the agricultural 
and mining sectors is minimal. The production of industrial 
Inputs for agricultural production activities is still in its 
infancy; industrial processing of agricultural output remains 
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minimal^although some progress has been made .:n recent years; 
the products of the metal refining industry are almost exclu­
sively exported} and the industrial inputs into mining are 
almost exclusively imported. Hence, although the value added 
to the Industrial sector has grown rapidly under the Belaunde 
administration, the progress of the industrial sector has not 
greatly altered the traditional Peruvian export economy, 
G, Concluding Observations 
1) The foremost conclusion which can be drawn from this 
chapter is that the effort to improve the material well-being 
of the Peruvian population must be based upon the skilful 
management of the Peruvian export economy. It is essential 
that substantial incentives be provided to the export sector 
as the level of export earnings is the most important single 
variable in the achievement of a high rate of income growth. 
Furthermore, a High level of export earnings lends "strength" 
to the balance of payments and helps to control the rate of 
internal inflation. As the Peruvian authorities cannot effec­
tively influence world prices for exports, policy attention 
should be given to increasing production for export through 
capacity expansion and diversification. The extensive natural 
resources of Peru will be extremely difficult to exploit with-
f 
out the aid of foreign capital and technology. Economic poli­
cy, therefore, must provide incentives to foreign capital. One 
of the principal factors in determining the attractiveness of 
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the Investment climate is the maintenance of a stable exchange 
rate without resort to foreign exchange controls. The Peruvian 
government can improve its good record with respect to exchange 
rate stability in a free market by further restricting the rate 
of internal inflation. One of the principal causes of inter­
nal inflation has been the financing of Central Government 
budget deficits by loans obtained from the Central Reserve 
Bank and private foreign loans. It would be more advisable to 
push for a thorough reform of the taxation system so as to 
improve the responsiveness of tax revenue collections to income 
growth in order to finance an expanded role of the public sec­
tor in the development effort,^ The reliance on deficit fi­
nancing and foreign loans and the avoidance of a clash on 
essential tax reform only delays a vital structural reform of 
the Peruviafï economy, 
2) The successful operation of the export economy, how­
ever, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the 
economic and social development of Peru, As emphasized in the 
Charter of Punta del Este, structural reforms are essential to 
the developmental effort. With respect to Peru, the fundamen­
tal structural reform is the widening of the distribution of 
gains from the export economy. Experience supports the con­
tention of the Belaunde administration that the role of the 
^An analysis of potential tax reform is presented in Chap­
ter VI, B, 
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public sector in the developmental process is crucial. On the 
revenue side, the tax structure can act to reduce the inequal­
ity of the distribution of gains through progressive taxation 
of personal and corporate Income. Furthermore, increased pub­
lic revenues can then be used to improve the economic and so­
cial position of the traditionally under-privileged groups in 
the country, particularly by the provision of educational, 
health, and housing opportunities. The provision of infra­
structure In the form of roads and irrigation can additionally 
Improve the economic and social condition of the members of 
the traditional economy of the Sierra. Furthermore, an im­
proved financial position of the public sector would permit a 
more determined agrarian reform effort which could substantial­
ly improve conditions In the Sierra, particularly when combined 
with the provision of technical assistance and basic infra­
structure, The heavy resource demands of the effort to improve 
economic and social conditions in Peru will require external 
assistance, but there Is no substitute for "self-help". At 
the present time Peru requires effective structural reform on 
both the revenue and the expenditure sides of the public sec­
tor, Tax reform is essential on the revenue side. However, 
an improved revenue condition will not substantially improve 
the prospects for successful development without the rational 
allocation of expenditures. The rational allocation of expen­
ditures requires an informed, conscientious economic decision­
making process which must recognize the range of alternatives 
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with which it is faced and the consequences of each alterna­
tive, It is the purpose pf a national planning system to en­
sure that the decision-makers are provided with an objective 
analysis of the range of alternatives and of their respective 
consequences, 
3) The analysis of the economic policy objectives of post­
war Peru has indicated that relatively greater weight has been 
given to (1) income growth, (2) monetary stability, and (3) the 
strength of the balance of payments than to (4) employment 
creation and (5) income distribution. 
For the sake of economy in reference, let us denote the 
first three objectives as the objectives directly relevant to 
the management of the export-economy of Peru and the last two 
objectives as the objectives reflecting a concern to improve 
the distribution of gains from the export economy. With re-
y 
spect to this frame of reference, it appears that the Odria 
and Prado Administrations were more concerned with the expan­
sion of the export economy than with the improved distribution 
of gains. The Belaunde Administration appears to have shifted 
the relative policy weights toward an improved distribution of 
gains, It Is difficult to assess the degree of this apparent 
shift in weights, however, it is assured that the weight 
attached to the successful management of the export economy in 
terms of expansion continues to exceed the weight attached to 
an improved distribution of gains. Nevertheless, the attempt 
at structural change by the Belaunde Administration, supported 
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by the Alliance for Progress, represents a significant improve­
ment in the prospects of Peru's achieving a relatively rapid 
economic and social development via the evolutionary path, 
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III. THE USE OF ECONOMETRIC MODELS AS A 
GUIDE TO ECONOMIC POLICY 
A, Introduction 
The essence of economic policy is uhe quality of the 
advice which the economist is able to communicate to the 
policy-maker. The advice offered by the economist is derived 
from the interaction of economic theory and empirical observa­
tion, The quality of this advice given by the economist rests 
upon the quality of the body of economic theory upon which he 
draws and the thoroughness with which this theory has been re­
lated to empirical evidence concerning the policy problem at 
hand (13, p, 4), 
Economic policy problems are generally concerned with the 
behavior of a given economic structure, or set of structures, 
in response to changes in policy instruments. The quality of 
technical advice on such economic policy problems is closely 
related to the economist's knowledge of the particular struc­
ture, or set of structures. Such knowledge of economic struc­
tures can be qualitative or quantitative in nature. Qualita­
tive knowledge is restricted to the determination of direction­
al impacts of economic policy changes upon the economic 
structure. Quantitative knowledge not only allows the deter­
mination of the directional impact but also provides an esti­
mate of the magnitude of the impact of a change in economic 
policy. Knowledge of directional impacts is essential to 
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economic policy formulation, however, as the conduct of eco­
nomic policy demands quantitative decisions it is also neces­
sary to develop quantitative knowledge of economic structures. 
Quantitative knowledge of economic structures is develop­
ed via the empirical testing of theoretical concepts using the 
methods of econometrics. The conceptual framework of economic 
theory provides the logical basis for the formulation of hypo­
theses concerning the behavior of a given economic structure 
which, if the data are available, cah be tested statistically. 
Statistically accepted hypotheses which are logically support­
ed by economic theory form the bases of our quantitative know­
ledge of economic structures. 
The estimation of economic structures has been extended to 
the estimation of the macrceconomic structure of an entire 
economy via the construction of aggregate econometric models. 
Aggregate econometric models incorporate quantitative know­
ledge of a set of economic structures and can be utilized to 
investigate the impact of economic policy on the behavior of 
these structures. Policy investigations through an aggregate 
econometric model can be handled in two logically distinct 
ways. The model can be used to evaluate the impact on the 
structures of changes in economic policy, such as the Impact 
of a 10^ increase in direct taxes on the level of private 
consumption. On the other hand, the model can be used to In­
vestigate the magnitude of the increase in direct taxes requir­
ed to reduce the level of private consumption by a specified 
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degree, The former use of the model is referred to as the 
"analytical use"» while the latter is referred to as the "policy 
use" of an econometric model. 
Section B of this chapter is concerned with the construc­
tion and analytical use of econometric models while Section C 
is concerned with the theory of quantitative economic policy. 
Section D presents a discussion of the applicability of aggre­
gate econometric models to the economic policy problems of the 
developing countries, 
B, Elements of Econometric Model Building 
"An econometric model can be thought of as a con­
ceptual mechanism that will determine the values 
of set of economic variables when certain quantita­
tive information is supplied to it. The mechanism 
is typically a set of simultaneous equations 
accompanied by a list of specifications that place 
restrictions on these equations" (9, p, 164) 
A common motivation for the construction of an econometric 
model Is the economist's desire to explain the behavior of a 
set of mutually dependent economic variables or of an aggre­
gate variable which is derived from it. Those economic vari­
ables for which an explanation is sought, or for which the 
model is solved, are denoted the endogenous variables. The 
endogenous variables are related to themselves and other vari­
ables known as lagged endogenous and exogenous variables 
through a system of simultaneous equations. The lagged endo­
genous and the exogenous variables are usually denoted the 
predetermined variables. They are denoted as predetermined 
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variables due to the fact that they are not solved for in the 
system of simultaneous equations, but rather their numerical 
values are obtained from sources outside of the model. 
The system of simultaneous equations which links the vari­
ous variables together contains various types of equations 
which are denoted as definitional, technical, behavioral and 
equilibrium conditions. Taken together they are referred to 
as structural equations as they represent a hypothesis concern­
ing the determinants of the behavior of a given structure, or 
set of inter-related structures. The definitional equations 
are accounting identities which the data must satisfy in order 
to maintain internal consistency within the model. The techni­
cal relations are generally concerned with the production 
function and institutional restraints. The behavioral equa­
tions are concerned with the economic behavior of the economic 
agents relevant to the model; a common behavioral equation in 
a macro-economic econometric model is the aggregate private 
consumption equation. Equilibrium conditions are designed to 
ensure the equating of both sides of a market and may be in 
the form of adjustment equations which describe the way in 
which the market responds to disequilibria. 
The general form of an econometric model can be formulat­
ed by denoting the following symbols; 
Y|. = (y^,,,,, yg) , current endogenous variables 
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^t-1 ~ (yi*''*' lagged endogenous variables 
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equation, g = 1, ..., G 
Mathematical consistency in the system of simultaneous 
equations requires that the number of equations be equal to 
the number of endogenous variables. Let f^, fg,,,,, fg denote 
G different equations derived from the foregoing variables. 
The G equations can be représented as 
(rt, h- "f Gi' = 0 
) 
• t 
' i « 
(yf "f "G> = ° 
The extended form of the G equations can be rewritten in 
matrix form providing that the model is linear and that no 
equation has more than one disturbance term. The coefficient 
matrices of the endogenous (Y^) and predetermined variables 
(Z^), which are composed of the parameters can be denoted 
as A and B respectively and the linear model can be written as 
+ EZt = "t ' 
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i 
The rcduced form of thé model, or the solution of the 
system of equations for the endogenous variables, can be 
defined thorough the matrix operation of inversion. First, 
rewrite the matrix equation to yield 
+ "t 
Then multiply through by the Inverse of matrix A to yield 
AY^ = A"1-BZ^ + A"^ 
Yt = -A"l BZ^ + A"^ 
which can be rewritten as 
ït = GZt + 
the final expression presents the solution for the vector of 
endogenous variables (Y^) as a function of the predetermined 
variables and the disturbances. 
Having presented the general form of an econometric model, 
let us consider the problems of specifying, identifying, and 
estimating a system of simultaneous equations which are to be 
used to explain the behavior of a set of economic variables. 
The specification problem in model building concerns the 
difficulty of establishing a set of equations to accurately 
represent the behavior of a given economic structure. It is 
possible to conceive of a set of alternative systems of equa­
tions where each system has been designed to explain the be­
havior of the same economic structure. The systems of equa­
tions may differ in many ways, such as, l) the number of 
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equations, 2) the number of variables 3) the "mix" of the 
variables, 4) the restrictions on the equations, 5) the lin­
earity or non-linearity of the equations, 6) the assumed 
probability distributions of the disturbance terms, and 7) the 
recursive or inter-dependent structure of the model. 
If the "true" explanation of the behavior of the given 
economic structure were known, then each system of equations 
could be ranked with Respect to its ability to represent the 
behavior of the structure. However, in actual model-building 
the "true" explanation is not lanown. At best one can make use 
of economic theory and empirical observation to construct 
hypotheses concerning the "true" explanation of the structure's 
behavior. Given that one can only have hypotheses concerning 
the "true" specification of economic structures and that the 
usual statistical estimation procedures assume no error in 
specification, it is of great importance to exercise care and 
judgment In the specification of econometric models in order 
to minimize the chance of misrepresenting the structural 
characteristics of the economy. 
Having specified the model, the model must be identified 
prior to estimating the parameters of the system. The concept 
of identification is concerned with the property of distin-
gulshabillty among the various equations and parameters belong­
ing to the equation system. In one of Its specific statistical 
senses (e.g., npn-ldentifiability of a set of coefficients in 
a given equation, due to multi-collinearlty) identification is 
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necessary In order to avoid norluniqueness and even indetermin­
acy of statistical estimates of parameters (13, p, 51). 
Two conditions must be satisfied in order to identify a 
model, A necessary conditions for identification is that the 
number of variables excluded from thé equation to be identi­
fied must be at least G-1, i.e., one less than the total number 
of structural equations in the whole system, A necessary and 
sufficient conditions for identification requires the ability 
to form at least one non-vanishing determinant of order G-1 
from the coefficients with which the variables excluded from 
the equation under consideration appear in the other G-1 
structural equations,^ 
Various methods are available for estimating the para­
meters of an econometric model, These methods for linear 
structures assume that all variables are observed without 
error, but that errors in the equations are present, "These 
errors are the result of the variables which should have been 
included in the system but which have been omitted. It is 
assumed that they give rise to disturbances which can be repre­
sented by certain random variables. These variables are 
assumed to be normally distributed" (39), P. 155). 
The decision as to which estimating procedure is most 
appropriate depends upon the logical structure of the model and 
^A more complete discussion of the identification problems 
can be obtained from the following sources (13), (26), (39)# 
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the assumptions with respect to the distribution of the error 
terms, A purely recursive (pure causal chain) model structure 
lends itself to the use of least squares procedures, either 
direct or indirect. Indirect least squares is indicated if 
the errors affecting the various structural equations cannot 
be considered to be mutually independent. The estimating pro­
blem for a completely interdependent model structure is more 
complex. In a simultaneous system of equations it is typical 
to have more than one jointly dependent variable in each equa­
tion which has required the development of special methods in 
order to obtain estimates with desirable properties. These 
methods are used to estimate the parameter of the "reduced 
form" which can then be transformed in order to obtain the 
structural parameter estimates. In this way, the information 
contained in other equations of the system can be utilized. 
The error terms are now assumed to be jointly distributed, if 
this joint distribution and the structural equations ( which 
may be regarded as a system of transformation functions which 
express the endogenous variables in terms of the disturbances 
given the predetermined variables) are known, then the joint 
probability distribution of the endogenous variables can be 
derived. Maximum likelihood methods can then be used in order 
to determine values for the coefficient of the structural equa­
tions which maximize the probability of obtaining the observed 
values of the endogenous variables on the basis of the assumed 
probability distribution of the disturbances (12, p, 30), 
i 
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The choice of estimation procedure is also influenced by 
whether a given structural equation within the model is "just-
identified" or "over-identified",^ In the "just-identified" 
case, there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the 
estimates of parameters in the reduced form and the structural 
equation form of the model. Hence, the reduced form equations 
can be estimated by straightforward least squares and the 
structural parameter estimates obtained from a unique trans­
formation of the reduced form parameters. In this case, the 
estimates obtained via least squares are equivalent to full 
information methods of maximum likelihood, the method of 
instrumental variables, the limited information method, and the 
methods of two-and-three-stage least squares (36, p, 9^), When 
a given structural equation is "over-identified", a one-to-one 
correspondence between the estimates of the parameters of the 
reduced form and the structural form is lacking. Hence, the 
maximum likelihood, limited information, two and three-stage 
least squares, etc,, must be used "which, very broadly speak­
ing, attempt to set up such a correspondence by indirectly 
using the information contained in the other equations of the 
system and still retain at least the property of statistical 
consistency of estimated coefficients", (36, p, 95)• 
^If there is only one zero (non-vanishing) determinant of 
order G-1 for equation j, it is said to be "just-identified"; 
if there are two or more non-zero determinants, equation j is 
said to be "over-identified". 
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The analytical use of the estimated econometric model can 
be discussed under five principal headings^ (l) obtaining 
quantitative knowledge: of economic structures, (2) testing the 
sensitivity of the model to structural change, (3) tracing the 
I 
impact of changes in economic policy on the economy, (4) in­
vestigating the sensitivity of the economy to changing magni­
tudes of exogenous variables, and (5) prediction. 
Econometric models of macro economic systems yield 
estimates of structural parameters. Structural parameters 
include such measures as the marginal propensities to consume, 
to save, to tax, and to import. Furthermore, the inter­
connection of the various structural parameters via a simulta­
neous equation system permits the analysis of the impact of 
changes in these parameters on the overall performance of the 
economy. Such knowledge is fundamental to an understanding of 
the behavioral characteristics of the economy. Various struc­
tural parameters, such as the propensities to tax, are subject 
to control by the public authorities. The estimated model can 
relate the changes in such parameters to the overall behavior 
of the economy. Hence, an estimate of the impact of public 
policy on the performance, of the economy can be obtained. As 
the estimates of the endogenous variables depends upon the 
given values of the exogenous variables, the influence of au­
tonomous changes in these variables on the performance of the 
economy can be obtained. Prediction of the future trends of 
the economy is fundamental to the economic policy-making 
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process. The reducèd form of the econometric model which 
presents the endogenous variables as a function of the pre­
determined variables is the basis of econometric forecasting. 
The essential ingredient to this forecasting technique is the 
set of estimates of the exogenous variables over the projection 
period. Having estimates of the reduced form parameters, the 
values of the respective exogenous variables can be "plugged-
into" the reduced form equations and the equations can be 
solved for the projected values of the endogenous variables. 
Successive computations w^ll permit the evaluation of the im­
pact of alternative estimates of the projected exogenous vari­
ables on the endbgenous variables as well as the impact of 
changes in the structural parameters under the control of the 
public authorities, 
G, The Theory of Quantitative Economic Policy^ 
1. General theoretical construct 
The basic difference between the analytical use and the 
policy use of an econometric model is that the policy use 
implies the introduction of a welfare function into the econo­
metric model. The welfare function is defined in terms of 
variables which enter into the econometric model. The policy 
^The author acknowledges a strong intellectual debt to 
the lectures of the Economic Policy Workshop (I963-I964) at 
Iowa State University and references (13) in the construction 
of this section. 
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problem is to induce the model to behave in a way that will 
optimize the welfare function. 
In order to illustrate the fundamental logical difference 
between the analytical and policy use of a model let us consid­
er a simple Keynesian model of income determination. The 
model is J 
(1) Y = + G 
(2) = a + bY 
where the symbols represent income (Y), private consumption 
(C^), private investment (I^), and government expenditures 
(G), The level of (C^) is assumed to be a linear function of 
(Y) whereas (I^), and (G) are exogenously determined. From the 
prediction standpoint, once (I^) and (G) are known, the level 
of (Y) can"be obtained from the reduced from equation, 
(3) Y = (Y^)(a + iP + G) 
To convert the model to policy usage, a simple welfare func­
tion can be specified, i.e., a fixed target policy model with 
the level of Income as the target (Y), the level of government 
expenditures (G) will be considered as an Instrument variable 
or a control variable, whereas remains an exogenous vari­
able, The policy problem is to solve for that level of G which 
will permit the attainment of the target (Y), The system of 
equations can be solved for the only unknown, (G), the control 
variable. Hence, in the simple case, 
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(4) Y = a t bY + + G* 
(5) G* = (l-b)Y - a -
the welfare function will be optimized providing that the public 
authorities maintain the control variable at the level G*, 
The fixed one target, one instrument policy model is the 
most simple example. The welfare function may be fixed, flex­
ible, random, or mixed. There may be and usually are several 
target variables and instrument variables involved in the 
policy problem. The theory of quantitative economic policy 
can be viewed as the systematizatlon and generalization of the 
characteristics of the policy problem as Illustrated by the 
preceding income determination problem in the simple Keyne-
sian model, 
Tinbergen (39) in his pioneering work on the theory of 
economic policy made a clear distinction between quantitative 
and qualitative economic policy. Quantitative economic policy 
is restricted to the analysis of changes in the magnitudes of 
the policy parameters within a stable economic structures. 
The methodology was not extended to the analysis of "structur­
al reforms" in the economic system. 
In the language of econometric theory, a model contains 
endogenous and exogenous variables. The variables are reclas­
sified in the theory of economic policy into the categories of 
(1) target (yj), (2) instrument (z^), (3) data (u^) and. 
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(4) Irrelevant variables (%_), The three basic elements of a 
policy model are (1) a welfare function (w), (2) an econometric 
model (m), and (3) boundary conditions on the targets, irrele­
vant and instrument variable. The welfare function, in the 
general form, is a function of the I target variables (y^) and 
J instrument variables (Zj). The econometric model, relates 
the J instruments to thé I targets. In a policy model the 
irrelevant variables can usually be eliminated through alge­
braic operations on the equation system. 
The objective of the policy model is the solution of the 
equation system for the required levels that the J instrument 
variables must attain in order to induce fulfillment of the I 
targets. In a fixed target model the consistency condition 
which must be fulfilled in order to permit the independent 
solution for J instrument variables is that the number of 
instrument variables must equal the number of target variables 
(J = I), If J > I, then policy degrees of freedom exist which 
means that some of the instrument variable values can be 
specified arbitrarily while the remaining can be solved for 
independently, , 
In order to facilitate the discussion of the technical 
implications of the model structure for the nature of the 
economic policy problem, let us specify the general form of 
the policy problem as 
Optimize W = a'y + b'z 
Subject to Ay = + Cu 
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boundary y min < y < y max 
conditions z min < z < z max 
where A, B, and C are matrices of coefficients and y, z, and . 
u are vectors. If the matrix B is square and non-singular with 
constant elements, then the inverse of B, (B"^), exists. 
Hence, the policy solution is given by 
(6) Bz = Ay - Cu 
( 7 )  ( B " ' ^ B )z = (B"^A)y - (B"^C)U  
(8) z s Gy + Hu 
The nature of the relation between the instruments (z) 
and targets (y) depends upon the structures of the B and A 
coefficient matrices. At least five distinctive situations 
can be envisaged, each with different implications for the 
conduct of economic policy, 
(1) If the B and A coefficient matrices are strictly 
diagonal, then there exists a one-to-one correspon­
dence between the instruments and the targets. Any 
given target is dependent on one and only one of J 
instruments. The solution of Instrument Zj to 
achieve target y^, where j = 1, can be obtained 
independently of the other j-1 Instruments and 1-1 
targets. The implication of this structure for the 
conduct of economic policy is that the decision with 
respect to the level of Instrument Zj in order to 
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attain target y^, where i = j, can be taken by the 
public authority responsible for the control of -j 
Independently of (or without consultation with) 
other public authorities responsible for the control 
of the remaining j-1 instruments. 
If the B and A coefficient matrices are strictly 
triangular, then there exists a one-way hierarchical 
dependence of the J instruments with respect to the 
I targets. The first instrument (z^) will depend 
on the first target (y^) only, (zg) will depend on 
Zj, y^, and y^, or Zg = P (z^, y^, yp). However, as 
z^, is known at this stage Zg can be considered as a 
function of only y^ and yg, (zy) will depend on z^, 
Zg, y^, 72 and y^ or z^ = F (z^, Zg, y^, 
However, as and Zg known, z^ = Fly^, ^21 
It is clear that the zj instrument depends only on 
the y^ i < j. In the conduct of economic policy, 
therefore, the authority in charge of Zj need only 
take into consideration the policy decisions of 
those authorities "higher-up" in the hierarchy in 
order to maintain overall policy consistency. 
If the B and A coefficient matrices are completely 
inter-dependent. then the Zj must be determined 
simultaneously. Complete consultation on all levels 
will be required in order to maintain policy con­
sistency, 
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If the B and A coefficient matrices are quasi-
diagonal or block-diagonal, then the economic policy-
problem can be decomposed. Let us assume that 1 = j 
= 6 where the quasi-diagonal structural is decompos­
able into three separate decision problems, i.e., the 
determination of the levels of z^, Zg, and Zy and 
z^, Zg, Each pair of decisions must be taken simul­
taneously, however, the decision with respect to any 
one pair can be made independently of the other two 
pairs of decisions. Economic policy could then be 
decomposed into three decision problems with each 
problem the responsibility of a different authority 
and policy consistency could be maintained even 
/ 
though each of the three authorities made their 
decisions without communication with the other two 
authorities. 
If the B and A coefficient matrices are quasi-
triangular or block-triangular. the economic policy 
problem is hierarchical in nature as with a strictly 
triangular structure except that sets of instruments 
rather than individual instruments enter the hierar­
chical order. Hence, the set of instruments corre­
sponding to any given sub-matrix block can be solved 
without any knowledge of other instruments belonging 
to blocks which are lower in the hierarchy. 
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In all of the above model structures, if matrix B is non-
singular and the fixed targets are known with the number of 
targets equal to the number of instruments, the policy solution 
for the instrument variables can be readily obtained. 
In a flexible target policy model the number of targets 
need not be equal to the number of instruments. We can specify 
the welfare function W as 
w — f(zj^, ^2*'**; ^j* ^2'***' 
The optimum set of instrument values is defined as that set 
which satisfies the following set of partial differentiation 
equations 
iiiL . 4£i + 4JL = 0 
dZj i ttFi "Zj 
provided that the second-order conditions for a maximum or 
minimum is fulfilled. The concept of "efficiency" as used in 
the theory of economic policy is derived from the optimum con­
ditions, The efficiency of policy instrument Zj is specified 
by the term ( c^W/oz^), Such an efficiency indicator yields 
a partial measure of the welfare impact of a given instrument. 
Although the above discussion of the theory of economic 
policy has demonstrated the central role of econometric model 
in the quantitative study of economic policy, it is necessary 
to note that the policy use of a model requires features which 
are additional to those required for the analytical use of a 
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model. The most evident additional features are the Incorpora­
tion of a welfare function and of boundary constraints on the 
magnitudes of the variables, —-
secondly, policy variables or instrument variables must 
be built into the model in order to permit the study of the 
impact of economic policy decisions on the performance of the 
economy, A further difference is that the estimation procedure 
for the structural relations of the policy model may not be 
independent of the decision-making process implied by the 
model as a whole and this becomes an additional factor in 
choosing the estimation procedure (36, p, 88), H 
2. Economic policy objectives 
It is the purpose of this section to identify the princi­
pal macroeconomic policy objectives which are utilized through­
out this work and to Illustrate possible uses of these objec­
tives. 
The economic policy objectives utilized in this work, 
following Tinbergen (39), are the general objectives of the 
macroeconomic policy-makers rather than objectives derived 
from individual welfare functions which have been aggregated, 
in some manner, into a social welfare function. These general 
economic policy objectives are identified as (1) aggregate in­
come expansion, (2) monetary stability, (3) balance of payments 
equilibrium, (4) employment creation, and (5) personal income 
distribution, and (6) regional income distribution. 
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In a fixed target policy model, as presented in Section C, 
each of the objectives cap be assigned a target value which 
reflects the aspirations of the economic policy-makers for the 
behavior of the economy. Providing that the consistency 
requirement obtains (i.e., the number of instruments equal to 
the number of targets) and the targets and instruments are 
adequately related via an econometric model, the model can be 
solved for the levels of the instruments which will induce the 
attainment of the targets. 
In a flexible target policy model the objectives enter a 
welfare function which is to be optimized subject to an econo­
metric model. For example, a linear welfare function may be 
constructed of the form 
6 
W = Z a, 0, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
1=1 ^ 1 
where the 0^ represent the six economic policy objectives and 
the a^ represent the normalized relative weights attached to 
the respective objectives such that 
6 
2 a, = 1 
i-1 ^ 
The policy problem can be stated as the maximization of the 
linear welfare function subject to the econometric model. 
The welfare function need not be linear in form, Theil 
(37) has developed the concept of a quadratic welfare function. 
Allowing only the objectives to enter the welfare function, it 
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can be written as 
W = W Z a, (0, - 0, 
i=l 1 1 
where oj represents the target,level of the i^^ objective, 0^ 
represents the attained level of the 0^ objective in the 
solution of the policy problem, and the a^ represent the 
* 2 
respective relative weights attached to the deviation , 
In this case, the policy problem can be stated as the minimiza­
tion of .the welfare function subject to the econometric model. 
Another way in which the objectives can be used is in a 
"mixed" policy model which combines fixed and flexible targets. 
In other words, some of the objectives will be assigned 
target levels while the remainder will be incorporated in a 
welfare function which is to be optimized. For example, it 
might be desired to maximize the linear form 
5 
W = Z a, 0, 1 = 2, 3, 4, 5 
1=2 ^ ^ 
•jfr •îf' 
while specifying target levels 0^ and 0^ which are fixed in 
* # 
value. In a sense, the fixed targets 0^ and 0^ become con­
straints upon the maximization of the welfare function. 
It is clear that in a flexible or "mixed" target policy 
model the relative importance of the various policy objectives 
must be established prior to the optimization process, i.e., 
the a^ must be assigned values. These relative weights, or 
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"trade-off" rates between objectives are usually explicitly 
derived from the welfare function of the raacroeconomic policy­
maker, 
D, Problems in Applying Econometric 
Models to Developing Economies 
1. The general problem of structural change 
A major problem is applying econometric models to devel­
oping economies is the phenomenon of "structural change" or 
"structural break". The matrix form of a linear econometric 
model can be written as (see Section II) 
Ayt + Bzt - ut 
which can be represented as a system of G functional relation­
ship such as 
"f "i' = ° 
# # 
# # 
fo'yf ° 
A model can be defined as a set of a "class" of structures 
where a given structure is defined as a set of functional re­
lationships together with the coefficients occurring in them, 
Supressing the disturbance term (u^), a given structure can be 
represented symbolically 
S = , a) 
B5 
whererepresents the relevant functional relationships and 
a represents the structural parameters. A "structural change" 
or a "structural break" Is defined as a change in either or 
a. Changes in a given structure's functional relationships 
can be of the following nature: (1) a change in the number of 
functional relationships, (2) a change in the number or classi­
fication of the variables entering the functional relation­
ships, and (3) the introduction of non-linearities. These 
alterations in the model in order to take account of changes 
in the structure of an economy can be considered to be speci­
fication problems in model-building. Such changes in the 
specification of the model Introduce estimation problems. The 
addition of functional relationships to the model need not 
introduce any estimation problems beyond the necessity to 
estimate new parameters, providing that the formal properties 
of the model are not changed. The addition of variables to 
existing functional relationships requires the re-estimation 
of the relationship at a minimum and may affect the formal 
properties of the model which could require a change in the 
estimation method. The introduction of non-linearities 
presents further problems of statistical estimation (36, p. 
1 0 0 ) .  
Estimation problems can arise even though the functional 
relationships remain unchanged via structural change reflect­
ed in the coefficients. For example, the form of the function­
al relationship for aggregate private consumption (C^), as 
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determined by the level of disposable income (Y^), 
cP = a + bY^ 
may remain unchanged under a fundamental shift in consumer 
behavior although the magnitude of the marginal propensity to 
consume (b) may shift significantly. If the sample period of 
the model contains the period of the structural break, then 
the need to estimate the pre-structural break coefficient (b) 
and the post-structural break coefficient may unacceptably 
reduce the degrees of freedom in the estimating procedure. 
In view of the significant specification and estimation 
problems implied by structural change, it is desirable to have 
a high degree of structural stability in the economy which is, 
to be represented by an econometric model. The importance of 
structural stability to the theory of economic policy is re--
fleeted in its emphasis on quantitative economic policy which 
abstracts from "structural reform" and qualitative policy 
changes in order to concentrate on the possibility of influ­
encing the performance of an economy through the control of 
instrument variables within the context of a stable economic 
structure. The importance of structural stability is evident 
also in the use of an econometric model for economic forecast­
ing, If the reduced form coefficients are expected to remain 
constant and the exogenous variables are quantitatively known 
over the projection period, the endogenous variables are pro­
jected in a straight-forward manner. However, the projection 
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procedure becomes more complicated if the reduced form coef­
ficients cannot be expected to remain constant over the pro­
jection period. The direction and the magnitude of the 
structural change must be anticipated and the reduced-form 
coefficients modified accordingly. 
In general, a greater degree of stability in structure is 
associated with the high-income, industrialized econoiries than 
in that of the low-income, developing economies which have an 
essentially agrarian or primary product orientation. In the 
latter type of economy, change of economic structure is often 
considered as a sine qua non of successful development (15, 
P. 767), For example, the effort to transform the productive 
base of a low Income economy from agriculture to industry in­
volves changes in savings requirements, import requirements, 
productive technology, etc,, which constitute a continued 
sequence of structural changes. The high-income, industrial­
ized economies are exposed to structural change also, partic­
ularly from the impacts of technological advance, qualitative 
economic policy changes, and changes in consumer behavior. 
However, structural change in such economies is usually more 
regular and of less consequence to the requirements of econo­
metric model-building than are the structural changes in the 
low-income, developing economies. 
The expectation that low-income, developing economies are 
more subject to structural instability than high-income indus­
trialized economies does not vitiate the specification and 
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estimation of econometric models for such economies. Low-
income developing economies are not homogeneous with respect 
to their susceptibility to structural instability. The refer­
ence to structural change as the sine qua non of development 
1 
reflects the observation that various low income economies are 
"stagnating", or not expanding, through their apparent in­
ability to overcome traditional modes of economic behavior. 
Providing that adequate economic data were available, an 
econometric model of such an economy would not be subject to 
structural instability problems. 
Evidence of structural change in the sample period or in 
the projection period need not imply a restriction on the use­
fulness of econometric model-building. If the change in eco­
nomic structure is reflected in the changes in a relatively 
small number of structural parameters (a) rather than in the 
nature of the functional relationships (/. ) then the structur­
al change can be satisfactorily accomodated within the model. 
For example, constraints can be placed on the relevant struc­
tural parameters so that they have different magnitudes during 
the pre-structural change period, the transitional period dur­
ing which the structural change is completed, and the post-
transitional period. If the model structure allows the use of 
ordinary least squares estimates of each structural equation 
and If the sample period is sufficiently great, estimates of 
the pre- and ,pogt-structural change magnitudes of the relevant 
parameters can be obtained. If the sample period is not 
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sufficiently extensive to permit such a procedure, it may be 
that a priori estimates of the parameter can be made. If the 
structural change occurs in the functional relationship (<: ), 
requiring a re-specification of the structure, then the re­
sulting difficulties may well vitiate the usefulness of econo­
metric model-building. In the case in which the economic 
structure has remained acceptably stable during the sample 
period but more substantial structural changes are expected, it 
is important to consider the probability of these changes 
occurring within the projection period. Short-to medium-term 
forecasting may not allow sufficient time for the expected 
structural changes to occur. Furthermore, to the extent that 
the direction and magnitude of the structural change can be 
anticipated, it may be possible to modify the reduced form 
parameters accordingly, 
It is clear then that the usefulness of an econometric 
model to represent a given low-income developing economy need 
not be impaired by the problem of structural instability, 
2. A special problem of structural change 
In the forecasting use of an econometric model the stabil­
ity of the reduced form parameters over the sample period is 
not sufficient. The straight-forward use of the reduced-form 
for projecting implicitly assumes that the parameters will re­
main constant over the projection period, A special problem 
of structural change arises in which the stability of the 
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reduced form parameters is jeopardized by the expectation of 
significant inflation during the projection period. Inflation 
could alter the underlying conditions assumed in the estimation 
of the structural parameters from constant-price data, such as 
the state of the functional distribution of income and relative 
prices. In such a situation it is necessary to evaluate the 
potential impact of the anticipated inflation on the structural 
parameters and to modify them accordingly in the forecasting 
procedure. 
The theoretical arguments supporting the supposition that 
inflation will lead to a re-distribution of income favoring 
profits at the expense of wages are derived mainly from the 
Keynesian theory of income determination. The assumption that 
the entrepeneurs react more quickly to the presence of infla­
tion than do wage-earners means that wage increases are out­
paced by price increases which leads to a change in relative 
income shares in favor of profits. If an additional assump­
tion is made that the propensity to save out of profits is 
higher than the propensity to save out of wages, then the re­
distribution of real income resulting from the inflation 
implies an increase in the real level of savings at the expense 
of real consumption. 
It is argued by the advocates of the quantity theory of 
money, however, that the Keynesian prediction of the redistri­
bution of income between wage and profits is not sustainable, 
either theoretically or empirically (23, p. 285), The quantity 
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theory argues that "In a sustained inflationary process the be­
havior of all sectors of the economy will become adjusted to 
the expectation of inflation. Consequently the effect of in­
flation will be to redistribute income, not from workers or 
savers to capitalist entrepreneurs, but, from the holders of 
money balances, to the monetary authorities who issue money 
the real value of which steadily depreciates (23, p, 286). 
The real effect of inflation is to reduce the consumption of 
current real income and to transfer the release of current real 
income to the public authorities (6, p, 123), 
In evaluating the impact of an anticipated inflation on 
the stability of the reduced from parameters over the projec­
tion period, two factors are of substantial Importance, (1) the 
stability of the rate of Inflation and (2) the length of the 
projection period. If the fate of inflation has been relative­
ly steady during the s,ample period and is expected to maintain 
the same approximate rate over the projection period, the 
weight of empirical evidence seems to support the position of 
the quantity theory of money with respect to the impact of in­
flation on the distribution of Income (23, p, 135). The expec­
tation of a continuing inflation tends to become built into 
the economy's behavior patterns which leads to the hypothesis 
that the reduced form parameters will not have to be modified 
for the Impact of inflation during the projection period. The 
situation changes, however. If it is anticipated that the rate 
of Inflation will accelerate or de-accelerate significantly 
during the projection period. It appears that when an infla­
tion has occurred that was not expected by the behavioral 
economic units of the economy there may be a substantial re­
distribution of income and wealth in the short-run (23, p, 135). 
Therefore if the rate of inflation significantly changes during 
the projection period and if the projection period is not suf­
ficiently long to permit a readjustment of expectations, than 
a change in the distribution of income might occur which would 
require a modification of the reduced form parameters in the 
forecasting procedure. 
The impact of inflation on the stability of the reduced 
form parameters is also Influenced by whether the economy is 
permitted to freely adjust, internally and externally, to in­
flation or whether the adjustment is subject to control by the 
public authorities. The maintenance of a freely fluctuating 
exchange rate avoids the creation of a divergence between the 
internal and external purchasing power of the domestic curren­
cy, On the other hand, the maintenance of a fixed exchange 
rate in the face of a domestic inflation increases the exter­
nal purchasing power of the domestic currency relative to its 
value internally. Under such circumstances, the propensity to 
import could increase substantially which would require an 
adjustment in the reduced form parameter. Further relative 
price changes could be induced via the government attempt to 
moderate the resulting pressure on the balance of payments 
through import-restriction and import-substitution policies 
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which could affect the structural parameters of an econometric 
model, However, the magnitude of the adjustments required 
would be Influenced by the length of the projection period, 
the structure of the ebonomy and the level of aggregation in 
the model. 
Although it is clear that the presence of inflation, par­
ticularly a change in the rate of inflation, can affect the 
stability of the reduced form parameters over the projection 
period, it is not at all clear as to which parameters will be 
affected and to what degree they will be affected without 
specific reference to the structure of the economy, the speci­
fication of the model, the nature of the inflationary process, 
the level of aggregation in the model, the length of the pro­
jection period, and the expected course of government economic 
policy,^ 
^A discussion of these factors is undertaken in Section lil 
of Chapter IV, 
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IV, A MACROECONOMIC PROJECTION OF 
THE PERUVIAN ECONOMY 
A, Introduction 
Th^ purpose of this chapter is to obtain rigorously deter­
mined projection of the macroeconomic performance of the Peruv­
ian economy during I966-1972. The macroeconomic variable of 
principal concern is the level of Gross Domestic Income (GDI), 
Given that the degree of price stability, the strength of the 
balance of payments, the distribution of income, and the level 
of employment are also important objectives of economic policy, 
the implications of the projected GDI performance for the ful­
fillment of these economic policy objectives are analysed. 
The chapter contains seven sections. Section B presents 
the conceptual framework for the construction of a macroeconom­
ic model of the Peruvian economy. Section C presents the de­
scription of the macroeconomic model. Section D presents an 
analysis of the formal properties of the macroeconomic model. 
Section E analyses the stability of the "reduced form" para­
meters over the projection period. Section F presents the 
macroeconomic -projections obtained from the model. Section G 
analyses the impact of devaluation of the, Peruvian currency on 
the macroeconomic projections of Section F, 
There are three appendices to the chapter. Appendix A pre­
sents the macroeconomic data used in estimating the model, Ap-
t 
pendix B provides the export^projections, projections of for­
95 
1 
eign, private and public capital inflow, and the public exter-
1 
nal debt projection. Appendix C contains projections of the 
public sector accounts, the balance of payments accounts and 
projections of selected macroeconomic variables consistent with 
three growth hypotheses, 
6, The Conceptual Framework of the 
Econometric Model 
1. Orienting the discussion 
The evaluation of the prospects for Peruvian economic 
development during the 1966-72 period requires indicators of 
economic development. In the analytical use of an econometric 
model, the fundamental objectives of economic policy (i.e., 
income growth, "strength" of the balance of payments, employ­
ment level', monetary stability, and personal and regional in­
come distribution) can be utilized as indicators of economic 
development. Assuming no change in the existing regime of 
economic policy, the projection can be assessed in terms of 
its contribution to these basic indicators. In a sense, it is 
assumed that economic development or economic welfare is a 
function of the above objectives. 
The indicator of most direct interest is the resulting 
growth projection of Gross Domestic Income (GDI), In addition 
to the use of the GDI growth rate as a policy objective in 
itself, it is also a crucial variable in determining the con­
tribution of the projected macroeconomic performance to the 
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other major indicators of economic development. For example, 
the level of unemployment implied by the projections can be 
estimated by calculating the difference between the amount of 
employment created due to inbome expansion (i.e., through the 
application of the historical relation between GDI growth and 
employment expansion) and the projected increase in the total 
labor force. The rate of growth of GDI is also a fundamental 
determinant of expanding import demand, which influences the 
"strength"'of the balance of payments. Although the aggregate 
GDI growth rate does not provide direct implications for 
improvements in personal and regional income distribution, it 
does affect the ability of public policy action to achieve 
such objectives, 
2. The interdependency of the national income accounts, the 
balance of payments accounts and the public accounts 
. The interdependency between the national income, the 
balance of payments and the public sector accounts can be 
appreciated through a consideration of the determinants of the 
level of GDI, Let 
GD I  = 0 ^ + 0 ^ + 1 ^ + 1 ®  +  E  +  Z  -  M 
represent the definition of GDI, where 
GDI = gross domestic income 
= private consumption 
C® = public consumption 
I^ = private investment 
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= public Investment 
E = exports 
1 
Z = terms-of-trade effect 
M = imports 
It can be appreciated that, although all these macroeconomic 
variables enter national income accounts as components of GDI, 
exports, imports and the terms-of-trade effect are derived 
from the balance of payments, public consumption and public 
investment are derived from the public sector accounts, while 
private consumption, private investment and GDI are strictly 
national income account variables. 
The interdependence of the accounts makes it useful to 
present complete accounts of the public sector and. the balance 
of payments as an integral part of the macroeconomic projec­
tions, This conclusion is strengthened by the utility of hav­
ing a set of integrated accounts in order to evaluate the pro­
jected performance of the economy with respect to the identi­
fied economic development indicators. 
^The terms-of-trade effect(Z) is defined as follows; 
where Px and Pm refer to the unit value of exports and imports, 
respectively, and Qx to the volume of exports. The further 
subscripts 0 and t refer to Year 0 (base year) and Year t. In 
the base year the terms-of-trade effect is equal to zero while 
in other years it is measured as deviations, positively and 
negatively, from the base year level. 
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The evaluation of the strength of the balance of payments 
requires the projection of the complete account. For example, 
if trie evaluation is to be performed, by comparing the projected 
import demand to the projected capacity-to-import^ then a com­
plete balance of payments projection Is required as the calcu­
lation of the capacity-to-import requires a detailed projection 
of the individual balance) of payments components. 
The complete statement of the public sector accounts is 
useful for the evaluation of the implications of the projected 
macroeconomic performance of monetary stability. The differ­
ence between total public expenditures and total public reve­
nues, both from domestic and external sources, must be financed 
by short-term external credits, by the sale of government bonds 
to the internal and/or external market, or through loans from 
the Central Banking System, As all these sources of financing 
except internal bond sales add to inflationary pressure, the 
magnitude of public expenditures is constrained by the objec­
tive with respect to monetary stability. Furthermore, the 
level of private credit offered through the commercial banking 
system, which is a major determinant of private investment from 
domestic sources, is not independent of the difference between 
^The capacity-to-import is defined as the sum of export 
earnings, net transfer payments, net investment income, net 
long-term capital i.nflow, and net short-term capital inflow, 
assuming no change in the level of international reserves, 
1 
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total public expenditures and total public revenues. In other 
words, given the monetary stability objective, competition for 
credit exists between the public and private sectors, There­
fore, from the policy viewpoint, the interaction between fiscal 
and monetary policy makes useful the projection of the complete 
public sector accounts. 
The interdependent nature of the major macroeconomic ac­
counts makes it essential to construct a macroeconomic model 
that explicitly provides the required consistency among the 
accounts and that, furthermore, is supplemented by projections 
of the complete balance of payments and public sector accounts. 
Such a model is useful in the formulation of macroeconomic 
policy, since it permits the tracing of the implications of 
alternative macroeconomic policy measures on each of the inter­
dependent major accounts. 
For example, the lowering of the legal reserve requirement 
of the commercial banking system would permit an expansion in 
the level of domestic credit. The credit expansion would in­
duce increased private investment which would result in an 
expansion of GDI, The increase in private investment would 
require increased imports of capital goods and the implied 
expansion of GDI would stimulate increased consumer good im­
ports, The increase in imports, however, would tend to reduce 
the rate of GDI growth. The net increase in GDI would yield 
increased tax revenue both from Internal direct and indirect 
taxes and from import duties paid on the induced increase in 
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the level of imports. Thus, the impact of the change in mone­
tary policy can be traced through each of the major macroeco­
nomic accounts. 
Furthermore, the testing of the desirability of such a 
change in monetary policy requires the analysis of the impact 
of the change on each of the accounts. If the objective with 
respect to monetary stability is threatened by an increase in 
private credit, then a reduction in the public sector expendi­
ture program may be the opportunity cost Incurred, Also, the 
effect of increased import demand on the objective with respect 
to the "strength" of the balance of payments must be analyzed 
in order to determine the desirability of the policy change. 
Since such testing of the desirability of a macroeconomic pol­
icy change is facilitated by a complete statement of the major 
accounts, it is desirable to include projections of the com­
plete account in conjunction with the projections of the macro-
economic model, 
3. Investment theory in Peruvian macroeconomic models 
a. Investment functions of the Thorbecke-Condos model 
The purpose of this section is to present a critique of the 
investment demand functions included in the macroeconomic mod­
els of the Peruvian economy prepared by Thorbecke and Condos 
(38), supplemented by the presentation of an alternative sys­
tem of investment demand functions. 
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Thorbecke and Condos present three macroeconomic models 
of the Peruvian economy, designated Models A, B, and C, The 
presentation of the investment demand functions is the same for 
both Models A and B, Total investment (I) is defined as the 
sum of private investment (I^) and public investment (I®), 
Private investment is treated aggregatively as an endogenous 
variable determined by the level of exports (lO and the terms-
of-trade effect (Z), each with a one year lag. Public invest­
ment is considered to be exogenous. The equations composing 
the investment subsector of the model are as follows; 
I  = 1 ^ + 1 ®  
iP = iP + ijP E.i H- q z.i 
I® = I® 
In model C, the private investment function is altered by the 
inclusion of a third explanatory variable, v;: i jh reflects 
capacity considerations, and public investment is treated as 
an endogenous variable. The investment equations of Model C 
are as follows; 
I = iP + 1% 
jP = ig + iP( / Mff/ K_j) + I|E_^  + iPz_^  
iS = (= sg) = gSxS _ gg)p 
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where ( L\ ^ • K .is the variable reflecting capacity 
-1 -l 
considerations, is public sector savings, whereas s'^ rep­
resents the proportion of 1^ financed by domestic public 
revenue, is the contribution of the public sector to GDI, 
where GDI is defined as the sum of a private part (X^) and the 
public part (X®) and F is the level of net public foreign cap­
ital inflow. 
As discussed by Thorbecke and Condos, the "fitting" of 
the private investment function was difficult due to "the lack 
of a sectoral breakdown for investment and the fairly arbitrary 
way in which depreciation was derived to obtain net investment" 
(38, p. 189). 
Considering the private investment function for Models A 
and B Thorbecke and Condos state that: 
"The implication of the private investment function 
selected here is obvious,, IP is determined completely 
exogenously through the changes occurring in the 
export sector, This appears to be a reasonable hypo­
thesis in the case of Peru, given (1) the relative 
importance of the export sector (the ratio of E + Z 
to X (i.e., GDI) having increased from about 20 to 
over 27X from 1950 to 1964); (2) the viry highly 
capital-intensive nature of the export sector; and 
(3) the virtual absence of a domestic capital-goods 
producing sector" (38, p, 190), 
^The variable ( f\ fx K , ) is the ratio of the annual 
-1 -1 
change in imports of raw materials and fuels to the annual 
change in the stock of capital each logged one year. 
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The explanation of private investment in terms of the volume 
of exports and the terms-of-trade effect, both of which are 
exogenous variables, does not yield instrument variables by 
which the level of private investment might be influenced. 
The major policy for fostering GDI growth is the stimulation 
of the volume of exports, which is further restricted by the 
fact that the determinants of export growth do not enter the 
model. The contribution of the public expenditure program to 
projected GDI growth depends on the exogenously determined 
level of public investment as public consumption is endogen-
ously determined as a function of the level of total tax col­
lections, which is dependent on the level of GDI. Hence, 
public consumption is determined by GDI and not GDI by C®, 
which Implies that C® is not an effective instrument for fos­
tering GDI growth. 
Model C, as Thorbecke and Gondos claim, does provide for 
more policy flexibility. In particular, the public expenditure 
program becomes a more flexible growth policy instrument. Con­
sidering the public investment relation of Model C, 
I® (= 3®) = sS/G + (1 - s®)F, 
it can be appreciated that an increase in the level of net pub­
lic foreign capital inflow (F), other things being equal, will 
allow an expanded public investment program (I^). In the re­
duced form for 1962 presented-by Thorbecke and Gondos, F has a 
GDI growth multiplier of ,8386, Likewise, an increase in the 
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level of XS will have a similar effect on I®, Model C defines 
/-^  as : 
H- F + ]{ 
where is the level of indirect taxes, is the level of 
direct taxes, F is the level of net public capital inflow and 
R is a composite term which mainly reflects the difference be­
tween total public expenditures and total public revenues. The 
basic source of flexibility with respect to increasing 
assuming no change in F, is a rise in H which amounts to defi­
cit financing of the implied expansion in X®. In the reduced 
form of Model G for 1962, R enters with a multiplier of 1,8580 
with respect to GDI, Model C does allow, therefore, explicit 
consideration of the public expenditure program as a means to 
achieve GDI growth, both through the inflow of public foreign 
capital and deficit financing; alternatives which could not be 
explicitly considered in Models A and B, It should be noted, 
however, that for the purposes of macroeconomic projections, an 
estimate of R is required, but only through a projection of the 
complete accounts of the public sector can an estimate of R be 
obtained. Furthermore, the model cannot be used to evaluate 
the degree of competition for credit between the private and 
public sector which must exist under the constraining objective 
of maintaining price stability. Model C, therefore, like Mod­
els A and B, does not explicitly consider the growth potential 
of private domestically-oriented economic activities. 
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b. A suggested Improvement In the Investment functions 
The definition of total investment in the Thorbecke-Condos 
models is : 
1 = iP + 1% 
The variable subsumes such private investment components as 
(1) foreign private investment, [?.) investment from domestic 
private sources and (3) private investment financed by capital 
transfer from the public sector, such as through the state 
development banks. It is suggested that an improvement in the 
private investment variable could be achieved through the dis­
aggregation of the variable into its major components. Let 
us define 1^ as: 
iP = jP' + iT f 
D ® 
where is private investment from domestic non-public 
sources, 1^ is total foreign private capital inflow and is 
the portion of domestic private investment financed through 
public sources, such as the state development banks, and is 
total private investment. 
The level of private foreign capital is subject to exten­
sive variation in its annual magnitude. The financing of a 
new large mining concern, such as the Toquepala copper mine, 
the Marcona iron mines, or one of the proposed new copper mines, 
requires very large inflows of private foreign capital over a 
one, two, or three year period. The discrete nature of this 
investment process and the relative infrequency of such large-
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scale investment projects causes large changes in the year-to-
year levels of private foreign capital inflow. Such irregular-
f ity in the level of I results in substantial fluctuations in 
the level of total private investment, which in turn compli­
cates tl'ie specification of statistically and theoretically ac­
ceptable private investment functions. 
In the case of Peru, however, an exogenous determination 
f 
of the level of I appears to provide a better estimate than 
an endogenous function. Major investment projects are usually 
identifiable a number of years before the actual investment is 
carried out. It appears that the approximate levels of invest­
ment required for such major projects are known in advance. 
Therefore, for planning horizons, or projection horizons, of 
approximately 5 years, an exogenous specification of the annual 
f levels of I is more accurate, to a high degree of probability, 
than any acceptable endogenous determination, 
Furthermore, since a complete balance of payments projec­
tion is desired for the evaluation of macroeconomic projections, 
f 
an estimate of I will have to be made for the balance of pay­
ments projection. If ah aggregative I^ function is used for 
projection purposes, such as in Models A, B and C, then an 
f 
estimate of I which Is obtained as a fixed proportion of the 
projection will not adequately project the extensive irregu-
f larlty in I , On the other hand, if an exogenous estimate of 
f 
I is made for the balance of payments projections, then it 
implies that 1^ - I^ = 1^* + I^, thereby, yielding implicit 
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estimates of the level of domestic private investment, which 
will be subject to extensive fluctuations in response to the 
f 
exogenously determined fluctuations in I . 
The conclusion is that should be disaggregated at least 
into + (I^* + I^), where if determined exogenously 
and + I^) is explained endogenously. 
Let us now consider the endogenous determination of the 
level of domestic private investment, (I^ + I^), It must be 
decided as to whether should be considered as a single 
endogenous variable or whether it should not be more accurate 
to treat 1^' and as separate variables. The variable is 
measured as the level of lending carried out by the state 
development banks plus direct capital transfer from the public 
to the private sector, the latter element being very small. 
The level of lending by the state development banks is deter­
mined by policy action, particularly through the extending of 
loans from the Central Reserve Bank to the state development 
banks. The level of is, therefore, a policy instrument of 
the public sector. It appears preferable, in this case, to 
treat I^' and as separate variables. It is suggested that 
the level of I^ should be treated as an exogenous variable, 
D ' 
subject to control by the public authorities, while I^ should 
be explained endogenously. 
In an effort to reduce the explicit dependence of I^* on 
the export sector, as implied by the Thorbecke-Condos models, 
D' the hypothesis that the level of I^ is determined by the level 
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of commercial credit (D) and enterprise profits (TT) is tested, 
A relation of the form 
= i^ + i^ (D + n)^ 
yields the estimated equation: 
if' = 904.0 + ,5005 (D + TT). if = . 8 5  
1 (.05) t 
i 
where D is the level of private credit, measured by commer­
cial and savings bank loans to the private sector, and n is the 
level of profits of enterprises. The relation, estimated on 
the basis of 1950-65 data in constant 19^3 Soles, is statisti-
p 
cally acceptable with a coefficient of determination of R' 
= ,85, The level of private credit (D) is subject to policy 
control by the public authorities, while the level of profits 
(TT) is explained as a function of the level of exports and the 
terms-of-trade, or 
TT = -752,0 + .642 E + 1.328 Z if = .93 
(.058) (.207) 
Therefore, although the determination of the level of private 
investment has been made less dependent on the external sector 
of the economy, the behavior of exports and the terms-of-trade 
effect remain as indirect determinants of the level of private 
investment. 
It is suggested, therefore, that the investment equations 
of a macroeconomic model of the Peruvian economy of the form, 
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I = iP' + + I® 
iP' = ig' + if* (D + TT). 
I* = Ï* 
jg = jg 
where the bar(-) over the symbol represents an exogenous pro­
jection, is preferable to the Investment equations utilized in 
Models A, B, and C of Thorbecke and Condos, For not only has 
the explanation of total private investment been improved, but 
also from the policy point of view a domestically controlled 
explanatory variable, D, has been included which allows policy 
action to influence the level of 1^, a feature which is not 
available in Models A, B or C, 
C, Description of a Macroeconomic Model of Peru 
for Medium-Term Projections (1966-1972) 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to present a macroeconomic 
model of the Peruvian economy that is designed for medium-term 
projections of the major macroeconomic variables. The initial 
part of the presentation consists of the complete system of 
relations that are used In the projection procedure. The com­
plete system contains 28 equations in 28 endogenous variables, 
oix relationships are behavioral, twelve are Identities and ten 
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s pecify constant relations between variables. The public 
sector is incorporated in the model. These relations are need­
ed in ordep to explain the derivation of the levels of the 
various exogenous variables that enter into the essential 
macroeconomic model, 
2. The complete system 
The complete system of relations is composed of 27 rela­
tions and one equilibrium condition. It is presented in esti­
mated form below. 
X = G + I + E H- Z - M 
C = H-
C^= 11050,0 + ,569X^ ,96 
( .029)  
X^= X - T^ 
I = I® H- + iP" 
C®= ( .4861 + ,0013t) G 
I^= G T G_ -
lP= iP' + 
I^= ,104G 
10 
11 
12 
13 
1/k 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
2 0  
P.l 
P.P 
P.-j 
25 
26 
P7 
28 
111 
= .0025 G 
iP' = 904,0 T .5005 (D + TT) 
( .05)  
G = C® + + VBEP + 
c r 
= .077 G 
VBEP = (.099 + .00048 t) G 
il = .062 
= .138 T^.i 
TT =.752.0 + ,642 hJ + 1.328 Z 
(.058) (.207) 
M =-3512,2 + ,155 C + ,58 I 
( ,039) ( .114) 
G = Y 
Y = H-
=-4047.2 + ,149 cj + ,259 M 
(.063) (.120) 
cj = 
= -2235,3 + .058 w 4- ,152 TT 
(.014) (,067) 
= ,227 M: 
= Tq (1 + .75 X)^ 
= (Xt . Xt_i)/Xt_i 
1'^  = G - (Y - TJ^ ) 
= .24 
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The definitions of the variables are as follows: 
iirdogenous variables: 
1) X Gross domestic income 
2) G Total consumption 
3) GP Private consumption 
4) Disposable income 
5) I Total investment 
6) iP' Domestic Investment from private sources 
7) n Profits of business enterprises 
8) M Total Imports 
9) Y Total public income 
10) rpi Indirect taxes 
11) ipd Direct taxes 
12) Private consumption minus consumer good imports 
13) Consumer good imports 
14) 
• 
Growth rate of gross domestic income 
15) mk 
•^1 Difference between total public expenditures and 
public revenue 
lixogenous variables; 
1) G® ; Public consumption 
2) : Direct public investment 
3) ! Private investment financed by state development banks 
Tr 4) I : Capital transfers to private sector from public sector 
f 5) I : Gross foreign private investment 
6) G : Total public expenditures 
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7) % • Current public expenditures 
8) 
s ' 
Capital public expenditures 
9) Tr®i Current transfers to private sector from public 
10) VBEP : Sum of net value added and inputs of public enter­
prises 
11) 1^ : Interest on internal debt 
12) , Amortization of internal debt 
13) Af : Amortization of external debt 
l4) D ! Commercial and savings bank credit to private sector 
15) if = Interest on external debt 
16) U I Wages and salaries 
17) T" ! Non-tax revenue 
18) Public foreign capital inflow 
19) 3 " Repayments of state development bank loans 
20) E : exports of goods and services 
21) Z t Terms-of-trade effect 
Equation 1) presents the definition of Gross Domestic Income 
(GDI). The use of the GDI concept instead of Gross National 
Product or Gross National Income "hinges on the relative 
importance of the terms-of-trade effect (Z), which permits the 
study of a potentially important factor in the growth of the 
Peruvian economy" (38, p, 189), It can be appreciated that the 
investment variable is treated as presented in Section (A,3,b), 
Private consumption, equation (3), is estimated as a 
function of disposable income, whereas public consumption equa­
tion (4) is treated as proportional to G, As C® is obtained 
11/; 
d. Tp r 
through the same estimating procedure as 1 , I , VBlîP and 
the methodology can be discussed in a unified form, A chart 
was constructed of the percentage incidence of each variable 
(i.e. G®, VBEP, with respdct to G for each year 
1960-65 (see Table 12) .  
Table 12, The proportion of C^, VANhlP^, INKP^ and 
T^, to total public expenditures (G) 196O-65 
C%/G 1^1/G l^^/G VAj^!':P/G INMP/G 
i960 49 .0  10 .9  .71 5.8 4,7 8.2 
1961 44 .8  12 ,1  .73 5.4 4 .7  7.0 
1962 49 .9  8 .2  .71 6,8 4.3 8,0 
1963 48 ,7  8 .9  .41 6,6 4,1 8.3 
1964 39 .2  10 .8  .13 6,1 3.4. 7 .2  
1965 49 ,0  11.5 , 22  5.5 3.3 7.5 
^VBi-:P is defined as (INEP + VANEP). 
^JNEP is defined as the value of inputs used by public 
enterprises, VAIMKP js defined as net value added of public 
enterprise. 
From Table 12 a second table (Table I ' j )  was derived that 
presented the average proportion of each variable to G for the 
period 1960-62 and for the period 1963-65, The difference be­
tween the average proportions calculated was computed and then 
divided by the number of years between the middle year of the 
two average calculations (196I and 1964) in order to derive the 
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Table 13t The average proportion of C®, VANEP, INEP 
and T^^ to G for the period 196O-62 and 1963-65 
C®/G I^/G I^^/G VANEP/G INEP/G tJ^/G 
1962 
E Ui/3 47.9 10,4 .72 6.0 4,6 7.7 
1=1960 
1965 
I: Ul/3 48.3 10.4 .25 6.1 3.6 7.7 
1=1963 
1965 1962 
E Ui/3 - Z Ui/3 0.4 0.0 -.47 .1 1,0 0.0 
1=1963 3=1960 
1962 
Definitions: Z Ui/3 is the average proportion of each vari-
1=1960 able (U) during I96O-62 and 
1965 
Z Ui/3 is the average proportion during 1963-65 
1=1963 
annual average change in each variable's percentage proportion 
of the total public expenditures. The resulting average annual 
change in composition was then applied to the average composi­
tion for the period 1963-65, which centers on 1964, to obtain 
estimates of the respective variables' composition in G in 1965, 
1966, etc. on to 1972. The constancy of the average composi­
tion of and T°^ to G for the 196O-62 and I963-65 calcula­
tions enabled the designation of the equations = .104 G and 
3? ' PC T . = ,77 G. C® is considered to increase its percentage 
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weight with respect to G by ,0013 each year from I966 to 1972, 
Therefore, enters the complete system of equations as 
- ( ,4M6l + ,00,3t)CJ^, as can be appreciated from Table 
12, has been subject to a rapidly declining composition.in G, 
although it recovered somewhat in 1965. For convenience the 
T r 1963-65 average composition of I was accepted as an appro-
Tr 
priate estimate of the weight of I in G for the 1966-72 pro-
rp-p jection period, thereby yielding the equation 1 = ,0025 G, 
A further modification was made in order to obtain the equa­
tion of VBEP, (i.e,, VBEP = (,099 + .00048t) (G). The result 
of the computations with respect to VAWEP and INEP yield an 
increasing composition of VAMEP and a decreasing composition 
of INEF, It was judged preferable to utilize the composition 
projection of VANEP but to modify the composition projection 
of INl'JP, The average relation of INEP to VAWEP, INEP = ,608 
VANEP, was calculated for the period 1962-65. INEP was assumed 
to maintain this average relation to VAJMEP during the 1966-72 
projection period. By summing VANEP and INEP to obtain VBEP, 
the equation VBEP = (,099 + ,00048t) G was obtained. 
Having presented the estimating procedure for the public 
expenditure account variables C^, T^^, I^, l"^^ and VBEP, it is 
convenient to continue with a consideration of the remaining 
expenditure account variables. Total public expenditure is 
^The symbol (t) is equal to the number of years beyond 
1966, or t = 0 for 1966, t = 1 for 1967, t = 2 for 1967 and so 
forth, ending with t = 0 for 1972, 
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defined as: 
G = Get + Gk 
C ^ = C® t T\ + VBl'JP + i^ + i^ 
ct ct 
Gj^ = I® + H-
i f 
Therefore, the remaining variables to be considered are i , i , 
A^, A^, I® and G, The variables i^ and A^ are determined by 
the 1960-65 relation of i^ to T^ and A^ to T^, The relations 
i^ = ,062 T^_^ and A^ = ,138 T^_^ are crude estimates of the 
order to magnitude of i^ and A^, Actually, A^ and i^ are 
related to internal debt formation, in terms of internal public 
V 
bond sales, whereas T^ is an aggregative term defined as the 
difference between total public expenditures and all public 
revenues excluding T^, or = G - (Y - T^), T^ subsumes a 
number of factors, such as internal debt formation, short-term 
credits to the public sector, and loans to the public sector 
from the Central Reserve Bank, However, given that such com­
ponents of T^ cannot be predicted, they are treated in unified 
fashion through the specification of T^, The use of the re­
lations i = ,062 T^ and A^ = ,138 T^, implies that as T^ in­
creases the level of internal debt formation increases in 
f f identical proportion, A and i , on the other hand, can be 
specified with greater certainty. Given the exogenous projec­
tion of the level of public foreign capital inflow and apply­
ing the appropriate rate of interest and amortization period 
f f the level of A and I on new public foreign capital inflow 
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f f 
can bo obtained, by combining A and I on projected new 
f f 
external debt formation with A and J. on the existing exter-
f f 
nal debt, the total A and i for each year of the projection 
period can be obtained. The I® variable as presented in equa­
tion (7) is determined as the difference between total public 
expenditure and all other expenditures, or 
1% = G - Gc/. - (I^ + -i- A^), 
The level of total public expenditure, G, is determined exo-
genously. For the purposes of the 1966-72 projections, three 
alternative hypotheses for G are considered; a 3.0/C, a 5.0^, 
and a 7,0% expansion considering the 1966 level of G as the 
base year. The arbitrariness in the projection of G is reduced 
by the use of the resulting level of T^ as an indicator of the 
level of G that the economy can support, given the existing 
policy regime and the policy objective with respect to mone­
tary stability. Therefore, the feasible range of G expansion 
is explicitly dependent upon the projected growth performance 
of the macroeconomy. 
The specification of I® as a residual requires justifi­
cation, However, as the justification involves reference to 
the revenue side of the public accounts, the discussion of the 
way in which the revenue account is derived is presented before­
hand. 
119 
Total public revenue is defined as 
Y + + Tg + Tj , 
where (T^ + + T^) constitutes revenue on current account 
and (T^ H- T, 4- tÎ5) represents revenue on capital account, In-
1 /• j 
4 
direct taxes (T ) are estimated statistically as a function of 
the level of consumption of domestically produced goods (C^ ) 
and the total level of imports (M), The estimated relation Is: 
T^ = -4047,2 + .149 cP* + ,259 M, = .94 
(.063) (.120) 
The level of direct taxes (T^) is estimated statistically as a 
function of the level of wages and salaries (W) and the level 
of profits (TT), or 
T^ = 2235.3 + ,058 W + ,152 TT. = ,89 
( . 014) '  ( . 067)  
Therefore, T^ is also endogenously determined. The level of 
non-tax revenue (T^), however, is not endogenously determined. 
For lack of a preferable procedure, T" is estimated through an 
elasticity relation between the growth rate of GDI and T". 
The elasticity of T  ^ with respect to GDI, during the 196O-65 
period; is determined as; 
(T^ - T^ ) 
1965 i960 / GDI 1965 - GDI i960 
rpn / , GDI i960 
i960 
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yields a value of (.75). is estimated during 1966-72, 
therefore, as 
(1  +  . 75  Xf )  
k 
the level of public foreign capital inflow (Tp) is estimated 
exogenously for 1966-72, as recorded in the 1966-72 projec­
tions of the balance of payments. The level of repayments of 
loans to the state development banks by the private sector 
(T^) is estimated as = ,24 I^, the average relation of 
to over the 196O-65 period. Finally, as discussed above, 
the lev3l of is determined by the difference between G an 
the sum of all other revenues, or 
= G - (T^ + + Tg + Tj), 
Keeping in mind this estimating procedure for the revenue 
accounts, let us turn to the justification of determining I® 
as a residual. As argued by Thorbecke and Condos (38, p, I98), 
the level of I® is determined by domestic and external factors. 
Thorbecke and Condos present the I® relation in Model C as 
iS (=38) = + (1-sG) F 
where 3® is total public sector savings, s® is the proportion 
of used to finance I®, X® can be considered to be equiva­
lent of Y, and F is net foreign public capital inflow or the 
k f f \ 
equivalent of (T^ - A - i ), In the system presented in this 
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section, the lev&l of I® is also determined by these external 
and domestic factors. The level of is actually obtained as 
the proportion of the sum of savings on current account (i.e., 
Gc - (T^ f + T"), to G. Basically an increase in one or all 
of these components of 3^ would mean an increase in 
Although the two approaches to the determination of 
are basically the same, a difference does exist in their re­
spective usefulness for projection and policy purposes. In the 
Thorbecke and Condos I® relation, the magnitude of s® must be 
determined, a priori, for each year in the projection horizon. 
The a priori specification of s® is complicated by the inter­
dependence between and X®, and between s® and other public 
sector variables. 
Model G does not provide explicit means for the consid­
eration of such Interdependence, On the other hand, the sys­
tem presented in this section does allow explicit consideration 
of the interdependencies. Furthermore, the level of s® can be 
obtained from within the system. Therefore, from the projec­
tion point-of-view, the system presented in this section en­
sures consistency within the public accounts whereas Model C 
does not ensure such consistency. Prom the policy viewpoint, 
the Thorbecke and Condos I® relation permits the policy use 
of s'^ to foster I®, However, Model C cannot give explicit 
consideration to the implications of a policy decision to in­
crease s^. The examination of the policies which must be 
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taken to allow the attainment of an increase in s® must be 
performed exogenously to Model C, which may endanger the inter­
nal consistency among the major macro accounts, 
\ 
The system presented ir. this section, which provides for 
the integration of thë màjor macro accounts, allows explicit 
consideration of policies needed to achieve an increase in s^ 
and ensures consistency, 
Equation (8) presents the definition of total private 
investment. The explanation of the disaggregation of total 
private investment and the estimation of the variable are 
presented in section B,3,b, For projection purposes the level 
of credit offered by the commerical banking system (D), is 
exogenously determined, while the level of profits (TT), the 
other explanatory variable of is determined endogenously 
as a function of the exogenous projections of export (E) and 
the terms-of-trade effect (Z), 
The only remaining equation in the complete system is 
equation (18), the import function. Total imports (M) are 
determined as a function of total consumption (C) and total 
investment (I), or 
M = -3512,2 + ,155 C + ,58 I = ,97 
(,039) (.114) 
The relatively high marginal imports of investment goods re­
flects the lack of any significant capital-goods producing 
industries in Peru, Considering the low rate of production of 
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capital goods, the import content of investment is maintained 
as low as it is only through the relative importance of con­
struction activity in total investment, 
3. The "basic" model 
The complete system of equations as presented in section 
B,2, can be considered as an overall model that can be decom­
posed into an interdependent system and a second system of 
relations which are dependent upon the solution of the inter­
dependent system. The interdependent system, or the "basic" 
model, can be constructed as a self-contained econometric 
model, which permits solution for the essential endogenous 
macroeconomic variables. 
The "basic" model, in estimated form, is as follows; 
la) X = C + I + E -f Z - M 
2a) C = cP + C® 
3a) I = 1^ + I® 
4a) = jP' + 
5a) = 11050,0 + ,569 X* 
(.029) 
6a) = X - T* 
.96 
7a) = 904,0 + .5005 (D + TT) 
( . 0 5 )  
.85 
8a) M = -3512,2 + ,155 C + ,581 I 
(.039) (.114) 97 
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9a) = -2235.3 + .058 W + .152 n ,89 
(.014) (.067) 
10a) n = -752.0 + ,642 E + 1,328 Z .93 
(.058) (,207) 
The model consists of ten independent equations and ten 
endogenous variables. It contains five definitional rela­
tions, and five statistically estimated structural rela­
tions, Nine variables are exogenous. The structure of the 
"basic" model is represented in Table l4. The equations, 
identified by their respective numbers, are listed verti­
cally in the left-hand column and the variables are entered 
horizontally across the top of the table. The coefficients of 
the variables entering each equation are written in the body 
of the table. The coefficients are entered in extended matrix 
form corresponding to the following matrix representation of 
the model structure 
By - Gx = d, 
where B and G represent the coefficient matrices of the endo­
genous and exogenous variables, respectively, y and x represent 
the vectors of endogenous and exogenous variables, respective­
ly, and d represents a vector of constants. It can be appre­
ciated from the table that the relations (10a), (7a), (4a), 
(3a), and (9a) can be obtained recursively, given the exogenous 
Table 14. The structure of the "basic" model 
Endogenous variables Exogenous variables 
Equations II IP' I T^ çP C M X c9 E Z D W I^ I^^ Constant 
10a 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -.642 -1.328 0 0 0 0 0 -752.0 
7a -.5005 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -.5005 0 0 0 0 904.0 
4a 0 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 -1 -1 0.0 
3a 0 0 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
O
 
.
 
o
 
9a -.152 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .058 0 0 0 -2235.3 
5a 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -.569 0 0 0 .. 0 0 0 0 0 0 11050.0 
2a 0 0 0 0 0 -1 1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
8a 0 0 0 -.581 0 0 -.155 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3512.2 
la 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 1 1 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
6a 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
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variables. On the other hand, the remaining relations are 
interdependent, thereby requiring a simultaneous solution. 
Let us now consider the relation between the "basic" model 
and the complete system of equations of Section B,2, 
It can be appreciated from the discussion of the complete 
system of equations in Section B,2 that the values of the exo-
p* iT d Ti* genous variables C^, I , and I are obtained from the lev­
el of total public expenditures (G) through the application of 
relations (4), (?), (9) and (10) of the complete system. The 
f 
values of IC, Z, I and D, on the other hand, are obtained 
exogenously to the complete system. The exogenous variable W, 
on the other hand, is obtained through the application of equa­
tion (25) of the complete system. 
The remaining variables in the complete system, after the 
estimation of the variables included in the "basic" model, are 
derived through the relations presented in Section B,2, The 
principal reason for their estimation is to allow the con­
struction of a full statement of the public sector accounts. 
All of the public expenditures components are estimated exo­
genously or as functions of exogenous variables, except for 
amortization of the internal debt (A^), interest payments on 
the internal debt (i^), and the level of public investment 
(I^), A^ and i^ are estimated as functions of the discrepancy 
between the level of expenditures and revenues (T^) lagged one 
year, (T^_^), (i,e,, equations (17) and (18) of Section B,2, 
In the base year (1966), the level of T^ is known and, there-
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4 4 "I 
fore, A and i can be entered directly into the public expen­
diture accounts for the projection year 1967, which then per­
mits the estimation of I® as the residual, I® = G - -
(I + I + A + A ), In order to construct the public expen­
diture accounts for 1968, however, the level of in 1967 
must be known, which can only be found through the estimation 
of the complete public revenue accounts, as = G - (T^ + 
+ + Tp + T^), Once the level of for 1967 has been 
estimated, the levels of A^ and i^ for I968 can be estimated. 
At this point, the complete expenditure account for I968 has 
been estimated, except for I®, which can now be obtained as a 
residual. This iterative procedure among the public expendi­
ture accounts, the public revenue accounts, and the projections 
of the "basic" model (i.e., is determined endogenously to 
the "basic" model and and are determined recursively 
from the solution of the "basic" model), must take place for 
each year of the projection horizon, in order to obtain esti­
mates of the public account variables entering the "basic" 
model that satisfy the consistency requirement among the major 
accounts, 
4. Critique of the complete system 
oection A and B contain an assessment of the attributes 
of the medium-term model for projecting the performance of the 
Peruvian economy over the 1966-72 period. This section is 
limited to a consideration of the outstanding deficiencies of 
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the model. 
Thé major deficiency of the model, as in Models A, B, and 
C of Thorbecke and Condos (38), is the lack of an aggregate 
production function. Due to this deficiency, the capacity-
I 
creating function of investment cannot be treated within the 
model. The specification of a theoretically and statistically 
acceptable production function has been unattainable. Further 
research is required of this problem, although the quality of 
the existing macroeconomic data may well frustrate the effort 
to obtain an acceptable production function. The alternative 
of specifying disaggregated production functions, (i.e., sec­
tor production functions) does not exist given the lack of 
data on the sectoral allocation of the factors of production. 
Current efforts to improve the quality of the macroeconomic 
data and to achieve estimates of the sectoral allocation of 
production factors may permit the specification of acceptable 
aggregate and/or sectoral production functions in the future. 
The lack of a production function in Model C of Thorbecke 
and Condos means that the level of public Investment (I®) 
enters the model only as a component of final demand. Given 
that an increase in the level of public investment requires a 
larger increase in the level of imports than an increase in 
public consumption, (i.e., M = -3512,2 + ,155 C + ,581), a 
decision to increase the level of domestically financed at 
the expense of C® will tend to depress GDI growth. This un­
desirable feature of Model C, which is also a feature of the 
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medlim-term projection model presented In section B, derives 
from the inability of the model to translate Increases In 
I 
investment into increased production capacity. Therefore, our 
projection model Is also subject to Goldberger's criticism of 
Model C, i,e„",,, it is disconcerting to find that a policy 
of increasing the share of Government domestic resources which 
is devoted to investment has the effect of depressing the level 
of income,,,," (38, p, 209), 
Although the legitimacy of Goldberger's criticism cannot 
be denied, it is pertinent to point out that the short-run 
Impact of an increase in the share of Government domestic re­
sources which is devoted to investment probably is to depress 
the level of income. Government investment in infrastructure 
has a delayed impact on the expansion of productive capacity, 
but an immediate impact of the decision to Increase the share 
of Government domestic resources into investment may not be 
substantially different from t^e predictions of Model C, 
although the medium to long-term Impact should emphasize the 
dominance of the capacity-creating effects, 
D, Formal Properties of the Basic Model 
Three formal properties of the "basic" model are analyzed; 
(l) equatlonal consistency; (2) identification of the structur­
al equations; and (3) the "reduced form" of the model. 
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1. Eauational consistency 
A system of equations, or a model, is equationally con­
sistent if the number of endogenous variables is equal to the 
number of structural equations, Satisfaction of the property 
ensures the existence of a unique solution for the endogenous 
variables. The "basic" model contains ten endogenously deter­
mined variables, (X, C^, T^, M, TT, 1, I^, 1^*) in ten 
equations. The "basic" model is therefore, equationally con­
sistent. 
2. Identification 
The concept of identification is concerned with the pro­
perty of distinguishability among the various equations and 
parameters contained within the model. The basic reasons for 
concern over the identifiability of an econometric model that 
is intended for policy investigations are summarized below; 
"There are at least three basic reasons for emphasizing 
the necessity of identification in an economic policy 
model. The first is that the model builder in economics 
is concerned with non-experimental data, , , With non-
experimental data, one has to know, for instance, on 
an a priori basis whether one obtains a supply function 
or a demand function by statistical fitting to a set 
of observed price-quantity data. Second, identification 
of economic relationships in a model is necessary under 
conditions of structural change, which is generally 
envisaged as a consequence of policy making. This would 
be the case, for example, when one is required to make 
predictions on the assumption that the economic be­
havior pattern itself will have undergone a change as 
compared with the past during which the historical in­
formation was obtained. Third, identification in one 
of its specific statistical senses (e.g,, non-identifi-
ability of a set of coefficients in a given equation, 
due to multicollinearity) is necessary in order to 
avoid nonuniqueness and even indeterminacy of statistical 
estimates of parameters," (9, P. 51), 
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with ronpect to the "bfislc" model, reason;: (l) and (3) 
are applicable to Its use as a projection model and reasons 
(1), (2), and (3) are applicaple to its subsequent policy use. 
The identification problen* is concerned with the statis­
tically estimated equations. We note that the "basic" model 
has five such equations, i.e,, (5), (7), (9), (8), and (10), 
Let us consider the identification of each of these equations. 
The equations are: 
(10a) n = aQ + a^ E + a^ Z 
(7a) = Iq + i^ (D + n) 
(5a) cP = Og + 0% X - Og T'l 
(9a) T^ = tg + t^ W + tp TT 
(8a) M = m^ + I® + m^ + m^ 1^' 
+ + my 
These equations can be represented by the matrix equation 
e = By - Cz - d 
where the definitions of the symbols are: 
e : vector of stochastic error terms 
B : coefficient matrix of endogenous variables 
C ; coefficient matrix of exogenous variables 
y : vector of endogenous variables 
z ! vector of exogenous variables 
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d : voctor of constants 
The voctor of endogenous variables is defined as follow 
= n 
yp = i"' 
yj = cP 
y^ = 
= M 
• ^6 ^ 
The vector of exogenous variables is defined as follows 
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The matrix equation can be Written in extended form as follows: 
(10) ej = ^11^1 - "13^3 -
(7) ej = - bpo + bggyz - bjjjyj -
( 5 )  ~  ^  ^3 3 ^ 3  ~  ^3 5 ^ 5  ^  ^3 ^ ^ ^  
(9) = - b^Q + bjj^y^ - b^j^y^ -
(8) ej = - bjg + ty^y^ - b^gy, - b^^y^ -
" °56^6 " °57^7 " G^gZa 
which yields the matrix equation 
-b 10 11 0 0 0 0 0 
1
 
o
 
-^21 ^22 
0 0 0 0 
! 
1 
j 
-tyo 
0 0 b^3 
"34 "^35 ° 
X i 
^3 
i + 
i 
-^40 
0 0 0 0 
-tyo 
0 
"^52 
-"53 
0 
"55 ° ! 
^5 
\j6^  
0 0 
"*13 "*14 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
-O25 
0 0 0 0 
" 2 I  
2 3 !  
- -i 
'1: 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 
=4 = 
^5 ^ 
^2! 
®3| 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
"G49 ^6 ®4! 
"*51 -°52 
0 0 0 
"*56 "*57 -G58 
0 
i 
Z7 
^8 , 
Z9 
^ 5 :  
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The presentation of the adjoined coefficient matrices for 
identification analysis with the definitions of the (1 = 1, 
2,,,,, 7) and (j = 1, 2, ,,,, 8) is presented In Table 15a, 
a. A necessary condition for identification The num­
ber of variables excluded from the equation to be identified 
must be at least G-1, i.e., one less than the total number of 
structural equations in the whole system (4^, p, 157), We 
note that equation (10) satisfies the necessary condition 
since at Ifeast G-l=5-l=^ variables are excluded from 
(10), but are in the total system of endogenous and exogenous 
variables. Indeed, all of our equations satisfy the neces­
sary condition since the largest number of variables Included 
in any one equation (i,e,, equation (8)) is 8 while the com­
plete system contains a total of 15 variables. Hence, it is 
assured that each equation will exclude at least 4 variables, 
b. A necessary and sufficient condition for identifica­
tion The necessary and sufficient condition for identifi­
cation requires the ability to form at least one non-vanishing 
determinant of order G-1 from the coefficients with which the 
variables excluded from the equation under consideration appear 
in the other G-1 structural equations (40, P, 157), 
Let us consider the identification of equation (10), The 
coefficient matrix (B + C) with equation (10) and variables y^, 
Zy eliminated is: 
Table 15a. Presentation of the coefficient matrix for identification analysis 
Variables II CP M X ^ C9 E Z D / I^ l"^^ W 
Yl Yg Yg Y4 Y5 zi 7-2 Z3 24 Z5 2^ 27 Zg Zg 
Equations Constants 
lu 1 c ^11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CO 1—1 0 1 -=14 0 0 0 0 0 
7 
"^20 "^21 ^22 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
"=25 0 0 0 0 
5 
~^30 0 0 ^33 ^34 ~^35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 
"^40 
f—1 1 0 0 
^44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -=49 
8 
~^0 0 "^52 ~^3 0 ^5 Û -C5I "=52 0 0 0 "^6 -=57 "=58 0 
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^2 ^3 ^5 ^6 '1 "2 '5 ^6 ^7 28 z? 
(7a) 
•^20 ^22 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
-025 0 0 0 0 
(5a) 0
 
1 0 
^34 "^5 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(9a) 0
 
1 0 0 
V 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -C42 
(8a) 
"^50 "t^2 -053 
0 
^5 
0 
-C52 0 -C56 "°57' 
0
 C
O 0 
From this matrix the rollowing determinant of order G-l 
= 4 can be constructed: 
^2 ^3 "1 
^22 0 0 0 
0 
^33 ^3^ 
0 
0 0 0 
-^52 "^3 
0 
'°51 
The value of the determinant is the product (bg^) x 
X (b^^) X (-c^^). If the value of this determinant is not 
equal to zero, then the determinant is non-vanishing. The only 
way in which the value can be zero is if one of the coeffi­
cients (bgg), (b^^), (b^^), or (-c^^) is equal to zero. In 
order to test this condition let us specify the estimated val­
ues for the coefficients J (bp^ = 1), (b^^ = 1), (b^^ = 1), and 
(-C51 fc -,581), 
Hence, the value of the determinant is -.581 which means 
that the determinant is non-vanishing. Therefore, equation 
i jOB. 
(10a) satisfies the necessary and sufficient condition for 
Identification, 
Since the condition states that at least one non-vanlsh-
lYïF, determinant of order G~1 is required, only one such deter­
minant is required, Kach equation of the model, i.e., (7a), 
(5a), (10a), (9a) and (8a) must be examined in the same way as 
equation (lOa) has been analyzed in order to ensure that it 
satisfies the nepessary and sufficient condition for identifi­
cation, Such analysis has been carried out for all the sto­
chastic equations of the "basic" model, yielding the conclusion 
that each equation does indeed satisfy the necessary and suffi­
cient condition for identification, 
3. The "reduced form" 
The "reduced form" of a model Is defined as the solution 
of the model for the endogenous variables in terms of the 
exogenous variables. With reference to the "basic model", the 
"reduced form" yields the solutions for the endogenous vari­
ables X, C, I, M, C^, , X^, T^, and n in terms of the 
exogenous variables I®, C®, E, Z, D, W, 1^, 1^^\ The 
numerical "reduced form" of the "basic model" is presented as 
follows, liach of the coefficients entered into the body of 
the matrix can be considered as an "impact multiplier". For 
example, a change in the level of any exogenous variable, 
listed across the top of the matrix, can be transformed into 
a change in the level of any of the endogenous variables, 
Table 15D. The "reduced form" of the "basic model" 
l9 C9 E Z D W if I^ Constants 
X .8070 l.b275 2.0951 2.2756 .4039 -.0537 .8070 .8U70 .8070 27,350.4 
c .4592 1.9261 1.1365 1.1798 .2298 —.0636 .4592 .4592 .4592 27,949.7 
I 1.0000 0.0000 .3213 .6647 .5005 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 527.6 
M .6522 .2985 .3629 .5691 .3264 -.0098 .6522 .6522 .6522 1,126.3 
cP 
.4592 .9261 1.1365 1.1798 .2298 -.0636 ,.4592 .4592 .4592 27,521.6 
O.OOOU 0.0000 .3213 .6647 .5005 o.oooa 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 527.6 
iP' u.oooo • 0.0000 . 3213 .6647 .5005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 527.6 
.a070 1.6275 2.0000 2.0738 .4039 -.1117 .8070 .8070 .8070 29,700.0 
Td 0.0000 0.0000 .0976 .2019 0.0000 .0580 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -2,349.6 
II 0.0000 0.0000 .6420 1.3280 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -752.0 
I  
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listed vertically in the left hand margin, through the appli­
cation of the relative "impact multiplier" to the change in 
the exogenous variable, (See Table 15b) 
E, Stability of the Reduced Form Over 
the Projection Period 
A projection of the Peruvian economy can be obtained from 
the application of the "reduced form" multipliers to the pro­
jections for the exogenous variables over the projection per­
iod, This forecasting procedure, however, implicitly assumes 
that the "reduced form" parameters will remain constant over 
the projection period: in other words, that there will be no 
significant change in the structure of the economy. This 
section analyzes the reasonableness of this assumption. 
The analysis presented in Chapter II identified two types 
of structural change, (1) a change that requires the re-speci-
fication of the functional relationship representing the 
structure and (2) a change that requires only an adjustment in 
the quantitative magnitude of the structural parameters as 
included in the specified functional relationships. The for­
mer type of structural change can be denoted a "0 "-type 
structural change, and the latter as an a-type structural 
change. 
The specification of the model in its present form identi­
fies the principal demand-creating factors as (1) the earnings 
of the export sector, (2) the level of government expenditures, 
and (3) the level of commercial credit. The model depicts the 
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Peruvian economy, as being heavily dependent upon the export 
sector. There is general agreement in the literature (11), 
(38), (^2)j that the principal motive force in recent Peruvian 
economic growth has been the performance of the export sector. 
There is no anticipated structural change which would signifi­
cantly modify the "export-propelled" growth orientation of the 
economy during the projection period, A large-scale import 
substitution program might temporarily shift the driving force 
of the economy from the export sector to the internal sector. 
However, substantial import substitution has occurred during 
the recent period of ample foreign exchange availability under 
tariff protection. The limited size of the domestic market, 
due to a relatively small population, a low level of per 
capita income, a highly skewed income distribution, and a pre­
ference for imported goods by the high income class, appears 
to have restricted the expansion of the domestic industrial 
sector. Likewise, the feasibility of a growth inducing large-
scale Import substitution program is restricted by these 
structural conditions. As the likelihood of achieving sig­
nificant changes In these structural conditions is low, it is 
also unlikely that the driving force of the economy will shift 
from the export sector to the internal market production sec­
tor. 
The expectation that the Peruvian economy will remain 
"export-propelled" during the projection period provides 
reasonable assurance that the specification of the functional 
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relationships in the model will not be invalidated by a •/ -
type structural change. This expectation is not independent, 
however, of the assumed behavior of government expenditures and 
commercial credit, both of which enter the model exogenously. 
The sample period for the estimation of the structural rela­
tions in the model (1950-1965) was a period of considerable 
monetary stability for the Peruvian economy relative to other 
Latin American economies. Both fiscal and monetary policy were 
conducted with considerable restraint. The average annual rate 
of inflation was restrained to approximately 8,6^, although 
substantially higher rates were recorded in some years due to 
the increased domestic cost of imports resulting from devalua­
tions of the domestic currency on the international market. If 
substantial changes in the conduct of fiscal and monetary poli­
cy were anticipated during the projection period, then a modi­
fication of the economic structure might occur which would be 
of sufficient significance to be classified as a /' -type 
structural change which would require the re-specification of 
some of the functional relationships in the model. 
Fiscal policy, for example, could be an important instru­
ment for reducing the skewness of the income distribution via 
the imposition of a more effective progressive income taxation 
system and an increase in those government expenditure which 
would augment the real resources at the disposal of the lower-
income classes. The implementation of such a fiscal policy in 
conjunction with measures to increase the productive efficiency 
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of the domestic industrial activities might improve the pro­
spects of achieving a growth stimulus from the domestic market 
production sector. In so doing, these policy measures might 
produce a structural impact that would require a re-specifica­
tion of some of the functional relationships in the model. 
However, the prospects of such policy changes during the pro­
jection period, from the current vantage point, are very 
modest. 
Alternatively, the possibility exists that fiscal and 
monetary policy will be used with much less restraint during 
the projection period than they were used during the same 
period. The implication is that the public authorities will 
opt for an acceleration in the rate of inflation. Budgetary 
deficits may be accepted, as necessary in the effort to finance 
an expended development program by the public sector while 
commercial credit expansion is allowed to finance the private 
sector expansion plans. 
It is highly probable that an accelerated rate of infla­
tion would induce a-type structural changes, if not -type 
structural changes, In a open economy such as Peru's accel­
erated inflation would require changes in balance of payments 
policy. The policy of maintaining a relatively constant ex­
change rate on the free market without direct control of im­
ports would have to give way to policies of foreign exchange 
control in order to adjust the level of import demand to the 
capacity-to-import, 
I4l 
An alternative would be to opt for a freely fluctuating 
exchange rate, a policy which has not been popular among devel 
oping countries. Accelerated inflation would also induce 
alterations in wage and price policy as various groups of the 
society sought to protect their rdal income from the effect of 
inflation. Such policy changes would affect the stability of 
various structural parameters in the model as variables which 
have not been included in the functional relationships, but 
which do influence the estimates of the included parameters, 
would be subject to significant change. In particular, the 
stability of the aggregate demand relationships would be 
brought into question by shifting relative prices and possible 
changes in the distribution of income. Furthermore, the pat­
tern of expenditure behavior might be significantly influenced 
by the efforts of income recipients to adjust their expendi­
ture patterns so as to protect their real assets from infla­
tion. 
Of the possible sources of change in the structural re­
lations and coefficients mentioned in this section, the possi­
bility of accelerated inflation is the most likely to occur. 
The projection procedure employed reflects the assumption that 
the public authorities will seek to restrain inflationary 
pressure. For example, the exogenous projection of the level 
of commercial credit is based on the historical average rate 
of growth of commercial credit to the private sector. The 
technique employed to determine the rate of expansion in public 
expenditures is based on an estimate of the impact of the def­
icit of the public sector on the rate of inflation, Specifi­
cally, it is assumed that the public authorities will seek to 
restrict the rate of inflation to less than 10% annually 
(slightly more than the 1950-1965 average of 8,6#) and that 
monetary and fiscal policy will be conducted in accordance with 
this objective with respect to the rate of inflation. 
If it is reasonable to assume that the rate of inflation 
will be restricted to less than 10% a year, then the necessity 
of making adjustments in the "reduced form" parameters is not 
conclusively established. Perhaps the most likely changes in 
the parameters derive from the prospect of tax reform. Reform 
in personal and business Income taxes would alter the para­
meters of the direct tax function which in turn would alter 
the "reduced form" parameters. However, subsequent attention 
is given to the prospective tax reform measures in Chapter VT, 
Kstimates are made of the expepted yield from tax reform 
measures and the possible impact of these additional revenues 
on the level of public expenditures, although the analysis is 
partial in nature. Although other structural changes probably 
will occur over the projection period, it is not expected that 
such changes will seriously affect the validity of the specifi­
cation of the structural relations in the model nor the general 
validity of the "reduced form" parameters. 
1^ 3 
F, Projected Macroeconomic Performance: 
1966-1972 
The essence of the macroeconomic projection procedure is 
the use of the "basic" model of Section C to project the major 
macroeconomic variables, complemented by the other relations 
contained in the complete system presented in oection C in 
order to obtain consistent accounts for the public sector and 
for the balance of payments. 
The major macroeconomic variables were projected by the 
application of the "reduced form" to independently derived 
projections of the nine exogenous variables which enter into 
the "basic" model. The projections of the exogenous variables 
were obtained in various ways, the procedure being determined 
by the nature of the variable. The sensitivity of the Peruvian 
economy to the performance of the export sector indicates a 
need for detailed export projections. Accordingly, the nine 
major export products of the Peruvian export sector are identi­
fied and projections are presented for each product in terms 
of volume, unit price, and value. The projected level of total 
exports is then derived from these detailed product-by-product 
projections. The terms-of-trade projection also derives from 
the product-by-product export projections as these projections 
present estimates of future commodity price levels. 
The projections of the public consumption and investment 
variables are obtained in the manner described in Section C, 
Three alternative assumptions are made with respect to the 
1# 
performance of public expenditures over the projection period. 
It is assumed that the rate of growth in total public expendi­
tures will be 3%, 5% or 7%, For each alternative growth rate 
of total public expenditures, the corresponding levels of pub­
lic consumption, public investment, investment by development 
banks, and capital transfers are estimated. The specification 
of three alternative growth rates of public expenditures trans­
lates into three alternative projections of the major macro-
economic variables contained in the model. 
The levels of foreign private investment over the projec­
tion period are estimated independently on the basis of exist­
ing trends and announced investment plans by major foreign 
enterprises operating in the Peruvian economy. The projections 
of wages and salaries and the level of commercial credit are 
based on trend factors. 
The projection procedure yields three alternative sets 
of macroeconomic projections, which are denominated A^, A^, 
and k.j corresponding to the 3^i 5%t and 7% growth rates in 
total public expenditures discussed above, l'îach alternative 
macroeconomic projection has five corresponding tables (1) 
the exogenous variable projections, (2) the resulting projec­
tions for the endogenous variables, (3) the public expenditure 
account, (4) the public revenue account, and (5) the balance 
of payments account. The five tables for each of the three 
alternative macroeconomic projections are presented in Appendix 
C, The detailed product-by-fproduct export projections are 
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presented in Appendix B along with the projection of the bal­
ance of payments entries other than total imports. 
The macroec:onomio variable of major concern is the level 
of Gross Domestic Income (GDI). The projection procedure in­
dicates that GDI can be expected to increase at an average 
cumulative annual rate, from I966 to 1972, of 2,5% under alter­
native , 3,0# under alternative A^, or at 3*5% under alter­
native ky The varying assumptions on the rate of growth of 
total public expenditures explain the differing growth rates. 
The annual variations within each GDI projection can be appre­
ciated from Table 16, 
Table I6, Projected growth rates of gross domestic income 
under three alternative hypotheses: 1966-1972 
Years 4 h. ^3 
1967 1.7 2.2 2.7 
1968 1.8 2,1 2.7 
1969 3.7 4.1 4,6 
1970 2.7 3.2 3.8 
1971 3.0 3.5 4,0 
1972 2.5 3.0 3.2 
Cumulative 
growth rate 
1966-1972 2.5 3.0 3.5 
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The shift to a higher annual GDI growth rate in 1969 is due to 
projected increases in investment activity. The relatively 
rapid growth in 1969 derives from a projected rapid increase in 
public investment. The explanation of the large increase in 
public investment resides in the interaction between the pro­
jection procedure for the public accounts and the refinancing 
of the Peruvian external debt in July of 1968, In essence, 
public investment is obtained as a residual. Prior to the re­
financing of the debt, the debt servicing charges (i,e,, inter­
est and amortization payments) were rapidly increasing their 
pressure on the public sector budget. In effect, as debt 
servicing charges rose they claimed an increasing share of the 
budget and, other things being equal, reduced the level of 
public investment which is obtained as a residual. The re­
financing of the external debt postponed large amortization 
payments until 1970, as well as increasing the interest due 
in later years consequent to the refinancing charges. Con­
sequently, the projected budgetary situation in 1968 and I969 
improved allowing a large increase in the residual item, pub­
lic investment. Of course, the level of public investment 
declines sharply in 1970 as the impact of the refinancing is 
absorbed. The continuing relatively high GDI growth rates in 
1970-1972 derive from the expected large inflows of private 
capital destined for copper mines. 
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The GDI projections are affected by the large changes In 
investment since exports are assumed to grow at a modest rate. 
The GDI growth multipliers of exports (2,0951) and the terms-
of-trade effect (2,2756) are much larger than that of the exo­
genous investment variables (,8070), However, the magnitude 
of the movements in the investment sector are expected to 
dominate the effects on income of the modest and steady growth 
of the export sector over the period to 1972, 
Recognition of the existence of monetary stability as one 
of the objectives of development policy introduces an element 
of choice among the alternative GDI growth projections. The 
fact that the size of the deficit in the public sector is an 
important determinant of the rate of inflation in the economy 
leads to a consideration of the implicit required internal 
financing that the public sector would have to undertake with 
respect to each of the GDI growth alternatives. 
It is clear from Table 17 that the increasing rates of 
public expenditures tend to lead to rapidly increasing levels 
of required internal financing. This pattern is determined by 
the response of GDI to increases in the levels of public expen­
ditures and by the response of tax revenue to Increases in GDI, 
The GDI projections indicate that a 2,0% Increase in the level 
of public expenditures engenders a 0,5# Increase in the level 
of GDI, However, the relative inelasticity of the existing 
tax structure does not permit significant increases in the 
level of tax revenue. Given the existing structure, it is 
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Table 17, Required Internal financing levels for the alter­
native Rross domestic income projections (in 
millions of 196J soles) 
Alternatives 
Years 
h. A3 
1967 1222,6 1610,3 2040,5 
1968 2034,8 2919.9 3800,4 
1969 2494,6 3866.3 5302,0 
1970 1856.2 3784.7 5809,9 
1971 868,0 3469.3 6078,3 
1972 1090,9 4318,3 7450,6 
evident that, other things being equal, the inflationary im­
pact of the public sector expenditures under GDI growth 
alternative is greater than under Ag or A^, and that the 
inflationary impact of is greater than under A^ and less 
than under A^, 
If a relation can be constructed between the level of the 
required Internal financing and the rate of inflation, then a 
choice can be made among the GDI growth alternatives for that 
alternative which will maximize the level of income while not 
violating the objective with respect to monetary stability. 
The concept of required internal financing as used in 
this context is defined as the difference between total income 
and total expenditures of the public sector. It is more gen­
eral than the concept of a budget deficit that is financed by 
148 
money creation. It includes the possibility of raising re­
sources by Internal and external bond sales and of obtaining 
loans from the international private banking community, as well 
as loans from the Central Bank,which constitutes money cre­
ation, Although the relation between the magnitude of the 
required internal financing and the rate of inflation has not 
been quantitatively specified, a rough guideline with respect 
to the consistency of the required level of internal financing 
with the historical rate of inflation can be arbitrarily 
specified through inspection. For the purposes of this inves­
tigation, a rough guideline is established such that a level 
of required internal financing less than S/2500 millions is 
consistent, a level between 3/2500 and S/3500 millions is 
doubtfully consistent, and a level of more than S/3500 mil­
lions is inconsistent with the objective of restricting the 
rate of inflation to below {o% during the 1967-1972 period. 
Applying the above rough guideline to Table 17, it is 
clear that only alternative is uniformily acceptable as 
the levels of required internal financing are consistently 
below the S/25OO millions bound, Alternatives Ap and A^ 
imply levels of internal financing that generally exceed the 
upper limit of the rough guideline and therefore imply rates 
of inflation that exceed the 10% level. The preliminary 
conclusion is that total public expenditures could be allowed 
to expand at a rate of more than jfo per year but less than 
5% per year in real terms over 1967-1972 which on the basis 
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of the projection procedure employed would indicate a GDI 
growth rate of more than 2,5% but less than 3,0#, 
The relation between fiscal and monetary policy under the 
objective regarding the rate of inflation needs to be noted. 
Increased public expenditures that are deficit financed 
creates additional pressure on the price level. In view of 
this threat to price stability, the monetary authorities would 
most likely decide to restrict the level of private credit, 
for example by increasing the reserve requirements of the 
banking system. Under such conditions, it is not unlikely 
that the increase in GDI stemming from the increased activity 
of the public sector as it pushes its level of expenditures 
from 3% towards 5^ expansion will be partly offset by the de­
clining contribution of private Investment activity to GDI 
creation which would be induced by the contingent contraction 
in commercial bank credit to the private sector. 
The indicated GDI growth performance of the Peruvian 
economy has been obtained in a passive manner, in the sense 
that is is the result of the interaction between the "reduced 
form" of the "basic" model and the independently specified 
projections of the exogenous variables. Improvement in the 
GDI growth projections can be obtained through the analysis of 
the impact of various changes in the structural parameters of 
the estimated form of the model and/or changes in the exogenous 
projections. These changes can be Induced by alternative 
policy actions that are under the control of the Peruvian 
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public authorities, such as tax reform, or of the internation­
al development institutions, such as the leve] of loans to the 
country. An analysis of the major growth alternatives open to 
the Peruvian economy is conducted in Chapter VI, 
Thusfar, the alternative GDI growth projections have been 
analysed from the point of view of income growth and monetary 
stability. It is clear, however, that the balance of inter­
national payments position also is an important element in 
evaluating the feasibility of the alternative GDI growth pro­
jections, Tables 60, 65, and 70 of Appendix C present the 
balance of payments position consistent with the alternative 
projections A^, A^, and A^, respectively. Perhaps the most 
advantageous manner in which to evaluate the balance of pay­
ments positions is to compare the calculated "capacity-to-
import" with the projected import demand for each GDI growth 
alternative. The comparisons presented in Table 18, ignoring 
temporarily 196? and 1968, indicate that only GDI growth alter­
native A^ implies a balance of payments problem. The 196? 
entries are actually recorded data whereas those for 1968 are 
estimates obtained independently of the projection model. The 
excess of import demand over the capacity-to-import in 1967 
resulted in a heavy loss of international reserves which in­
duced the Central Bank of Peru to withdraw from the market in 
September 196?, thereby allowing a devaluation of the Peruvian 
domestic currency. The loss In reserves recorded in 1967 is 
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Table 18, Comparison of import demand levels to the capacity 
to-import under growth alternatives Ag, A^ 
(in millions of U, S, dollars) 
Years Ai *2 A3 Capacity-to-import 
1967 1017.7 1017.7 1017.7 943.7 
1968 900.0 900,0 900,0 962,7 
1969 996.4 1015.5 1035.3 1046,4 
1970 1058.2 1082.0 1112,2 1075.8 
1971 1134.9 1168,0 1205.9 1179.5 
1972 1195.7 .1238.2 1342.3 1230,7 
Total 6302,9 6421,4 6613.4 6438,8 
largely balanced by the gain in reserves implied by the excess 
of the capacity-to-import over the import demand in I968, The 
sharp drop in import demand in I968 is projected on the basis 
of special policy action on the part of the Peruvian public 
authorities. In addition to the devaluation of the Peruvian 
currency, additional import duties were levied, and various 
consumer good imports were temporarily prohibited through the 
end of 1968, As the import restrictions are expected to be 
withdrawn at the end of 1968, and assuming that the Peruvian 
currency will not be devalued again during the projection 
period and that the public sector budget deficits will be 
reduced so as to enhance monetary stability, the import demand 
estimates based upon the structural import function of the 
15?-
projection model war: employed to estimate import demand for 
1969-197?., Under this situation, international reserves will 
be rebuilt in 1968 and are not expected to brought under severe 
pressure unless public expenditures are allowed to expand at 
more than S% annually in real terms. 
As a preliminary conclusion, therefore, the analysis of 
this section indicates that the Peruvian economy can be expect­
ed to expand at a rate of 2,5^ to 3.0^ annually over the I967-
1972 period while maintaining relative price stability and an 
acceptable balance of payments position, The analysis of 
Chapter VI studies the possibilities of improving the growth 
performance of the Peruvian economy through policy action, 
G, The Impact of Devaluation on the 
Macroeconomic Projection 
The macroeconomic projection presented in Section E 
assumes constancy in the rate of exchange of the Peruvian 
domestic currency on the international market. The projection 
procedure has been adjusted for the anticipated impact of the 
September 1967 devaluation of the Peruvian currency. These 
adjustments are Incorporated in the projections of the exoge­
nous variables used in the projection procedure and in the 
presentation of the public sector and balance of payments 
accounts. This section presents a qualitative analysis of the 
impact of the I967 devaluation of the Peruvian economy. 
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1. Devaluation and the balance of payments 
If devaluation is to improve the balance of payments, then 
it must induce a reduction in the excess of imports (M) over 
exports (E), and autonomous capital outflow vç, capital inflow. 
The analysis must consider both the response of supply of 
Peruvian exports and the response of demand for imports in Peru 
with respect to a change in the exchange rate (r) between the 
1 
Peruvian Sol and foreign currencies. 
The determinants of the supply of Peruvian exports (E^) to 
the world market can be considered to be (1) the level of world 
prices (Pw), (2) the exchange rate (r), and (3) the production 
capacity for the various export products (,S), Hence we can 
write 
(1) Eg = Dg (Pw, r, S) 
The impact of a devaluation of the Peruvian domestic currency 
on the supply of exports can be represented by the total dif­
ferential of (1) with respect to the exchange rate, or 
( 2 )  =  i l l ' s  (Pw) + E»s (r) + E»s (3)  | |  
where (E's) represents a partial derivative. By assuming that 
devaluation will not affect the level of world prices for ex­
port products, the term (d(Pw)/dr) becomes zero and the entire 
^(r) is defined as the price of foreign currency in terms 
of the domestic currency. 
first term is eliminated. Considering the length of our pro­
jection period and the length of the gestation lag in bringing 
major mines into operation, it is assumed that devaluation will 
not affect the productive capacity of the major export pro­
ducts, Hence, (ds/dr) becomes zero and the last term is elim­
inated, Under these conditions the change in export supply is 
limited to the expression, 
(3) d (j'Js) = l-C's (r) dr 
Hence, expansion in export supply can only be achieved via the 
ability of devaluation to divert production from domestic mar­
kets into export markets and to induce a fuller utilization of 
productive capacity for export products. 
The ability of devaluation to direct goods from the do­
mestic market to the export market is limited due to the fact 
that the Peruvian export market-oriented products and domestic 
market-oriented products form almost mutually exclusive sets. 
Most Peruvian export products have insignificant domestic 
markets and those that do have significant domestic markets, 
such as refined sugar, are faced with international quotas 
which restrict the incentive to shift the delivery of the pro­
duct from the domestic to the export market in response to a 
devaluation. Similarly, the industrial sector serving the 
domestic market is not sufficiently efficient to become inter­
nationally competitive through devaluation. Furthermore, the 
dependence of the domestic industrial sector on imported 
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capital and intermediate goods reduces the favorable impact 
of devaluation on its comparative advantage. 
One instance in which the relative price effect of deval­
uation could induce a shift of productive resources out of 
domestic market production and into export production is the 
case of cotton, Peru's comparative advantage in cotton pro­
duction had been reduced in recent years due to the impact of 
domestic inflation on production costs while the rate of ex­
change remained unchanged. In this situation, the price of 
various domestic market products increased relative to the 
cotton price, in local currency, which induced a shift of pro­
ductive resources into domestic market production at the 
expense of cotton production for export. The devaluation of 
the Peruvian currency raises the price of cotton in terms of 
the local currency. The inflationary impact of the devalua­
tion will result in rising prices for the domestic market pro­
ducts as well. However, it is reasonable to assume that the 
relative price will shift in favor of cotton production and 
tend to induce a return of some productive resources to cotton 
production leading to an expansion in cotton exports. 
Devaluation may lead to improved utilization of capacity 
in the case of mining and fishmeal exports. The increase in 
the domestic currency price of mining exports may induce ex­
panded output from small and medium sized mining operations. 
To the extent that these mines are marginal and operate only 
in times of high world prices (4l), devaluation by raising 
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world prices in terms of the domestic currency may bring some 
of them back into production, Raw material limitations crent-
ed a capacity constraint on the f isFrntea]. indufrlry, I. nor ease; ; 
in export volume are expected to be determined by productivity 
Increases (i.e., higher yield of fishmeal per unit of raw 
material)„ 
However, such productivity increases require renovation 
in the productive plant. To the extent that devaluation im­
proves the profit position of the fishmeal industry, it 
improves the financial ability of the industry to retool its 
plants and expand the export volume of fishmeal. 
The analysis of the response of export supply to devalua­
tion indicates that: 
(4) d(Es) / dr > 0 
but that the quantitative increase in export volume will be 
marginal, 
The demand for imports (M) can be represented as deter-
1 
mined by the level of real income (Y) and the exchange rate 
(r), or 
(5) fl = M (Y, r) 
The response of import demand to devaluation can be represented 
by the total differential of (5) with respect to the exchange 
^(Y) is defined as (GDI), 
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rate, or 
(6) - M: i ï )  0 + M» (r) 
where M' denotes a partial derivative. It is assumed that M 
(Y) is positive which means that import demand will rise if 
income increases while the exchange rate does not change. On 
the other hand, it is assumed that M' (r) is negative which 
means that import demand will decrease in response to an in­
crease in the domestic price of imports if income is held con­
stant, The unknown quantity at this point, is the response of 
income to a change in the exchange rate (dY/dr), 
We can re-write expression (6) as 
(?) dM = M' (Y) dY + M» (r) dr 
If dY < 0, it is clear the devaluation will induce a decline in 
import demand. On the other hand, if dY > 0, then the impact 
of devaluation on import demand is ambiguous. Import demand 
will decrease (dM < 0), if the negative term M' (r) dr is 
larger in absolute terms than the positive terra M'(Y) dY, 
(i , e , ,  M *  ( r )  d r  >  M '  ( Y )  d Y ) ,  H o w e v e r ,  i f  M '  ( r )  d r  <  M ' ( Y ) d Y  
then import demand will increase (dM > 0) in response to a 
devaluation. Hence, it is necessary to determine first the 
direction of change in Y (i,e,, dY/dr ^  0) and secondly to 
determine the quantitative significance of M' (Y) dY relative 
to M' (r) dr in the case of dY > 0, 
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The principal determinants of the level of income (Y), as 
derived from the reduced form of Section D, with modifications, 
are (1) the level of export volume (E), (2) the level of the 
terms-of-trade effect (Z), (3) the level of government expendi­
tures (G), and (4) the level of commercial credit to the pri­
vate sector (D), or, 
( 8 )  Y = Y (E, Z, G, D) 
Each independent variable can be represented as a function of 
the exchange rate r, in more or less direct form, which yields 
(9) 1 Y = Y -, E (r), Z E (r) , G (T^, Y, r), 
D (T^) \ 
where represents the magnitude of the public sector deficit 
(i.e., the difference between total public expenditure and 
total public revenue). The total differential of Y with re­
spect to the exchange rate (dY/dr) indicates the directional 
change in Y in response to devaluation, or 
(10) 11 = Ï' (li) If + Ï' (z) al • if + Ï' («) G.(T^) -ji 
+ G« (Y) 0 + G' (r) + Y« (D) ! dP 
dTj' 
dT ik 
dr 
where Y', and G' represent partial derivatives. Each term on 
the righthand side of expression (10) must be evaluated and 
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assigned a positive or negative value in order to determine 
the directional change of (J.Y/dr), It is known from the "re­
duced form" of Section D that all of the partial derivatives 
Y' are positive. Previous analysis in this section has estab­
lished that ^  > 0* Even though the terms-of-trade index 
remains invariant under devaluation, the terms-of-trade effect 
(Z) will increase via export expansion (i.e., dE/dr > 0), 
hence, dZ/dE > 0, The impact of devaluation on the level of 
commercial credit D is contained in the expression 
dD 4 
# 
dlj 
the term ((dD)/dT^) is assumed to be negative. The reasoning 
behind the assumption is that a degree of competition exists 
for credit between the private and public sectors if monetary 
stability is one of the economic objectives of the public 
authorities. Hence, if deficit financed development projects 
are to continue while it is necessary to restrain the rate of 
Inflation, then commercial credit to the private sector must 
be constrained. Hence, in the ceteris paribus world it is 
assumed that changes in D and T^ are inversely related, or 
dD/d (T^) < 0, The term (dT^/dr) is assumed to be negative,^ 
As both terms in the expression 
1 
See argument on page l60. 
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dP '^ ''^ 1 
are negative, their product is positive. Hence, the level of 
commercial credit is expected to increase under devaluation. 
As Y' (D) > 0, Increased commercial credit under devaluation 
makes the term Y' (D) 
The impact of devaluation on the contribution of the public 
sector to (dY/dr) can be determined from the third expression 
on the right hand side of (10), The partial derivatives 
G * (T^) and G' (Y) are positive reflecting the propensity of 
public expenditures to rise with increased income, A behav­
ioral assumption is made that (d T^/dr < 0) reflecting a pro­
pensity to reduce the public deficit under devaluation. 
This propensity stems from the desire to limit inflationary 
pressure already Invigorated by devaluation. This effect may 
be heightened If the incurrence of substantial public deficits 
has been an important contributor to the forces leading to 
devaluation. The partial derivative G' (r) is assigned a 
negative value which reflects the impact of higher import 
prices on public revenue,obtained from import duties. Assum­
ing no Qhange in the level of Income, the rate of import 
duties, nor importer's behavior, the increased relative price 
I6l 
of imports due to devaluation induces a decline in the quantity 
of Imports demanded and also a decline in public revenue. 
Under the ceteris paribus assumptions of the partial derivative, 
a reduction in government expenditures (G) is implied, hence 
G' (r) < 0, The impact of devaluation on the level of govern­
ment expenditures depends, at this point, on the behavior of 
in the term G' (Y) The entrance of dY/dr into the ex­
pression relating to government expenditures introduces an 
inter-dependency as we are trying to evaluate the entire right-
hand side in order to determine dY/dr, Nevertheless, the 
impasse can be avoided by assuming various values for dY/dr in 
the expression G * (Y) ^  and evaluating their respective 
implications, (1) If dY/dr < 0, then the level of government 
expenditures will decrease unambiguously. As 
dE ( 1 1 )  Y' (10 ~> 0 
and 
Ï' (Z) i • > 0 
Y' (D) _ F!L 
dr 
dD 
> 0 
while only Y* (G) 
k aif a Y 
G' (ip jji + C (r) + G' (Y) II 
L 
< 0, 
the assumption of (dy/dr < 0) implies that the negative effect 
of the reduction in government expenditures resulting from 
devaluation, dominates the positive effects of increased 
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exports, torrns-of-trade effect, and commercial credit. The 
probability of such a result is low, particularly If the income 
multipliers of oection D are taken into account, {?.) If 
(dY/dr >0), then the sign of the expression 
dT k 
G' (T^) ggl f G» (Y) + G» (r) becomes ambiguous. 
Its sigh is negative if 
(12 )  G« 
dT 
(T^) dT G' (Y) dr 
and positive if 
(13) 
dT k 
G' (T^) ^  + G' (r) < G« (Y) dr 
If expression ( 3) obtains then (dY/dr > 0) unambigously. If 
expression ( 2) obtains, then (dY/dr > 0), implying that 
(14) Y» (E') If + Y' (2) H • If + Y' (D) dD 
dT 
dT^ 
k ' dr 
Y» (G) 
,k 
k d?! dY 
G' (TJ) ^ f G' (Y) + G« (r) 
or the equation is inconsistent as it implies dY/dr > 0 on 
the right hand side and dY/dr < 0 on the left hand side of 
equation (10), 
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It is assumed that relation (12) obtains. The implica­
tion is that although income (Y) increases with response to 
devaluation and that it tends to increase public expenditures 
through itr: positive impact on public revenue, the resulting 
increases in public revenue are not sufficient to compensate 
for the decrease in public revenue from import duties and the 
behavioral propensity to decrease or eliminate the public 
deficit under devaluation. 
Referring back to relation (7) 
dM = M« (Y) dY + M« (r) dr 
it is now determined that dY > 0, hence the change in the level 
of imports (dM) depends on whether 
(15) M' (Y) dY J M' (r) dr 
If devaluation is to improve unambiguously the balance of pay­
ments situation and support the analysis of the impact of de­
valuation on public expenditure, then 
(16) M« (Y) dY < M« (r) dr 
must hold. The problem can easily be depicted via graphical 
analysis, Figure 1 depicts the demand curve for imports (D) as 
a function of the exchange rate assuming that the level of 
income is constant. The initial situation is that quantity M q  
will be demanded at exchange rate TQ, 
164 
Exchange rate 
0 
D, 
D 
° \ 
T -1\ -
\ 
I 
Q ^ I I  1 .  .  
M» Mq 
Imports 
Figure 1, The demand for imports as a function of the exchange 
rate and Income level 
Devaluation will increase the exchange rate, say to r^^. At 
r^ only quantity of imports is demanded where < Mq, How­
ever, if devaluation induces a rise in the level of income, 
then the whole demand curve shifts to the right to position , 
Therefore, the new level of demand is where , How­
ever, if the increase in income is sufficient to shift the 
I II 
demand curve to then quantity will be demanded at ex-
II 
change rate r^^, where > M q, In this case the income-effect 
outweighs the price-effect and the level of imports rise under 
devaluation. The contention of relation (l6) is that the 
demand curve, in the case at hand, will shift only to and 
therefore tMt the post-devaluation level of imports will be 
less than the pre-devaluation level. 
What evidence can be offered to support the contention 
that relation (l6) actually obtains in the situation at hand? 
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Perhaps', the most direct evidence would be to obtain the esti­
mated form of the import demand function and to take the rele­
vant derivatives. Lacking these quantitatives estimates an 
analysis of the relevant historical experience may provide 
supporting evidence, A check on the response of income and 
imports to devaluation in 195^ and 1959 shows that income 
(GDI) increased while the level of imports decreased in both 
cases. In 1958, another devaluation period, both income and 
imports decreased. The fact that imports decreased while in­
come increased in 195^ and 1959 cannot be unambiguously derived 
from the impact of devaluation on the relative price of imports. 
Changes in both the level of foreign private capital inflow 
for investment purposes and foreign public capital inflow for 
government development projects affect the level of import 
demand. Nevertheless, imports tied to inflows of foreign 
long-term capital may be considered as an exogenous "shock" 
variable that influences the level of imports which is deter­
mined by the level of income and relative prices of imported 
goods to domestic goods. The influence of the exogenous fac­
tors on the level of imports need not in themselves be a mat­
ter of concern in the effort to improve the balance of payments 
as these imports are financed by contingent increases in long-
term capital inflow, Hence^ the capacity-to-import increases 
along with the rise in imports. Abstracting from the influence 
of foreign capital Inflow on import demand, it is clear that 
devaluation will tend to reduce those types of import demand 
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which are not related to foreign capital inflow, particularly 
imported consumer goods. Given that the real rise in the cost 
of Imported goods deriving from the September I967 devaluation 
is approximately 20% while GDI may be expanded by as much as 
1/0, it is anticipated that the price-effect will outweigh the 
income-effect leading to a reduction in import demand compared, 
at minimum, with the pre-devaluation import demand projection. 
Although the Impact of devaluation on the autonomous 
movements of long-term capital,is an important consideration in 
the determination of the effect of devaluation on the balance 
of payments, it can be analysed only in general terms. Con­
centrating attention on private long-term capital inflow, it 
appears reasonable to assume that devaluation will tend to 
induce a higher level of foreign investment. Recognition of 
the fact that the Peruvian currency was over-valued in the 
pre-devaluation period may have encouraged the delay of some 
foreign investments until the expected devaluation had taken 
place. To the extent that the foreign investor's project 
required domestic currency purchases of goods and services, 
the devaluation would tend to lower the costs of establishing 
and operating the project. It is clear, however, that in the 
Peruvian case the major foreign investment decisions under 
consideration are only very marginally influenced by the 
exchange rate. The major pending foreign investment decisions 
at the time of the September 196? devaluation were concerned 
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with large-scale coppér mines. The magnitude of these pro­
spective investments completely over-shadow the average normal 
level of foreign private investment. The major points of 
bargaining between the prospective investors and the Peruvian 
government concerned such matters as tax policy, depreciation 
allowances, importation privileges, and profit remittance 
procedures, not the level of the exchange rate. The basic 
reason for the marginal importance of the exchange rate is 
that large-scale mining operations obtain the large part of 
their capital goods and inputs from abroad and sell their pro­
duct abroad. Hence the exchange rate is of importance on?y in 
relation to the relatively small purchases of domestic goods 
and services. With reference to the above analysis, it ap­
pears reasonable to expect that devaluation will tend to in­
duce an increase in the level of foreign private investment, 
but that major capital movements will not be significantly 
influenced. 
In conclusion, the analysis has established that exports 
will tend to increase marginally, while imports will tend to 
decrease substantially and that the level of foreign private 
investment will expand modestly in response to devaluation. 
Hence, it can be expected that the devaluation of September 
1967 will lead to an improvement in the balance of payments 
thereby alleviating but not solving the projected balance of 
f 
payments problems of the Peruvian economy. It can also be 
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expected that devaluation will tend to accelerate by perhaps 
l'jé the pre-devaluation anticipated increase in the level of 
Gross Domestic Income, 
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V, IMPLICATIONS OF THE MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS 
FOR DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS: 1966-1972 
The Implications of the macroeconomic projections of 
Chapter '.IV for Peruvian development prospects during 1967-72 
can be evaluated most advantageously by contrasting the pro­
jected to the historical performance of the economy during 
Î 
1950-66, The evaluation is conducted in terms of the funda­
mental policy objectives, o.^? development indicators (i.e., 
income growth, the "strength" of the balance of payments, 
monetary stability, employment creation and personal and region­
al income distribution, 
A, Development Performance; 1950-66 
Peruvian developmental experience during 1950-65 can be 
characterized by a sustained rapid rate of income growth, a 
strong balance of payments situation, a low rate of inflation, 
a tolerable employment situation, a continued condition of ex­
tensive inequality in functional and regional income distribu­
tion, and a relatively high degree of social and political 
stability, 
1. Income growth 
Gross Domestic Income^ (GUI), in real terms, expanded at 
a cumulative growth rgte of 5,3# during I95O-66, Per capita 
^Gross Domestic Income is defined as the Gross Domestic 
Product plus the terms-of-trade effect. 
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GDI expanded at a cumulative rate of 2^$%, as population grew 
at 2,8% per year. The long-term per capita Income growth of 
i'oru, therefore, f ul fillod the A] .1 lance for f'ro;rro;;,'; per 
capita income growth objective. 
Table 19 provides a comparison of the growth performance 
of the individual Latin American countries, for the period 
1955-6^, It can be appreciated from Table 19 that the growth 
of Peru's Gross National Product per capita during 1955-60 
(i.e., 2,1%) exceeded the Latin American average of 1,8%, 
Only Venezuela, Panama, Mexico and Brazil attained more rapid 
per capita GNP growth than Peru, During the 1960-64 period, 
however, per capita GNP grew at 3.7% in Peru versus a 1,0% 
average growth for Latin America, Only Panama, with a per 
capita Gi\IP growth of 5.0%, grew faster than Peru, 
Although Peru has experienced sustained income growth 
during 1950-66, growth was not always steady. The rate of 
income expansion faltered in 1952 with the end of the Korean 
War and, although the rate of income expansion revived in the 
post - 1952 period, economic difficulties remained until 196O, 
In 1958, total GDI actually decreased from C/,64,290,0 millions 
of 1963 Soles in 1957 to S/,63,268.3 millions in 1958, This 
fall in the level of GDI was occasioned by a sharp decrease in 
the terms-of-trade effect, due to falling export prices, as 
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) increased from 3/,62,747,8 mil­
lions in 1957 to 3/,63,244,2 millions in 1958, Peru emerged 
from its stringent economic situation of 1958-59 in a 
Table 19. Latin American gross national products, population and growth rates® 
Gross national product 
1965 Population 
Annual growth rates of gross 
product (%) 
national 
Per capita 
US$ 
Total U3$ 
Mill. 
1966 
Mill. 
Growth rate 
1955-66 
1955-66 
Total 
1960-64 
Total 
1955-60 
Per capita 
1960-64 
Per capita 
Venezuela 882 7,691 9.0 3.4 6.5 5.4 2.5 1.8 
Argentina 718 16,050 22.7 1.6 2.7 1.2 0.8 -0.6 
Uruguay- 573 1,555 2.8 1.4 -0.1 0.2 -1.3 —1.0 
Panama 495 617 1.3 3.2 5.3 7.8 2.5 5.0 
Chile 485 4,257 9.0 2.4 3.8 3.8 1.4 1.3 
Mexico 455 10,415 44.2 3.5 6.1 6.2 2.8 2.8 
Peru 367 4,281 12.0 3.1 4.7 6.4 2.1 3.7 
Colomnia 284 5,103 18.5 3.0 4.0 4.6 1.1 1.7 
Brasil 270 21,970 84.0 3.0 5.9 3.9 2.8 0.7 
Ecuador 222 1,128 5.2 3.4 4.5 3.6 1.3 0.4 
Paraguay 221 443 2.6 2.1 2.4 3.6 -O.l 1.1 
Bolivia 145 559 6.2 2.4 -0.2 5.0 -2.2 2.6 
Central America^ 293 3,890 13.4 3.3 4.3 6.0 1.0 2.7 
Total Latin 
America 385 88,286 236.9 2.9 4.7 3.9 1.8 1.0 
^ S o u r c e s3 (35) and (41). 
^Includes: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua y Costa Rica. 
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spectacular way, GDI increased by 11,^% in 196O spurred by 
both an increase in GDP and in the terms-of-trade effect, Dur-
in;/ 1959-66 Peru attained a 7.1 cumulative annual GDI frrowth 
rate. 
Ry far the major characteristic of Peruvian GUI growth 
during the past 17 years has been the tremendous growth of its 
export sector,^ 
The relation between export earnings and GDI can be il­
lustrated by noting that the 4,0/ cumulative annual GDI growth 
during 1950-59 is associated with a 4,3# cumulative annual 
growth of export earnings, whereas the 7.1^ GDI growth during 
1959-66 is associated with a 10,5# growth in export earnings. 
Further evidence of the impact of export earnings on the level 
of GDI can be obtained from the reduced form of the estimated 
"basic" model In Section D,3 of Chapter IV. The GDI "growth 
multipliers" of exports is 2,0951 while that of the terms-of-
trade is 2,2756, These GDI "growth multipliers" are by far 
the largest of the exogenous determinants of the level of GDI, 
2. Balance of payments 
Peru's balance of payments position has been relatively 
strong during the 195O-66 period, A useful summary statement 
of the strength of the balance of payments is presented in 
Table 20, The comparison between the total capacity-to-import 
^t'or an analysis of the role of the export sector iri 
Peruvian economic development, see reference (42). 
Table 20. The balance of payments and the capacity ot import (in millions of U. S. dollars)^ 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 Categories 
1. Exports (FOB) 198.4 259.0 245.7 228.3 254.3 281.2 320.2 331.5 291.8 
2. Net financial 
services -26.6 -16.5 -16.6 -11.2 -32.0 -52.2 -45.8 -46.2 -35.2 
3. Net non-financial 
services -12.3 -20.9 -24.8 —28.0 -22.9 -37.2 -51.0 —56.0 -49.0 
4. Net transfers 1.3 1.4 3.7 4.8 7.8 7.7 11.3 17.5 14.7 
A. Current caoa-citv to 
import (1+2+3+4) 160.9 223.2 207.9 193.9 207.2 199.4 234.7 246.8 222.4 
5. Net long-term 
capital -3.2 23.9 42.5 62.4 
00 •
o 1 72.6 68.3 118.4 93.4 
6. Net short-term 
capital 13.7 10.9 -11.7 0.3 0.5 3.4 41.5 9.1 9.2 
B. Total capacity to 
import (A+5+6) 171.4 257.9 238.7 256.7 200.9 275.4 344.5 374.2 325.0 
C ,  Total imports (FOB) 149.3 223.0 257.2 257.5 225.4 294.6 342.5 402.1 344.7 
D. Errors & omission -19.7 -28.4 16.9 -5.5 31.1 15.5 12.8 -5.6 6.3 
E. Internal monetary 
reserves -2.4 -6.5 1.6 6.3 -6.6 3.7 1 1 4 . 9  33.6 13.4 
^SourceÎ (18), 
TaDie 20 (Continued) 
Categories 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
1. Exports (FOB) 322.6 444.3 510.2 556.0 555.1 684.6 686.6 786.5 
2. Net financial 
services -47.8 -65.9 -66.7 -67.1 -73.0 -72.3 -86.3 - 117.8 
3. Net non-financial 
services -44.2 -50.2 -54.1 -65.9 -65.0 -95.3 -107.3 -112.8 
4. Net transfers 9.9 20.6 26.8 18.2 19.0 14.8 24.1 28.5 
A. Current caoacitv to 
import (1+2+3+4) 240.5 348.9 416.3 441.8 436.1 531.9 517.1 584.4 
5. Net long-term 
capital 48.9 13.8 1.7 36.7 56.3 86.0 128.6 219.1 
6. Net short-term 
capital 0.3 9.0 13.6 27.0 -9.7 -45.6 44.3 -29.9 
B. Total capacity to 
import (A+5+6) 289.7 371.6 431.6 504.9 482.8 572.3 690.0 775.6 
C. Total imports (FOB) 280.5 341.0 428.6 478.4 517.9 517.7 659.7 746.2 
D. Errors & omission 8.3 2.1 31.3 -20.3 53.7 -29.5 "15.6 -51.6 
E. Internal monetary 
reserves -17.4 -32.7 "34.3 -6.3 -18.5 -25.0 -14.7 22.2 
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and total imports is of prime interest. It is clear from Table 
20 that the balance, of payments has been stronger during 1959-
()(j than duriiip; 1950-58, Total Imports excood(id tho capacll.y-
to-import in 1952, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1958, The level of 
reserves did not fall in 195^ nor in 196] due to large positive 
entries in the Errors and Omissions category, 
Exports are a major determinant of the capacity-to-import. 
The strong export expansion of post-1959 is the principal ex­
planatory factor for the strong post-1959 balance of payments 
position. Likewise, the poor performance of the export sector 
in the immediate post-Korean War period, limited the growth of 
the capacity-to-import and. generated, the need for policy mea­
sures aimed at restraining import demand. 
The second, most important determinant of the capacity-to-
import is the level of net long-term capital inflow. The ex­
tensive variation in the level of this determinant of the ca­
pacity-to-import can be appreciated from the range of its val­
ues during 1950-66: the lower limit being -6,8 millions of dol­
lars in 1954 and the upper limit being 219,1 millions of dollars 
in 1966, The relatively high levels of 1952, 1953, 1957, 1958 
and 1959, reflect large inflows of foreign private capital for 
mining investments, whereas the relatively high levels in 1955, 
and post-1963 reflect large Inflows of foreign public capital, 
Of course, the contribution of net long-term capital to the 
capacity-to-import is substantially counterbalanced by the con­
tingent large imports destined for the investment projects. 
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The balance of payments records a consistently negative 
entry for both net financial services and net non-financial 
services. Net financial services represent the payment of 
dividends to foreign investors and the payment of service 
charges on private and public loans from the exterior. Private 
net financial services have expanded from 25,0 millions of U, S, 
dollars in 1950 to 88,3 millions in 1966, although it has 
fluctuated with the level of export earnings. Public net 
financial services have increased more steadily than private net 
financial services, as they reflect debt servicing charger 
rather than dividend payments. The mont râgnifleant development 
is the rapid growth of the public as opposed to the private net 
financial services in the 1964-66 period. This structural 
change in net financial services reflects the impact of the 
debt servicing charges on the large inflow of public foreign 
capital during the post-1963 period. 
The consistently negative entry for net non-financial 
services, determined by the difference between the importation 
and the exportation of services, indicates that Peru's demand 
for imported services, such as for the transportation of her 
raw material exports and insurance payments, has consistently 
outrun her ability to export such services. 
The attempt to restrain import demand to within the limits 
of the capacity-to-import has required periodic policy action. 
The level of international monetary reserves decreased in 1952 
and 1953 in response to levels of total imports that exceeded 
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the capacity-to-import. The devaluation of the Peruvian Sol 
in the latter part of 1953 to S/, 19,53 to the U, S, dollar 
retarded import demand in 1953 and decreased the level of im­
ports in 195^ in absolute terms. In 1957, reserves declined 
by 33.6 million dollars as imports rose sharply while the 
capacity-to-import rose slowly under virtually stagnant 
export earnings. The devaluation of the Sol in 1958 to S/, 
23,40 to the U, S, dollar resulted in an absolute decline in 
total imports in 1958, yet the level of imports still exceeded 
the capacity-to-import yielding a further 13,4 million dollar 
decline in reserves. The further devaluation of the Sol to 
S/, 27,64 to the U, S, dollar in 1959 reduced the level of 
imports once more. Although the capacity-to-import also fell 
in 19591 the level of total imports decreased even more sharply 
yielding a total level of imports that was within the capacity-
to-import, Following the export boom of i960, the capacity-
to-import grew rapidly. Imports, although remaining within the 
capacity-to-import, also rose rapidly. The rapid increase in 
total imports was restrained in 1964 by an increase in import 
duties that raised the average ad valorem duty from 36,9/° to 
43,9#, However, in I965, total imports leapt to a record high 
with an increase of l42,0 million dollars over the 1964 level. 
Import demand rose strongly again in I966 resulting in the first 
decline in the level of reserves since Peru emerged from the 
1958-59 crisis. 
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3. Price stability. 
As recorded in Table 21, Peru has experienced a high degree 
of monetary stability relative to other Latim American countries 
as evidenced by the average annual rate of inflation during 
1950-66 of 8,6#. 
Table %1, The annual rate of inflation in Peru during 1950-1966^ 
1950 1955 6.4;^  i960 7.6# 1965 15.0# 
1951 14.8# 1956 7.3 1961 7.8 1966 8,0 
1952 3.8 1957 4,0 1962 8.5 
1953 4,4 1958 13,2 1963 4,0 
1954 10,2 1959 13.4 1964 8.8 
^Source: (18), 
The rapid price level increases of 195^, 1958, and 1959 cor­
respond to periods in which the Peruvian monetary unit was 
devalued in international exchange. Although continuing infla­
tion in face of a constant exchange rate builds pressure to 
devalue the external purchasing power of the domestic currency, 
the rapid price level increases during the devaluation periods 
should not be viewed as causal factors leading to devaluation, 
but as the post-devaluation impact of higher import prices on 
the domestic price level. The extensive direct and indirect 
dependence of the Peruvian economy on imported goods and services 
translates higher import prices into a rapid increase in the 
domestic price level. 
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The 15,0 rate of inflation in I965 represents a unique 
case in the post-1950 'period. In all other years in which the 
rate of inflation exceeded 1Q% the major contributing factor 
was the domestic impact of the external devaluation of the 
Peruvian currency. The I965 instance, however, was the result 
of excessive monetary expansion. The deficit of the Central 
Government was partially covered by loans from the Central Bank 
while commercial banks were permitted to rapidly expand credit 
to the private secotr. The result was as pure a case of mone­
tary inflation as Peru has experienced since 1950, The re­
striction of the- rate of credit expansion in 1966 helped to 
reduce the rate of inflation to approximately 8% in I966, 
4. Employment creation 
The attempt to analyze the employment situation of Peru 
during 1950-65 must be conducted in general terms as the employ-
ment data are in need of substantial improvement, Nevertheless, 
various features of the employment situation can be analyzed. 
The employed labor force is reported to have increased 
from 2583,6 thousands in 1965.^ The official statistics record 
a low level of unemployment. The planning documents of I IMP 
argue that the problem is not unemployment but the low pro­
ductivity of existing employment opportunities. It is virtu­
ally certain that the official statistics under-state the 
degree of unemployment. Furthermore, the large numbers of 
^.'jee reference (3), 
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street vendors and minor service workers provide eloquent evi­
dence of a deficient employment situation. Potential difficul-
1:1 or: dorjvlng from the deficient employment situation have been 
mitigated by extensive public construction activities, sub­
stantial private construction deriving from the post-1959 in­
come expansion and, probably, by the relatively low level of 
expectations on the part of recent migrants from the rural 
areas in the urban centers, 
A general indication of the sectoral allocation of the 
labor force can be appreciated from Table 22, 
Table 22, Sectoral distribution of the labor force; 1950-61-
65 (in thousands of laborers)^ 
Year Agriculture % Industry % Mining % Others % 
1950 1522.0 58,9 335.1 13,0 55.9 2.2 670.6 25.9 
1961 1703.6 52,8 435.0 13.5 70.8 2,2 1017.6 31.5 
1965 1813.4 50,5 491,5 13.8 79.3 2.2 1209.9 33.5 
^Source; (3). 
The outstanding feature of Table 22 is the large but de­
clining share of the total labor force employed in agricultural 
activities, which Includes fishing activities, A slight in­
crease in the proportion of the labor force in industrial acti­
vities has been recorded, while employment in the mining sector 
has maintained a constant relation to the total labor force. 
It is clear that the relative decline of employment in agri­
culture has been counter-balanced by the increasing proportion 
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of employment opportunities in "other" economic activities, 
which include such activities as construction, commerce, ser­
vices, and public administration. 
During 1950-65, under a condition of sustained income 
growth, the level of average labor productivity also increased. 
As recorded in Table 23, the overall level of average labor 
productivity increased from 8/,17,1 thousands, in 19^3 prices, 
in 1950 to S/,26,7 thousands in 1965. It is clear, however, 
i 
that the level of average labor productivity is substantially 
different among the various economic sectors. The level of 
average labor productivity in agriculture is substantially less 
than the overall level while the levels for industry, mining 
and other economic sectors substantially exceed the overall 
level for each year. Furthermore, the most rapid increase in 
the average level of labor productivity was achieved by the 
mining sector, the sector with the highest level of average 
labor productivity. 
Table 23, The average productivity of labor in 1950, 1961, 
and 1965, (in thousands of constant 1963 Soles 
per laborer) 
Year Agriculture Industry Mining others Average 
1950 7.3 20,5 35.7 35.9 17.1 
1961 9.1 32.5 74,0 41,1 23.8 
1965 9.8 38,1 71.1 44,4 26,7 
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The aggregation of the economic sectors submerges impor-
. ' I 
tant structural characteristics with respect to the level of 
average labor productivity. For example, the industrial sec­
tor is an aggregate composed of three elements: (1) the indus­
trial manufacturing component (estrato fabril); (2) the re­
gistered handicraft component (estrato artesanal registrado); 
and (3) the non-registered handicraft activities. In terms of 
the labor force, the industrial manufacturing component employ­
ed 161,000, registered handicraft employed 30,000 and non-
registered handicraft employed 265,000 to yield a total indus­
trial sector labor force of 4^6,000 persons in 1963 (17U The 
overwhelming majority of the value added produced derives from 
the industrial manufacturing component which in 1963 yielded 
an average labor productivity level of S/,88,1 thousand in 
1963 Soles, Furthermore, substantial variation in the level of 
average labor productivity prevailed within the industrial 
manufacturing component. The basic structural factor is the 
difference in productivity for production for the internal mar­
ket versus production for the export market. In 1963, the 
level of average labor productivity in industrial manufacturing 
for the internal market was S/,78,9 thousand versus S/,207.7 
thousand for industrial export activities, 
A further feature of interest with respect to the Peru­
vian employment situation is the specification of those sectors 
which provided the most employment opportunities during the 
1950-65 period. Table 24 presents a summary statement of 
Table 24. Enployment creation by economic sector during 1950-1965 (enployment by thousands 
and value added by millions of 1963 Soles)® 
Enpioyment Enployraent L = L Value Value X = X ^^50 
'50 
1950 1965 L=o added added X«sn Xc,n L/L 
5^0 *65 
Agriculture & 
fishing 1522.0 1813.4 291.4 .191 11153.5 17774.3 6620.8 .594 3.11 
Mining 55.9 79.3 23.4 .419 1996.3 5642.9 3646.6 1.827 4.36 
Industrial 335.1 491.5 156.4 .467 6877.9 18704.0 11826.1 1.719 3.68 
Construction 70.5 132.8 62.3 .884 2001.7 5571.7 3570.0 1.783 2.02 
Energy 4.6 11.4 6.8 1.480 212.3 955.5 743.2 3.501 2.36 
Transport 
coiranunications 70.0 115.6 45.6 .651 1115.6 6011.0 4895.4 4.388 6.74 
Coirenerce 170.1 338.9 168.8 .993 7373.9 17046.5 9672.6 1.312 1.32 
Banking, insurance 9.9 22.3 12.4 1.253 1445.2 3771.6 2326.4 1.609 1.28 
Public 
administration 104.2 215.4 111.2 1.067 4057.4 8712.3 4654.9 1.147 1.08 
Services 241.3 373.5 132.2 .548 6829.4 11458.6 4629,2 .678 1.24 
2583.6 3594.1 1010.5 .391 44110.5 95841.4 51730.9 1.173 3.00 
^Sources: (3), (18), 
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sectoral employment creation. It can be appreciated from 
Table ?.h that the agricultural sector recorded the largest 
absolute increase in employment creation, 291,400 new posts, 
followed by Commerce, Industry, Services, and Public Admini­
stration with 168,800, 156,400, 132,200 and 111,200 new posts, 
respectively. It is clear, therefore that even though the pro­
portion of the total labor force engaged in agricultural acti­
vities is declining the provision of new employment opportuni­
ties in agriculture is important to the objective of attaining 
an acceptable level of employment. 
On the macroeconomic level. Table 24 indicates that in 
order to obtain a 1,0% increase in employment total value added 
must increase at 3.0^. The sectoral relations of output 
expansion to employment creation show substantial variation. 
The historical relation for transport and communications shows 
that a 6,74^ expansion in value added is required in order to 
achieve a 1,0% expansion in employment opportunities. On the 
other hand, a 1,08% expansion in the value added of public 
administration permits a 1,0% increase in employment. The 
variation in the sectoral relations between output expansion 
and employment creation reflect the degree of capital intensity 
in the production process. While public administration, ser­
vices, banking and insurance, and commerce require little capi­
tal stock relative to the labor input, mining, industry, and 
transport and communications require a large capital stock 
relative to the labor input. 
185 
With respect to the provision of employment opportunities 
to the migrant from the Sierra "semi-subsistence" economy to 
the urban centers, it is most probable that he has found em­
ployment in construction, services, commercial activity of the 
street and market sellin# variety, in the registered and non-
registered handicraft activities of the industrial sector, and 
in public maintenance work within the public administration 
sector. Many of these low-productivity employment opportuni­
ties are of a marginal nature that are heavily dependent upon 
a high rate of GDI growth. The limited anti-cyclical policy 
capacity of the public sector makes these employment opportuni­
ties very vulnerable, 
5. Personal and regional income distribution 
Even though Peru attained a relatively high rate of GDI 
growth during 1950-66, its performance with respect to social 
progress was much less satisfactory. According to the pro­
minent Peruvian economist Romulo Ferrero; 
"In the last 25 years, and in particular since 1950, 
Peru has experienced considerable demographic and 
economic growth, accompanied by a lesser degree of 
social progress" (11, p, 5), 
The measurement of social progress presents great difficulties, 
nven the measurement of social progress in terms of personal 
and regional income distribution over time cannot be achieved 
given the existing Peruvian national income data. An appre­
ciation of the low degree of social progress attained during 
the 1950-66 period of high GDI growth, however, can be obtained 
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from an analysis of the state of personal income distribution 
in 1961, 
The INP has published a study of the state of income 
distribution for the census year of 1961 (18, pp. 111-2]), 
Table 25 presents a summary statement of the contribution of 
income according to income classes. An outstanding feature of 
Table 25 is that the highest income group, composing 1,9% of 
the employed population, received of the total income, 
while the 80,1^ of the employed population in the income class­
es between o/,3000 and S/,30,000 received only 42,0% of the 
total income. It is generally considered that the personal 
income distribution of Peru is one of the most unequal in Latin 
America, Indeed, the INP study states that Peru's income dis­
tribution is more unequal, on the basis of a "Lorenz Curve" 
analysis, than Chile, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela, 
Data limitations do not permit an analysis of the evolu­
tion, of the income distribution oyer the 1950-61 period. How­
ever, it is clear that the state of income distribution in 
1961, after 11 years of substantial GDI growth, was extremely 
unequal. In the post-1961 period, which recorded oven more 
rapid GDI growth that the 195O-6I period, it is unlikely that 
any significant change in income distribution has been achieved. 
As the requisite data are not available, an inference about the 
probability of a change in functional income distribution must 
be made from a consideration of public policy measures during 
1961-66, The major instruments available for improving the 
Table 25. Distribution of income by income groups in 1961® 
Income groups s Medium Total Enployed Total Enployed Income Enç>loyed 
annual income income in income in population income as population accumulative population 
in Soles thousands millions in percentage of totals percentage 
of Soles of Soles thousands 
Less than 3000 2.5 697.8 275.9 1.4 9.2 1.4 9.2 
3000 to 5000 4.0 3948.6 983.9 8.0 32.7 9.4 41.9 
5000 to 10000 7.1 4889.4 688.4 9.9 22.9 19.3 64.8-
10,000 to 20,000 14.2 10479.4 737.7 21.2 24.5 40.5 " 89.3 
20,000 to 30,000 27.2 1453.2 53.5 2.9 1.8 43.4 91.1 
30,000 to 50,000 34.7 6315.9 182.2 12.8 6.0 56.2 97.1 
50,u00 to 100,000 59.3 1784.6 30.1 3.6 1.0 59.8 98.1 
Over 100,000 340.6 19888.5 58.4 40.2 1.9 100.0 100.0 
Totals 17.6 49457.3 3010.1 100.0 100.0 
®Sources (18). 
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distribution of income withir^ 9 given economic structure are 
tax measures and social prograiis. Progressive income taxes 
have been a major tool for improving income distribution in the 
economically mature countries the proceeds from which were 
utilized for social programs which are designed to improve the 
economic position of the lower income groups. 
In the 1961-66 period Peru has had various tax changes. 
However, the need for increased public revenue has been met 
from increases in import duties and in other indirect taxes, 
such as consumption and production taxes, The tendency to in­
crease indirect taxes, while granting tax exonerations on 
business profits for Industrial development incentives, has 
shifted the structure of direct and indirect taxes to total 
taxes from 35.1^ and 64,9# in 1961 to 24,3# and 75*1% in 1966, 
respectively. It is clear that progressive income taxes have 
not been implemented as a means to improve the distribution of 
income during 196I-66, 
The public sector has expanded both current and capital 
public expenditures during 196I-66, The consequent expansion 
in public employment has improved the economic position of the 
middle income groups that are engaged in public administration. 
The extent of the improvement may be somewhat transitory. 
Much of the public wage bill has been met with loans from the 
Central Reserve Bank to the Government which with a constant 
foreign exchange rate meant an increase in net purchasing power 
even though it exacerbated the rate of domestic inflation. 
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However, a readjustment of the relationship between the domes­
tic currency and external currency though a devaluation erases 
much of the gain in real income enjoyed by the public service 
employees. The major Instrument aimed at improving the eco­
nomic position of the lowest income classes, i.e.. Agrarian 
neform, has not been implemented as extensively as would be 
required to induce a significant change in their economic 
position. 
The most salutary impact on the absolute economic position 
of the lower income groups during I96I-66, stems from the 
strong GDI expansion of the economy. The spectacular rise of 
_ the fishmeal industry and the expansion of mining exports, 
principally the export of copper, enabled a substantial growth 
of the economy which created employment opportunities for the 
low income groups. High profits stimulated a private construc­
tion boom which was supplemented by an extensive expansion of 
Government financed infrastructure investment. Given the 
existing economic organization of Peru, it is doubtful, how­
ever, that the relative position of the low income groups has 
improved. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that the lowest in­
come group actually suffered a decline in its relative position, 
although the number of people belonging to the group declined 
(42, p. IV-IO), 
The evolution of the regional distribution of income can­
not be quantitatively studied with the existing data, however, 
an indication of the degree of regional disparity can be 
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offered. The fertile lands located on the estuaries of the 
rivers that flow from the Sierra to the Pacific Ocean, provide 
the scene for the production of cotton and sugar» The profit­
ability of such crops has attracted many of the trained agri­
culturists and has allowed heavy capitalization in the produc­
tion process. The location of high productivity mining opera­
tions is also determined by natural factors. However, the 
mines are located in the Sierra region of Peru, To a large 
degree these mining operations (i,e,, Cerro de Pasco, Marcona, 
and Southern Peru Mining Coj'p,) qualify as "enclaves". The 
mining centers represent areas of high productivity amidst a 
region of extremely low productivity activities. The mining 
centers do offer employment opportunities, directly and in­
directly, to the surrounding population. The capital-intensive 
nature of large-scale mining, however, has not created much 
direct employment. As recorded in Table 22, of Section A,4, 
mining employment has only maintained its 2,2% share of the 
total labor force during the 1950-65 period of rapid increases 
in mining output. Furthermore, the mining centers, which are 
foreign owned and operated, are heavily dependent on imports 
which reduce their integration with the domestic economy. Also, 
the tendency of the mining sectors to supply their own food­
stuffs from company owned and operated haciendas further re­
duces the integration of the centers with the domestic economy. 
Being foreign owned much of the value added produced leaves 
the country in terms of dividends, amortization, and interest 
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payments (42, pp. 113-14), 
Industrial production, although not as closely bound to 
the location of physical resources as are mining and agricul­
tural activities, is also highly concentrated regionally. The 
value added per inhabitant of industrial production in each of 
the eight regions of the country, as presented in Table 26, 
illustrates the degree of regional concentration of industrial 
production. It can be appreciated that industrial production 
is highly concentrated in the Metropolitan Region (principally 
in Lima-Callao), It produced approximately 62^ of total indus­
trial value added and achieved a per capita level of industrial 
value added of 8/,4340, while its closest rival was the Central 
Region, However, even though the Central Region..i^ closely 
related to the Metropolitan Region, it attained a level of per 
capita value added of only 8/,1040, 
Table 26, Industrial manufacturing production by regions in 
terms of value added®' 
Percent of value added Value added per " 
in each region inhabitant 
I960 1963 1963 
Total 100.0 100.0 
1, Metropolitan 62.2 62,1 S/,4,340 
II. Worth 10,9 7,5 893 
III. Middle Worth 11,6 11,9 710 
IV, North Wast 0.3 0,3 137 
V. Central 7.1 11,9 1,040 
VI, Middle oouth 1,6 1,3 180 
VII, southeast 1,1 0,6 103 
VIII. 8 out h 4.4 492 
^Source; (17), 
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The majority of the industrial production outside the Metro­
politan Region consists of export industries such as sugar, 
petroleum, mineral refining and fishmeal. Except for fishmeal, 
these industries are limited to a small number of firms, in 
general of foreign ownership, that cooperate only very margin­
ally with the economic activity of the region in which they are 
located (20, p. 52). 
The reasons for the concentration of industrial activity 
in the Metropolitan Region appear to be as follows: 
(1) The industrial structure is orientated towards the 
production of final consumption goods and therefore, 
needs proximity to the market; 
(2) Production consists in great part of simple trans­
formation processes with a high degree of dependence 
on Imported inputs; 
(3) The administrative decisions concerned with the ob­
taining of credit and financing, official authoriza­
tion, etc,; are available almost exclusively in Lima 
(19, P. 50). 
It is considered that the effect of these factors has virtually 
nullified the fiscal incentives for the decentralization of 
industrial development as provided in the Industrial Promotion 
Law of 1959. 
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B, Implications of the Macroeconomic Projections 
for Development Prospects 
The analysis of Section A indicates that the Peruvian 
economy performed well in terras of income growth, monetary 
stability, and balance of payments while doing considerably 
less well in the areas of employment, and personal and regional 
income distribution. The success elements during the 1950-
1966 period can be explained largely in terms of the favor­
able export expansion achieved during that interval. In 
essence, rapid export expansion, led by fishmeal and copper, 
generated considerable income growth while vastly enlarging 
the import capacity of the economy. The availability of 
foreign exchange for the purchase of imports to supplement 
domestic supply, such as agricultural products, encouraged a 
high degree of monetary stability. Viewed in this manner, 
the performance of the economy in terms of income growth, 
monetary stability, and balance of payments is strongly com­
plementary with the rate of export expansion. 
The macroeconomic projections presented in Chapter IV 
indicate that the success elements of recent Peruvian econo­
mic performance will not be continued in the next five years. 
The central reason for this result is that the rate of export 
expansion is expected to be very modest in comparison to the 
experience of the 1959-1966 period. The anticipated growth 
rate of current dollar exports leads to an income projection 
of approximately 2,5# to 3,0% annually contrasted to the 5»'}% 
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annual cumulative growth rate from 1950 to 1966, or to the 
7,1% rate achieved during 1959-1966, I'Jven though the rate of 
export growth ;lfj expected to be modest, CDI growth alternative 
does not imply difficulties with the balance of payments in 
the post-1968 period, This balance of payments position de­
rives largely from the modest rate of income growth and the 
expectation of large private investment inflows destined for 
the copper mining projects. It also reflects an assumption 
tYiat the Peruvian currency will not become substantially over­
valued during the projection period. The GDI growth 
alternative implies comparative price'stability as it limits 
the rate of inflation to less than 10% annually. In order to 
do so, however, the rate of increase in public expenditures 
must be constrained to less than 5% annually in real terms. 
Furthermore, even though GDI growth alternative A^ does not 
imply balance of payments difficulties, foreign exchange will 
not be available for import supplements to domestic supply on 
the scale that has been possible in the pre-1967 devaluation 
period. Therefore, the problem of inflation control will be 
considerably more difficult over the next few years in com­
parison to recent years. 
The slowdown in the rate of income growth can be expected 
to lead to a deterioration in the employment situation. The 
reduction in private economic activity and the tightening of 
/ 
expenditure control on the part of the public sector due to 
budgetary difficulties indicate that those employment 
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opportunities which have absorbed large numbers of workers in 
the recent past will not be available on any considerable scale 
during the next few years. As indicated in Section A,5, these 
opportunities in constructiqn, services, minor commercial 
activity, handicraft activities, and unskilled public employ­
ment are vulnerable to a deterioration in the rate of income 
growth. The information icoritained in Table 6 of dectlon A,5, 
assuming constant technology and relative prices, indicates 
that employment is increased by 1% of the labor force for every 
3% Increase in GDI, Considering that the labor force will be 
expanding at approximately 2,S% per year, it can be appreciated 
that GDI growth alternative A^ Implies an increasing unemploy­
ment problem over the next few years. 
In summary, the macroeconomic projection indicates that 
some of the most postlive aspects of Peru's recent economic 
growth are not likely to be maintained during the next five 
years. Economic conditions may pose, therefore, a greater 
threat to the stability threshold for Peruvian economic and 
social development than they have in the recent past. 
The projected deterioration in the Peruvian economic 
situation during 1967-1972 suggests that It would be of value 
to investigate the potential Improvements that might be 
achieved through economic policy action. Given the modest in­
come growth expectations under existing economic policy and 
the apparent complementarities between income growth and the 
other policy objectives, it is suggested that the primary 
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objective for macroeconomic policy over the period in question 
should be the stimulation of income grow.t^,^ The general econo­
mic policy objective might be stated as maximizing the rate of 
GDI expansion subject to (1) non-vlolatlon of the capacity-to-
import, (?.) a 10% upper limit on the rate of domestic inflation, 
i'j) avoiding an increased capital Intensity in income growth, 
and (4) avoiding a deterioration in the existing state of 
personal and regional income distribution (i.e. a more uneven 
distribution). As a first approximation, a target level of 
GDI expansion can be fixed and an investigation can be carried 
out to determine the feasibility of the target in view of the 
conditions specified above. The GDI growth target is set at 
5% annually for this investigation. 
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VI. ALTEIiNATIVi.-; GUOWTIl PATHS FOI? 1967-72 
The anticipated deterioration in the income growth pro­
spects of Peru indicates a need to investigate the range of 
growth alternatives for the economy during 1967-72 in order to 
determine the potential GDI growth gains from alternative sets 
of economics policies,: The basic growth alternatives are 
"export-propelled" growth and the stimulation of domestic mar­
ket production. As export prices are largely determined by 
factors beyond the control of Peruvian economic authorities, 
attention will be placed on the ability to stimulate export 
volume in the short - to medium - term time period to levels 
exceeding these provided in the export projection of Appendix 
B, The stimulation of domestic market production can be con­
sidered through the action of the public sector and the pri­
vate sector. The public sector expenditure program can be 
supported by domestic and external resources, hence the 
ability to expand the role of the public sector from these 
sources is investigated. Finally, the potential growth con­
tribution of the private sector is analyzed, 
A, Potential Growth Gains from the Export Sector 
The influential role of the export sector in determining 
the growth performance of the Peruvian economy encourages an 
investigation of the ability of public policy action to in­
duce a more rapid expansion of export earnings. Export prices 
which are determined by world market conditions are largely 
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beyond the effective control of Peruvian public authorities, 
i ioncf i ,  attention mu.st be focused on the abiHt.y of economic 
policy to induce expanded export volume. 
The ability of economic policy to induce expanded export 
volume is determined by the structural characteristics of the 
export sector, its relation to the rest of the economy, and 
the nature of the incentive to invest in export production. 
Subsequent analysis of these factors indicates that the ability 
to achieve export expansion via promotion policies during the 
short to medium term period is limited. 
An outstanding feature of the Peruvian export sector is 
its diversification, Peru exports twelve major products. The 
contributions of these products, respectively, to total export 
earnings for I966 are presented in Table 27. It can be appre­
ciated from Table 2? that copper contributed the most to total 
export earnings, closely followed by fishmeal. The remaining 
51,9/^ of total export earnings is rather evenly distributed 
among the remaining ten major export products, ouch diversifi­
cation of exports improves the stability of overall export 
earnings in face of individual export price fluctuations. 
The rapid increase in export earning during 1950-66 (i,e, 
a 7,0/> cumulative annual growth rate) was largely due to the 
appearance of new export products rather than to the expansion 
of traditional exports. The major structural changes in the 
export sector can be appreciated from Table ?.8, It presents 
trie composition of exports in terms of agricultural, fish, and 
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Table 27, The composition of export earnings by major products 
for 1966& 
Product Year 
ougar 6,0 
Coffee 3.7 
Cotton 11.1 
Wools 1,0 
i"'i sl'uneal 23.8 
Fish oil ?-.l 
Iron 7.0 
Copper 24.3 
Lead 4,5 
^inc 4,4 
Silver 5.4 
Petroleum 
.7 
Total 100,0 
^I'Jource: (19). 
minin# ola^Gifications, The dominant structural change is the 
phenomenal rise of the exports of fish products. Fish product 
exports earned only 0,1% of total export earnings in 1950 
while they earned 25,9% in 1966, Mining products have also 
steadily increased their contribution to total export earnings 
from 25,2% in 1950 to 46,3% in 1966, On the other hand, the 
traditional agricultural exports have declined from contri­
buting 55*1% of total export earnings in 1950 to 2\,W% in 
1966, 
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Table 28, Composition 
cation (in 
1  
1 of exports by 
percentages 
major commodity cla ssif1-
Year Agricultural 
exports 
Fish product 
exports 
Mining 
exports 
Other Total 
1950 55.1 .1 25.2 19.6 100,0 
1951 54.8 .2 27.6 17.4 100,0 
195% 52.2 .3 31.1 16,4 100,0 
1953 52.0 .6 32.2 15.2 100,0 
1954 46.1 . 8  34.5 18,6 100,0 
1955 44.2 1.0 36,5 18,3 100,0 
1956 43.7 1.4 37.8 17.1 100,0 
1957 43.7 2.6 36.7 17.0 100,0 
1958 46.3 4.6 . 34.9 14,2 100,0 
1959 41,4 10,9 33.6 14.1 100,0 
i960 33.8 10,2 45.5 10,5 100,0 
1961 35.1 12,5 43.7 8.7 100.0 
1962 34.0 20.9 36.5 8,6 100,0 
1963 35.4 21,0 36.7 6.9 100,0 
1964 30,4 23.7 41,0 5.9 100,0 
1965 24,3 27.0 43.1 5.6 100.0 
1966 21.8 25.9 46.3 6.0 100,0 
^.iource: (21), 
A more detailed explanation of these structural changes 
can be obtained from an analysis of the earnings of each of th:: 
major export products during 1950-66, as presented in Table 29 
and ]0, Fish products exports,' fishmeal and fish oil, rose 
from practically nothing to 1.0% of total export earnings in 
1955. In 1959 fishmeal amounted to 10,0% while fish oil rose 
to ,9/î of total export earnings. Thus, 1959 was the first 
'01. 
Tabic ?. 9 • i'l a j 0 r expo r 
lars 
t product ^ • W \ j. i i millionG of current M ol -
Year Sugar Coffee Cotton Wool Fishmeal Pish oil Iron 
1950 29.7 1.0 67.9 7.9 0,3 — -
1951 34.2 2.4 85.6 13.8 0.5 - -
1952 32.8 2.8 79.3 7.6 0.8 - -
1953 34.6 5.3 65.1 8.7 1.0 0.4 6,4 
1954 32.7 7.1 64.8 8.5 1.2 0.7 12.9 
1955 36.9 8.0 68,1 5.9 2.0 0.7 8.0 
1956 32.8 8.9 85.7 7.8 3.5 1.0 14.8 
1957 49.6 13.0 68,0 9.8 7.1 1,4 23.5 
1958 33.9 15.8 75.4 6.1 11,6 1.3 16.4 
1959 35.9 15.6 69.3 9.0 31.3 2.9 19.4 
I960 47.5 18.6 73.2 7.1 38.8 5.3 32,7 
1961 63.9 22.8 79.6 7.4 49.6 12,2 36.8 
1962 53.8 24.2 96.9 8.9 99.9 12.9 32.7 
1963 63.1 25.6 91.0 11.7 104,5 9.4 36,4 
1964 63.4 37.0 91.0 11.6 • 143,4 14,7 38,9 
1965 37.3 29.0 86.7 8,4 155.7 23.9 47,0 
1966 46,3 28.5 85.0 7.7 181,8 15.8 53.4 
^.'Jourco : ( 2 1 ) .  
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Table 29 (Continued) 
Year Copper Lead Zinc Silver Petroleum others Total 
1950 10,2 12.3 10.5 8,2 7.3 37.9 193.3 
1951 15.3 23.6 15.1 10,4 4.4 't3.2 248,5 
1952 17.1 23.9 15.0 12.4 4,6 38,5 234,8 
1953 17.4 22.5 7.6 11.7 4,9 33.2 219.0 
1954 20,0 23.7 9.1 14,4 5.0 45.7 245,7 
1955 29.3 26.2 13.8 16,2 5.0 49.3 269,4 
1956 33,6 31.3 14,1 17.7 5.7 52,8 309.8 
1957 24.5 29.3 15.1 17.9 5.6 56.6 321,4 
1958 22,0 24,4 11.3 18.9 6.1 40,4 283,6 
1959 24,9 21,2 14,2 20.4 5.8 44,1 313.9 
i960 94,7 21.7 16.7 24,2 6,4 45.6 432,4 
1961 105.1 22,3 19.1 27.6 6,4 43.1 495.9 
1962 92.4 16,3 15.8 33.0 6,8 46,3 539.8 
196] 87.3 16,4 15.8 35.8 6,5 37.4 541.0 
1964 103.0 33.0 39.1 45.2 7.0 39.3 666,7 
1965 121.3 37.9 35.8 39.1 6,0 38,1 666,2 
1966 186,3 34.6 34,0 41,4 5.0 45.5 765.3 
V.I 
Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
i960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
30, Major export products (nomposltlon by percentages; 
Sugar Coffee Cotton Wool Fishmeal Fish oil Iron 
15.4 0.5 35.1 4.1 0.1 - -
13.8 1,0 34.4 5.6 0,2 - -
14,0 1.2 33.8 3.2 0.3 - -
15.8 2.4 29.8 4.0 0,4 0.2 2.9 
13.3 2.9 26,4 3.5 0.5 0.3 5.3 
13.7 3.0 25.3 2,2 0.7 0.3 3.0 
10,6 2.9 27.7 2.5 1.1 0.3 4.8 
15.4 4.1 21,2 3.0 2,2 0.4 7.3 
12.0 5.6 26.6 2.1 4.1 0.5 5.8 
11.4 5.0 22.1 2.9 10,0 0.9 6.2 
11.0 4.3 16.9 1.6 9.0 1.2 7.6 
12.9 4.6 16.1 1.5 10,0 2.5 7.4 
10.0 4.5 17.9 1.6 18,5 2.4 61. 
11.7 4.7 16.8 2.2 19.3 1.7 6.7 
9.5 5.5 13.7 1.7 21.5 2.2 5.8 
5.6 4,4 13.0 1.3 23.4 3.6 7.0 
6.0 3.7 11.1 1.0 23.8 2.1 7.0 
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Table 30 (Continued) 
Year Copper Lead Zinc Silver Petroleum Others Total 
1950 5.3 6.3 5.4 4,3 3.8 19.6 100,0 
1951 6.1 9.5 6.1 4.2 1.8 17.4 100,0 
1952 7.3 10,2 6.4 5.3 2,0 16,4 100,0 
1953 8.0 10.3 3.5 5.3 2,2 15.2 100,0 
1954 8.1 9.6 3.7 5.9 2.0 18.6 100.0 
1955 10.9 9.7 5.1 6.0 1.9 18,3 100,0 
1956 10.9 10.1 4.6 . 5.7 1.8 17.1 100,0 
1957 7.6 9.1 4.7 5.6 2.4 17,0 100,0 
1958 7.4 8,6 4.0 6.7 2.2 14,2 100.0 
1959 7.9 6.7 4.5 6.5 1.9 14,1 100,0 
i960 21.9 5.0 3.9 5.6 1.5 10,5 100,0 
1961 21.2 4,5 3.8 5.6 1.3 8,7 100,0 
1962 17.1 3.0 2.9 6.1 1.3 8,6 100,0 
1963 16.1 3.0 2.9 6,6 1.2 6,9 100,0 
1964 15.5 4.9 5.9 6,8 1.0 5.9 100.0 
1965 18.2 5.7 5.4 5.9 0.9 5.6 100,0 
1966 24.3 4.5 4,4 5.4 0,7 6,0 100,0 
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year of the Peruvian fishmcal boom which brciight fishmcal's 
contribution to total export earnings to a high of 23,8# in 
1966, Further noteworthy changes in the export product struc­
ture occurred with the opening of. the Marcona iron mines in 
1953 which initiated iron as a Peruvian export product and 
with the opening of the Toquepala copper mines by the Southern 
1 
Peru Copper Corporation in 1959, Although copper was an export 
product before the opening of the Toquepala mines, the magni­
tude of the volume exported by these mines compared to the 
I 
then existing volume led to an increase in copper exports from 
7,9# to 21,9% of total export earnings from 1959 to i960. The 
traditional agricultural exports, not being able to match the 
dynamic growth of the new export products, lost relative im­
portance, An exception was coffee which increased its contri­
bution to total export earnings from 0,5% in 1950 to S»5% in 
1964', The percentage of exports to GDP increased from a low of 
11,8/2 in 1951 to a high of 23,6# in 1961 as the impact of 
rapid fishmeal and copper exports was felt. It can be appre­
ciated from Table 31 that export production substantially in­
creased its incidence to GDP in 1959, the continuing influence 
of which has increased the average dependence of GDP on export 
production substantially during the i960's as compared to the 
1950's. However, neither the raw material nature of Peru's 
exports nor the basic weakness of the linkage effects between 
export production and the rest of the economy has changed. 
Export products, except sugar, continue to lack a significant 
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Taule 31-32. The relation of export production to gross domes­
tic product: 1950-1965 (in millions of 1963 
Soles)* 
y ear I'Jxr^ort 
production 
J'I 
Gross domestic 
production 
on? 
1950 5,662.3 44,110.5 .1^9 
1951 5,541,9 47,148.3 .118 
1952 6,473,3 49,798.1 .130 
1953 7,158.7 52,210.7 .137 
1954 7,677.6 55,128,6 .139 
1955 8,225.9 57,257,0 .144 
1956 9,123.4 59,231.6 .154 
1957 9,502.5 62,747.8 .151 
1958 9,681.6 63,244.2 .153 
1959 11,179,3 65,768,8 .170 
i960 14,188.0 72,453.7 .196 
1961 16,379.8 76,674.1 .236 
1962 16,975.8 80,933.4 .210 
1963 16,538.6 85,031.0 .194 
1964 17,928.2 90,166.2 .199 
1965 17,855.0 95,841.4 .186 
^•Source: (IB), 
207 
] • 
domestic market. "Backward linkage" effects to the domestic 
production activities remain small. The one major exception 
to this general situation is fishmeal. Compared to the other 
major export products, fishmeal production represents a model 
of the potential growth stimulus that a new export activity 
can create for the domestic production activities (42), 
The substantial success achieved by Peru in export pro­
motion appears to have been substantially influenced by her 
long-term policies which were implemented, in the post-1945 
period, under the Odria regime. It was recognized that Peru 
required foreign capital and technology in order to exploit 
her extensive natural resources. In order to attract foreign 
capital the following policies were established: 
(1) The maintenance of foreign exchange convertibility 
as well as a relatively stable exchange rate; 
(2) The granting of investment incentives; 
(3) The avoidance of discrimination against foreign 
capital ; 
(4) The maintenance of a relatively stable internal price 
level. 
The ability of the Government to induce export expansion 
in the short-run, via devaluation or export subsidies, appears 
to be limited. Increases in mining output are largely deter­
mined by the opening of new large-scale mines, However, the 
opening of these mines requires long gestation lags (4 to 5 
years). Agricultural exports are limited by international 
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quota restrictions and world demand limitations, Fishmeal, 
which has provided a large expansion in export volume, is not 
likely to repeat its performance due to a supply restraint on 
its raw material, 
A policy of diverting goods from domestic consumption to 
exports cannot be utilized to obtain short-run increases in 
exports as exportable products in general do not have domestic 
markets. The small-scale industrial manufacturing sector, 
working under conditions of productive Inefficiency fostered 
by the smallness of the domestic market and high effective tar­
iff protection, does not have significant short-run export 
potential, 
A conscious policy of export promotion might yield some 
expansion in the export volume of particular products above 
and beyond the levels provided by the export hypothesis which 
were used in the projection procedure of Chapter IV, However, 
It is not the purpose of this work to analyze the details of 
export promotion and their respective impacts on the export 
volume of particular products. Rather the purpose at hand is 
to delineate the likely bounds with respect to the gains which 
might be achieved through export promotion policies during the 
next 5 years. 
The preceeding brief analysis of the structure of the ex­
port sector and of its relation to the rest of the economy 
indicates that there is little or no reason to expect that an 
export promotion pplicy could Induce an expansion of exports 
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significantly in excess of that pr-OYided. by the export; hypo= 
thesis of Chapter IV, Hence, even though a conscious effort 
to promote exports is a step in the direction of diversifying 
and strengthening the Peruvian export sector, it cannot be 
expected to make a substantial contribution to attaining fur­
ther income growth during the 1968-1972 period, 
' 1 
B, Potential Growth Gains from the Public Sector 
The fundamental restraint to the level of public expendi­
tures (in the context of Chapter IV)^ is the level of public 
revenues. If the level of public revenues could be increased, 
then the level of public expenditures could expand, thereby 
inducing an expansion of GDI, The two principal sources of 
additional public revenues are (1) the inflow of foreign pub­
lic capital and (2) Internal tax reform. Inflationary financ­
ing of expanded public expenditures is restrained by the limi­
tation placed on deficit financing in accordance with the 
objective with respect to monetary stability. In this section, 
after a discussion of the main features of the public sector 
during 1960-65, an analysis of the potential GDI growth gains 
^In Chapter IV, the establishing of the rough guideline 
for evaluating the impact of the level of required internal 
financing on the rate' of inflation makes the acceptable level 
of public expenditures a function of the level of public reve­
nue, It is assumed that increases in public revenue will not 
entail decreases in private economic activity in the context 
of the tax reforms considered in Section 3,3 of this capter. 
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from the Implementation of the OAS/BID tax reform proposal * 
1. Main features of the public sector; 1960-65 
iiapid growth of public sector expenditures during the 
1960-65 period was one of the most striking features of Peru­
vian oconomjc change, Public expenditures and Gross Domestic 
income, both expanded greatly in 196O over their respective 
1959 levels, which were depressed throughout the 1958-59 re­
cession in the Peruvian economy, Referring to Table 3'j| the 
ratio of public iixpendltures to Gross Domestic Income, increas­
ed from 16,8^ in 1959 to 18,in i960 and to 25,7# in 1965, 
uven though the rate of income growth, was appreciable during 
the 1960-65 peripd, propelled by the strong expansion of the 
export sector, the public sector measured in terms of public 
expenditures increased more than two-and-a-half times as fast 
as Gross Domestic income. 
The growth of the public sector was characterized by a 
strong expansion of economic and social services provided, 
including capital investment, rather than by the production of 
public goods such as utilities and industrial enterprises. 
The increasing relative importance of the public sector 
is reflected by its larger participation in internal demand, 
the sum of consumption and investment. 
As presented in Table 3^, public consumption, and invest­
ment together constituted 11,0% of total internal demand in 
i960, and increased steadily to a high of above X6% in 1964 and 
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xttoxc J J, uciauiuii ui L-ur" i v wi lu 
incomes I96O-65 (millions of I963 Soles)®' 
Year Public Gross domestic Public expenditures .^ 
expenditure income GDI ' 
i960 13,416.8 72,800.8 18,4 
v j6 i  17,828.3 75,845.2 23.5 
1962 ly,105.8 80,504,8 21,2 
1963 19,957.9 85,031.0 23.5 
1964 23,049.8 92,737.9 24,9 
1965 25,104.7 97,551.6 25,7 
^oource; (20), 
1965. The ratio of public consumption to total consumption, 
has climbed from 11,5^ in i960 to 15,8% in I965, while the 
ratio of public investment to total investment grew, in a 
rather more erratic manner, from 8,8^ to 17,2% over the same 
period, 
h factor of major importance in the growth of the Peruvian 
public sector has been the sustained growth of social services, 
principally education and health. While public expenditures 
grew more than two-and-a-half times as rapidly as Gross Domes­
tic Income, the participation of expenditures on social ser­
vices to total expenditures increased from 30,J# in i960 to 
39.6# In 1965. 
Taoie 34. The participation of the public sector in total internal demand: 1960-1965 
(in millions of 1963 Soles)® 
Year Consunption Investment Internal 
demand 
Government 
consunption 
Government 
investment 
1960 57,228.1 14,029.2 71,257.3 6,577.5 1,235.9 
1961 60,094.3 15,005.9 75,100.2 7,981.5 2,709.4 
1962 62,853.0 17,334.0 80,187.8 8,531.8 2,025.4-
1963 66,291.8 19,483.7 85,775.5 9,715.2 2,855.2 
1964 71,531.3 19,254.3 90,785.6 10,870.4 4,069.6 
1965 64,635.2 22,413.0 87,048.2 12,085.0 3,861.0 
^Sources (18). 
Table 34 (Continued) 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
Government demand 
Total demand 
(%) 
11.U 
14.2 
13.2 
14.7 
16.5 
16.1 
Government consumption 
Total consunption 
11.5 
13.3 
13.6 
14.7 
15.2 
15.8 
Government investment 
Total investment 
iSQ. 
8.8 
18.1 
11.7 
14.7 
21.1 
17.2 
rv) 
2l4 
The increased participation of expenditures on social 
services was made possible, in large part, by the declining 
relative expenditures for general administration, defense, 
police, and justice, which decreased from 26,3^ in I96O to 
XI,iX In 19(6, Public expenditures can be fjubdivided into: 
(1) social services (e,f,, education, health), (2) economic 
services and (3) general services and administration. The 
bulk of the expenditures on social services are on current 
account as opposed to capital account (i.e., for capital for­
mation), while the economic services are mainly on capital 
account (particularly for transportation, communications, and 
other infrastructure facilities ) (17). 
The financing of the rapidly expanding public sector has 
been aggravated by a situation in which the inflow of tax 
revenues relative to Gross Domestic Income has responded much 
more slowly than the outflow of public expenditures. This 
trend has led to budgetary deficits and has magnified the 
importance of foreign capital inflow in the financing of the 
public sector investment program. 
The slower growth of current revenues compared to current 
expenditures has led to a reduction of savings on current ac­
count which is one of the major revenue sources for public 
Investment expenditures. In I960, according to Table 35, 
savings on current account covered 48,5# of capital expendi­
tures, but only 12,9# in 1965, JMot only did the participation 
of savings on current account to capital financing fall 
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Table 35= The percentage of pufoliç^çapltal formation financed 
by savings on curren-tWjècdOnt and public foreign 
capital inflow durin^Khe I96O-I966 period^ 
Year Savin@e^>erf^ 
current account 
Public foreign^ 
capital inflow 
i960 48,5% 7,3% 
1961 34.2# 9.8% 
1962 34,6# 27,1% 
1963 26,4# 32,5% 
1964 23,6# 33.2% 
1965 12,9# 46.3% 
1966 5.9% 70.9% 
^Source; (20), 
^The remainder of public capital formation was financed 
during the above period by accumulated surpluses and other 
sources which will not be available in the future, 
relatively but also absolutely from S/,2517,2 million in 196O 
to 3/,936,9 million in I965, 
The decline in domestic sources of public finance for 
investment expenditures was countered by a substantial inflow 
of foreign public capital. The participation of public capital 
inflow, or external public debt, in the financing of capital 
expenditures, increased from 7,3% in I96O to 46,3% in I965, 
representing an absolute Increase from 3/,378,0 million to 
3/,3365,0 million. It is clear that foreign public capital 
inflow has been a substantial contributor to the expanding 
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role of the public sector in the Peruvian development experi­
ence of recent years. 
Although tax revenues increased less rapidly than public 
expenditures, the proportion of tax income to Gross Domestic 
Income, as presented in Table j6, increased from 12,6# in I960 
to in 1965, although it fell somewhat in 1966, The in­
creasing tax pressure, however, was not accomplished by a 
parallel expansion of direct and indirect taxes. Direct taxes 
decreased from 38,3# of total taxes in 196O to 24,9# in 1965. 
The probably expansion for the decline in direct tax 
revenues during the 1964-66 period is exoneration from tax 
payments on business income granted for the purpose of stimu­
lating industrial development, The loss in revenue resulting 
from exonerations has not been officially estimated at the 
present time, A preliminary estimate of the loss has been 
obtained through regression analysis. On the basis of record­
ed statistical information for the period 1950-63, a multiple 
regression equation was estimated which explained the level 
of direct tax revenues as a function of the level business 
profits and wages and salaries. The resulting equation was 
then used to estimate the expected level of direct tax reve­
nues for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966, The expected levels 
of direct tax revenues were subsequently compared to the 
actual levels of direct tax revenues in Table 37. The esti­
mated loss in direct tax revenues due to exonerations on busi­
ness taxes was 3/,1233.1 in 1964, 0/,1434,2 in 1965, and 
Table 16. Direct (T~) and indirect tayes, (T") and the rela­
tion of total taaes (T) to gross domestic income 
(GDI): 1960-65 (millions of I963 Soles)a 
Year T ' f/T t1 T^/T T/M 
GDI 
i960 9,148,8 3,-504,0 38.3 5,644,8 61,7 12.57 
1961 10,542,0 3,700,2 35.1 6,841,8 64,9 13.89 
1962 10,671.2 3,660,2 34,3 7,011,0 65.7 13.25 
1963 12,137.1 4,044,2 33.3 8,092.9 66,7 14.27 
1964 13,361.6 3,621.0 27.1 9,240,6 72,9 14.40 
1965 14,049.1 3,498.2 24,1 10,550.9 75.1 14.40 
^Source; (20). 
Table 3?. A preliminary estimate of the loss in direct tax 
revenue due to exonerations on business profit 
taxes: 1964-66, (in millions of I963 Soles) 
1964 1965 1966 
i.!istimated revenue 
Recorded revenue 
Loss in revenue 
4854,1 
3621.0 
1233.1 
4932.4 
3498.2 
1434.2 
5574.9 
3385.2 
2189.7 
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and o/_2iH9,7 in 1966= FiKuro 1 presents the actual direct 
tax revenue as contrasted to the estimated direct tax revenue 
for each year of the 1950-66 period. The close fit of the 
estimated to the actual annual direct tax revenue during the 
1950-63 period contrasts sharply to their divergence during 
1964-66, The divergence during 1964-66 represents the estimate 
of the loss in direct tax revenue due to the exonerations. 
Direct taxes actually declined in absolute terms in 1964-66, 
In contrast, indirect taxes have increased strongly principally 
through changes in import duties and transaction taxes rates, 
2. The public foreign capital inflow (T^) alternative 
A projection of the annual levels of T^ during 1967-72 
has been used in the macroeconomic projection procedure of 
Chapter IV, It is now proposed to determine an estimate of 
the public foreign debt servicing capacity during 1967-72, 
If the annual debt servicing capacity exceeds the projected 
debt servicing requirements of the projection of Tg used in 
Chapter IV, then an estimate can be made of the additional 
annual Tg that the Peruvian economy could finance, 
A "rule-of-thumb" for estimating the foreign debt ser­
vicing capacity of the public sector that has been used by 
international development finance institutions in that debt 
servicing charges should not exceed 1?.% of export earnings. 
However, in July of 1966 an international consortium of world 
development financing institutions met to consider the feasi­
bility of channeling a requested 500 million U, S, dollars in 
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Graphical analysis of the preliminary estimate of direct tax losses 
due to exonerations 
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aid funds to the Peruvian government. In the course of these 
discussions it was accepted that debt servicing charges up to 
15% of export earnings would not be excessive, at least tempo­
rarily, for the Peruvian economy. An estimate of the Peruvian 
debt servicing capacity can be obtained by applying this 1S% 
rule to the export earnings projection elaborated in Appendix 
B, The resulting debt servicing capacity calculations and the 
estimated required debt servicing payments for 1968-1972 are 
presented in Table j8. 
Table 38, Calculation of the debt servicing capacity of Peru 
using the 15% of export earnings rule (in millions 
of U, S, dollars) 
Projected 
export 
earnings 
Calculated 
debt servicing 
capacity 
Required 
debt servicing 
payments 
Surplus debt 
servicing 
capacity 
1968 942,2 141,3 101,0 40,3 
1969 989,3 148,4 93.5 54.9 
1970 1038,8 155.8 188.9 -33.1 
1971 1090,7 163.6 202,1 -38.5 
1972 1145,2 171.8 210,2 -38.4 
Considering the surplus debt service capacity figures 
recorded in Table 38, it would appear that the Peruvian public 
sector is already over-burdened by its external debt. The 
positive surpluses recorded in 1968 and 1969 appear to indicate 
that more external debt could be accomodated in those years. 
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However, the debt service estimates are corrected for the re­
financing of the Peruvian external debt which was announced in 
July 1968, The surpluses in I968 and I969 which appear in 
Table 38 derive directly from the postponement of 40,0 million 
U, S, dollars in amortization payments which were due in I968 
and of 60,0 million U, 3, dollars which were due in I969, The 
1968 crisis in the Peruvian budget, largely caused by the 
September 196? devaluation of the domestic currency on the 
international exchange markets and the inelasticity of the 
public revenue structure to income growth, motivated the effort 
to obtain relief from rapidly growing debt servicing charges on 
the external debt. 
In conclusion, the fact that debt servicing payments on 
the external debt, both on past loans and on the projected 
level of new loans included in the projection procedure of 
Chapter IV, already exceed the 15^ of export earnings rule and 
that the public sector has budget difficulties, indicates that 
additional resources from external lending institutions to 
finance higher levels of public expenditure during 1968-1972 
cannot be expected. Therefore, if the additional revenues 
needed to finance a higher rate of public expenditures are to 
be obtained, without indiscriminate use of money creation, 
they will have to be obtained from tax reform. 
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The tax reform alternative 
The unresponsiveness of tax revenue to GDI growth has led 
to the projection of increasing internal financing requirements 
during 1967-1972 under the GDI growth alternatives as the rate 
of increase in public expenditures rose. The imposition of a 
decision rule (the rough guideline presented in Chapter IV) 
with respect the magnitude of required internal financing that 
can be considered as consistent with the monetary stability 
objective enabled a choice to be made among the GDI growth 
alternatives. An increase in the annual level of public 
revenue would permit a reduction in the level of required in­
ternal financing under each GDI growth alternative. The sub­
sequent reapplication of the decision rule might permit the 
selection of a different growth alternative with a higher 
rate of GDI growth. 
In this section an analysis is made of the public revenue 
gains which might be expected from the increase in import 
duties of June 1967 and from the implementation of other tax 
reforms based upon the OAS/BID tax reform proposal,^ 
The potential revenue gains from the increase in import 
duties of June I967 are estimated by the use of the multiple 
L 
^Tax reforms very similar to those presented herein were 
instituted in July of 1968, Although the individual tax yields 
that are expected from the actual tax reform are different 
from the estimates presented herein, the aggregate revenue 
gains are approximately the same, at least for 1968, 
22] 
regression equation for Indirect taxes (T-). The estimated 
equation is 
= -4547.4 + .149 eg + ,259 M = .94 
( . 0 6 8 )  ( . 1 2 0 )  
where represents private consumption expenditures minus 
consumer good imports and M represents the level of total im­
ports, The intercept coefficient has been adjusted by li;^ to 
obtain the estimation equation used in the following analysis, 
T^ = -4047,2 + ,149 + ,259 M , 
The 11/é adjustment in the intercept coefficient includes a 10% 
shift to compensate for the reduced exoneration benefits on 
imports as provided by Supreme Decree 137-H of June 5, 1967 
and a 1% shift to compensate for recent administrative action 
to improve the collection of consumption and production taxes. 
The import duty increase affects the marginal indirect tax 
coefficient for imports (,259 M), It was estimated by the 
Institute Nacional de Planificaclon that the average ad 
valorem tariff rate increased from 44/^ to S5% due to the new 
import duties. The pre-June 1967 effective ad valorem tariff 
rate (i,e,, the ratio of import duties paid to total imports) 
was approximately 20%, Since the increase from 44% to 55% 
represents a 25% increase in the nominal ad valorem tariff 
rate, the effective rate was adjusted by 25%, from 20% to 25% 
of imports. The increase in the effective rate is equivalent 
to ,05 M, hence ,05 M was added to .259 M to yield .309 M. 
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TllS 6S oimaoed. cQuâtlOn fOP u-xj/SCfc taXGS (T ) frOSl til' 
recorded data is; 
= -405,1 + .058 W + .152IT = .94 
(.014) (.067) 
where W represents wages and salaries and"^ represents profits 
of enterprises. In the "basic" model of Chapter IV the direct 
tax function is adjusted to; 
= -2235.3 + .058 W + .152TT 
The change in the intercept was motivated by the cumulative 
impact of business profit tax exonerations and the decision to 
improve direct tax collection. As illustrated by Graph 1 in 
section B,l, direct tax collections have decreased substantial-
I 
ly since 1963 due to tax exonerations granted as an incentive 
for industrial development. It was decided to correct the 
intercept for the impact of tax exonerations. An estimate of 
the level of for 1966 was made using the estimated equation 
obtained from the recorded data which yielded S/,557^,9 
millions. The recorded 1966 level of direct taxes, S/,3385.2 
millions, was subtracted from S/,557^,9 millions to yield 
S/,2189,7 millions. Reducing the intercept by S/,2189,7 mil­
lions yielded a new intercept of -259^,8 millions which was 
then increased by 13.9^ to compensate for a change in the 
granting of exonerations and improved direct tax collection. 
The new intercept, therefore, is (-2235.3) which yields the 
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estimated T^' equation used in the "basic" model. The OAS/BID 
tax reform proposal included provisions for increasing personal 
income taxes and business profit taxes. The OAS/BID team 
estimated a 8/,100 million Increase in revenue for 1965 from 
its personal income tax reform. The estimated personal income 
, > 
tax yield for 1965 from our estimated equation is (,058 W 
= 3/,336^,2), The S/,100 million was added to the estimated 
S/,336^,2 millions to yield 8/,3464,2 million which Is equi­
valent to ,06 W, Hence, the W coefficient was adjusted to 
,06 W from ,058 W, The OAS/BID estimate of additional business 
profit tax revenue for I965 under its suggested reform is 
S/,225,3 millions. The estimated I965 tax revenue from pro­
fits from the direct tax equation is (,152TT = 1973.3) 
8/,1973.3 millions. Adding 8/,225,3 millions to 8/,1973.3 
million yields 8/,2198,6 millions which is equivalent to ,169-^r. 
Hence, the a coefficient was adjusted to ,169 from ,152 ct. 
The resulting direct tax equation under tax reform is: 
T^ = -2235,3 + ,06 W + ,169 ir 
A major feature of the OAS/BID tax reform proposal Is the 
enactment of a property tax. The property tax is estimated to 
yield between S/,676,3 million and 8/,1052,1 million in I963 
prices. For our purposes It has been assumed that the incep­
tion of the property tax in 1968 could yield the lower level of 
S/,676,3 million rising by ^972 to the higher estimate of 
S/.1052,1 million. 
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A further tax change that is imder consideration, but not 
part of the OAS/BID tax reform proposal, is an increase in the 
gasoline tax. To obtain an estimate of the revenue yield of 
a change in gasoline taxes, a hypothesis was constructed which 
assumed that both the high, and the, low octane gasoline taxes 
would be doubled, that the price elasticities were 0,4 and 0,1 
for high and low octane gasoline, respectively, and that gas­
oline consumption would increase at 10^ per year. This hypo­
thesis yields a revenue gain of 3/,29^#5 millions (in 196] 
Soles) in I968, 
A summary statement of the potential revenue gains from 
the proposed tax reform plus the increase in import duties is 
presented in Table 39. 
Table 39. Potential revenue ggins from tax reform and in­
creased import duties (in millions of I963 Soles) 
.967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
1, Business and 
personal inc 
tax reform 
2, Import duty 
increase 
3, Property tax 
'4-, Gasoline tax 
Total 
487.5 
5.97.6 624,7 
673.3 
294.5 
5.97.6 2704.6 
502,3 512,6 
1381,9 1443.9 
758.6 843.9 
320.7 354.8 
3963.5 3155,1 
528.9 547.8 
1529.4 1587.8 
942.7 1052.1 
388.1 426.9 
3389.1 3614,6 
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The estimation procedure for calculating the revenue 
prains from increased import duties was altered for the 1968 
estimate. The level of imports for I968 is expected to be 
approximately 9OO million U, u. dollars, down from 1.01? million 
U, ;j, dollars in 196'/» This restriction in imports derives 
from the impact of the devaluation of the Peruvian currency 
from o/,26,82 to the U, o, dollar to 3/,38,70 on the certifi­
cate market and an even higher rate on the free market, 
although the certificate rate applies to most imports that are 
subject to duty, the application of a surcharge on various im­
ports for the latter half of 1968, and from the prohibition of 
other Imports over most of 1968, Due to the impact of these 
measures on effective import demand and to the impact of the 
prohibition and surcharge taxes on imports that are usually 
subject to substantial import duties, it is estimated that 
only one-half of the increase in duty collections calculated 
by the procedure described above will be obtained in 1968, 
The estimates for 1969-1972 derive directly from the adjusted 
estimating equation for the level of indirect tax collections, 
on the assumption that the restrictions which have been placed 
on imports during I968 will be eliminated in January I969, as 
the current scheduling decrees, and that the Peruvian currency 
will not be further devalued in those years. 
The impact of the expected additional revenue from tax re­
form on the feasible rate of GDI growth over the 1967-1972 
period can be evaluated by reducing the annual levels of 
22M 
Tcqi.!l.refj 1 nherna ! t'lnancln/^ unci fir f;ach of tht; three GDI ATOwth 
alternatives, as presented in Table 1/ of Chapter IV, by the 
additional revenue gains from tax reform and re-applying the 
rough guideline for evaluating the consistency between the 
resultant required level of internal financing and the desired 
degree of monetary stability. The re-application of the rough 
guideline might indicate that a higher rate of GDI growth has 
become feasible. The recalculated levels of required internal 
financings for each of the GDI growth alternatives, A^, Ap, and 
ky are presented in Table 40, Restating the rough guideline, 
if the level of required internal financing is less than 
^/.2500 millions it is consistent, if between o/,2500 and 
3/,3500 it is doubtfully consistent, and if over S/,3500 it is 
definitely inconsistent with the desire to restrain the rate 
of inflation to less than 10% annually. The application of the 
guideline to the data of Table 40 indicates that GDI growth 
alternative becomes feasible,^ with the sole exception of 
1972, The indication is that under the tax reform presented 
above the rate of increase in public expenditures could reach 
7% annually which on the basis of the projection procedure 
^It is assumed that the increase in public sector revenue 
will not adversely affect the growth contribution of the private 
sector. This assumption does not appear unreasonable consider­
ing the nature of the tax reforms and the relatively low 
incidence of tax collections to GDI in Peru, 
Table 40. i?eviRed internal financing levels for the alterns-
tive gross domestic income projections (in millions 
of 1963 Soles) 
4 A3 
1967 625,0 1012,7 1442.9 
196% - 669,8 215.) 836,9 
1969 - 468,9 902,8 2338,5 
1970 -1298,9 6x9,6 2654,8 
1971 -2521,1 80,2 2689,2 
1972 -2523.7 703.7 3836,0 
presented in Chapter IV would permit the achievement of a 3.5^ 
cumulative annual expansion in GDI from 196? to 1972, The 
more rapid expansion in the level of GDI would also entail a 
more rapid expansion of imports, other things remaining the 
same, As presented in Table 18 of Chapter IV, the level of 
import demand would exceed the calculated capacity-to-import 
from 1970 to 1972 and the total import demand from 1967 to 
1972 would amount to 66l j,4 millions of U, :J, dollars in com­
parison to 6438,8 millions of U, S, dollars for the total 
capacity-to-import. The implication is that the acceleration 
in GDI growth derived from the tax reform would entail in­
creased balance of payments difficulties over the period. 
2)0 
C. Pobcintial (irowth Gain,': from !;h" !'rl doctor 
The analysis of Section A indicated that little growth 
impetus can be expected from additional export promotion efforts 
In the next few years. The investigation of tax reform in Sec­
tion B indicated that additional GDI growth gains could be 
obtained through this means, whereas no additional growth 
impetus can be expected from a more rapid inflow of public for­
eign capital as the debt servicing capacity of the economy is 
already overburdened. Incorporating the GDI growth gains de­
riving from the implementation of tax reform, the cumulative 
annual growth rate of GDI was estimated to be approximately 
from 1967 to I972, At this point it is of interest to 
investigate the possibility of closing the gap between the 
projected 3.5^ growth rate and the 5,0% targeted growth rate 
of GDI over the 1967-1972 period by inducing an expansion in 
the level of domestic private investment activity, if the 
analysis indicates that the gap is not likely to be closed 
through Increased private investment activity, assuming that 
the tax reforms are enacted as indicated in Section B and that 
GDI growth alternative A.^ obtains, then the tentative con­
clusion can be reached that the 5*^% GDI growth target is not 
attainable during 1967-1972, 
The level of domestic private investment activity enters 
the projection model of Chapter IV as an endogenous variable 
which is explained as a function of a quantity which is defined 
as the sum of profits of business enterprises and the level of 
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commercial credit offered to the private sector by commercial 
and savings banks. The level of profits is explained by the 
level of export volume and the level of the torms-of-trade 
effect, both of which are exogenously determined. The level 
of commercial credit, however, is a relatively flexible policy 
instrument of the public authorities for influencing the level 
of private investment activity. One way in which the possibi­
lity of inducing sufficient domestic private Investment activity 
to achieve the GDI income growth target can be analysed is 
by calculating the level of commercial Credit necessary to gen­
erate the additional income expansion and then evaluating the 
feasibility of obtaining the required expansion in the level of 
commercial credit. The calculation of the required annual 
level of commercial credit and the annual rates of increase in 
the levels is presented in Table 4-1, 
It is clear from the required growth rate of commercial 
credit that an initial large increase in the level of credit 
would be necessary in 1968, followed by a lower but still very 
rapid rate of increase in the 1969-1972 period. Even though 
the projected level of required internal financing by the public 
sector for I968 is very modest, assuming the implementation of 
tax reform, and that the level of commercial credit has not 
expanded very rapidly in the past few years, it is not feasible 
to restrain the rate of inflation to the desired level under 
an approximate 50^ increase in the level of commercial credit. 
Furthermore, a smaller increase in the level of commercial 
Table 41. Required commercial credit levels to achieve the 5.0% GDI growth target (in millions 
of 1963 Soles) 
Year GDI 
under 
GDI 
growth 
target 
Required 
GDI 
increment 
Required 
commercial 
credit 
increment 
Required 
coiranercial 
credit 
level 
Required 
commercial 
credit 
growth rate 
Required 
domestic 
private 
investment 
1967 113,340 113,340 15023 - 18553 
1968 116,443 119,007 2,564 6,348 22348 49% 22557 
1969 121,853 124,957 3,104 7,685 24725 11% 23990 
1970 126,433 131,205 4,772 11,814 29961 21% 26797 
1971 131,520 137,765 6,245 15,462 34789 16% 29598 
1972 135,696 144,653 8,957 22,176 42759 23% 34014 
tSJ 
t  
233 
credit than 5G^ for I968 would mean that the required increases 
in the subsequent years would rise even further. Therefore, it 
is deemed highly unlikely that the gap between the projected 
and desired income growth rate can be closed by inducing addi­
tional domestic private investment activity during 1967-1972. 
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VII. THE SUPPLY OF SAVINGS 
A, Introduction 
The invcntiPiation of alternative growth paths in the pre­
ceding chapter has established the levels of investment re­
quired in order to raise the projected GDI performance of the 
Peruvian economy to the targeted S% growth rate during 1968-72, 
However, only a preliminary evaluation of the ability to 
finance the required investment has been made. It is the pur­
pose of this chapter to present a more detailed analysis of the 
economy's ability to finance the required investment. The fun­
damental postulate is that total savings must equal total in­
vestment, Having determined the required level of total invest­
ment, attention must be focused on the anticipated supply of 
savings in order to check for the existence of a possible in­
vestment-savings gap. In order to orient the analysis a re­
view of the historical savings pattern is presented, followed 
by the examination of two hypothesis with respect to the level 
of private national savings. Subsequently, the level of sav­
ings is projected and a check is made for the existence of an 
investment-savings gap, 
B, Historical Savings Pattern 
The ratio of total savings to national income has become 
an important indicator of the development effort of an economy. 
This importance stems largely from the crucial role of the 
savings ratio as illustrated by the Harrod-Domar type of growth 
model, y Mtatort. p;j,ven tiio oapi. tal-output ratio, the 
magnitude of the savings coefficient determines the feasible 
rate of growth of national income, Lewis has stated that the 
central problem in the theory of economic growth is to under­
stand the process by which a community is converted from a 
to a l?S saver (1), 
A brief examination of the savings ratio attained by the 
Peruvian economy indicates clearly that Peru has successfully 
! ' • 1 
maintained a greater than \2% savings ratio , The average 
ratio of total gross savings to Gross Domestic Income (GDI) 
during 1950-65 was 20,7X, The fact that Peru has maintained 
a high level of savings throughout the 1950-65 period is 
demonstrated by Table k?.. 
The level of total savings is an aggregate variable 
derived from the net inflow of foreign savings and the level 
of national savings. Therefore, the analysis of total savings 
can be improved by disaggregating and examining the behavior 
of its individual components over time. 
Total savings (S^) can be defined as the sum of national 
savings i^-^), net long-term foreign savings (S^), and net-short-
term foreign credits or 
T  ^ ' -L Q J- J. «7 
•Jfjl + 'Jp ^ 
^It must be noted that Lewis refers to net savings while 
the data on Peru is in terms of gross savings (28), 
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Table 4-2. The ratio of total savings to gross domestic income: 
1950-1965 (in millions of 1963 boles)* 
Year Total 
savings 
Gross domestic 
j ncome 
Total 
savings 
Gross domestic 
income 
1950 7386.5 45848 .161 
1951 10050.8 50378 .200 
1952 11564,6 51454 .223 
1953 12675.5 53249 .238 
1954 10942.8 56425 .194 
1955 11241.6 58732 .191 
1956 13586.7 61071 .222 
1957 14926.9 64290 .232 
1958 12836.9 63268 .203 
1959 10188,7 65366 .156 
i960 14029.2 72801 .206 
1961 15005.9 75845 .198 
1962 17334.8 8050b .215 
1963 19483.7 85031 .229 
1964 19254.3 92738 .208 
1965 22426.7 97551 .230 
^Source: (18). 
National savings () can be disaggregated Into private nation-
P G 
al savings (S^) and public national savings (3^), while net 
private long-term foreign savings (Sp) and net public long-term 
foreign savings (Sp), Table 4] presents the historical data 
with respect to the components of total savings. 
The contribution of net long-term foreign savings (Gp) to 
total savings has been subject to great fluctuation during 1950-
65. The tip variable experienced a minimum of 8/,-472,6 in 195^ 
and a maximum of o/,3133.2 in 1957. The contribution of Sp to 
iiip was most substantial during three distinguishable time 
periods, 1952-53, 1955-59, and 1963-65, The 1952-53 behaviour 
<v 
of Up was dominated by the large-scale foreign private invest­
ment in mining, specifically the Marcona iron mines. The 
T 1955-59 heavy contribution of 3p to stemmed from the large-
scale foreign private investment in the Toquepala copper mines, 
except for 1955 when there was substantial public foreign cap­
ital inflow. The contribution of Sp to during 1963-65 
derives from the public investment program which was heavily 
financed by public foreign capital inflow. 
The irregular behavior of net short-term foreign capital 
and credits (3^,) has generated an uneven contribution of to 
A maximum of 3/,1213,6 was attained in 1956 while a mini­
mum of -3/,2731.B occurred in 1964, A satisfactory explanation 
of the behaviour of 3^ is not available, although loans from 
private foreign banks to the Peruvian Government for budgetary 
support have been entered into the 3^ calculation. However, 
Table 4j. The level of total savings and its components : 1950-1965 (in millions of 1963 Soles)^ 
Years Total 
savings 
Sj 
Total net 
long-term 
foreign 
savings 
4 
Net 
long-term 
private 
foreign 
savings 
Net 
long-term 
public .. 
foreign 
savings 
Short-
term 
foreign 
credits 
Total 
national 
savings 
% 
Private 
national 
savings 
N 
Public 
national 
savings 
1950 7386.5 314.1 272.4 - 41.7 285.7 7986.3 6511.2 1475.1 
1951 10050.8 646.2 683.0 - 36.8 -744.4 10149.0 8028.1 2120.9 
1952 11564.6 1083.4 1029.8 53.6 202.5 10278.7 8283.6 1995.1 
1953 12675.5 2022.4 1607.9 414.5 36.3 10616.8 8803.7 1813.1 
1954 10942.8 -472.6 -441.1 - 31.5 799.7 10615.7 9199.1 1423.6 
1955 11241.6 1813.2 220.0 1593.2 698.9 8729.5 6683.5 2046.0 
1956 13586.7 1822.4 1538.4 284.0 1213.6 10550.7 8424.7 2126.0 
1957 14926.9 3133.2 2915.0 218.2 1090.9 10702.8 9087.6 1615.2 
1958 12836.9 2753.5 2605.5 148.0 843.1 9240.3 8232.4 1007.9 
1959 10188.7 1318.1 1433.3 -115.2 -259.0 9129.6 8446.b 683.0 
1960 14029.2 79.7 467.6 -387.9 "628.3 14577.8 12068.7 2509.1 
1961 15005.9 -62.9 111.2 -174.1 289.7 14779.1 12344.6 2434.5 
1962 17334.8 967.5 490.1 477.4 12.0 16355.3 14418.1 1937.2 
1963 19483.7 1483.3 99.2 1384.1 682.7 15272.3 15272.3 2045.4 
1964 19254.3 2291.3 305.6 1985.7 -2731.8 19694.8 17162.9 2531.9 
1965 22426.7 19264.4 
^Sources (18). 
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the extensive fluctuations in the Sp magnitude can significant­
ly affect the total level of savings. For example, the large 
negative value of 8^ in 1964 resulted in a negative contribu­
tion of foreign savings to total savings in spite of a high 
level of Op, 
The fundamental determinant of total savings, however, is 
the level of national savings (3^). The level of Sj^ can be 
considered as the level of total savings minus the sum of total 
net long-term and short-term foreign savings, or 
+ Sg) 
In some years (i.e., 1950, 1951, I960, 1964) 3^^ has exceeded 
T 
as the sum (Sp + 8^) was negative. Due to the generally 
positive value of (3^ + S^), however, the average ratio of 
to GDI exceeds that of to GDI (l.e,, ,207 to ,184, respec­
tively). 
The level of national savings is determined by private 
P c (Sj^) and public (G^|) national savings, or 
P G 
" '"n '"N 
Q 
The greater irregularity occurs in the time series. The 
c level of is determined by the difference between revenue on 
current account () and current expenditures (G^^) for the 
public sector, or 
^CT ~ ^CT 
?.ko 
v Private national savings (3,,), on the other hand, appear to be 
more closely related to the overall growth experience of the 
Peruvian economy. The historical averages show that approxi­
mately 89/) of total .savings are derived from national savinp:;, 
while approximately 84X of national savingn are private. The 
p 
primary sources of are personal and corporate savln^H, 
G, Procedure for Projecting Total oavings 
The definition of total savings has been stated as 
T 
^rp - Op + 
or in a more disaggregated form 
The fundamental relation to be used is the equilibrium condi­
tion that total savings must equal total investment ( I r p ) ,  
or 
iJfp ~ Irp 
'J'he total investment level required is known from Chapters IV 
and VI, Therefore, the total savings required is also known by 
means of the equilibrium condition. However, it is necessary 
to investigate the ability of the economy to generate the 
required total savings which is carried out through projecting 
the components of total savings. 
* 
PM 
'1 '  
•The level of can be obtained from the balance of pay-
ments projections of Appendix B of Chapter IV, An exogenous 
projection of net long-term foreign capital inflow (o,;,) has 
been entered in the capital account as has been the projected 
level of public long-tetm capital (ïJp). Hence the level of 
Op = (Sp + Sp) has been projected until 19??.. 
The level of short-term foreign capital and credits (S^) 
also enters the capital account of the balance of payments. 
However, due to the uncertainty attached to 3^, it has been 
projected as zero during 1967-72, In this manner, qualita­
tive judgments of the potential impact of during the pro­
jection period can be made more easily, 
r The level of public national savings can be projected 
according to various hypotheses with respect to the expansion 
rate of public expenditures as provided in Appendix C, Chapter 
IV, The projected level of therefore, is available. 
The one remaining unknown is the projected level of 
private national savings (3^), Accepting the existing pro-
p 
jections for the other variables, can be derived as a resid­
ual, However, the residual does not allow an analysis of the 
1' feasibility of achieving the required levels of under the 
existing economic structure. Therefore, attention must be 
P focused on obtaining an explanation of the level of which 
can be subsequently used to project during 1967-72. 
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D, An Explanation of the Level of 
Private National Savings 
Two explanations of the level of private national savings 
p (3j^) have been investigated. The first hypotheses, which 
could be called the "real income hypotheses", attempts to 
P 
explain the level of on the basis of the level of dispos­
able national income which is defined as Gross Domestic Income 
(GDI) minus direct tax payments (T^) or symbolically, 
= F (GDI - T^) 
P the second hypothesis is that the level of 8^ is explained 
by the level of export earnings, which is defined as the sum 
of exports and the terms-of-trade effect (R + Z), or symboli­
cally, 
= F(EH-Z) 
Hypothesis 1 is the more orthodox hypothesis, derived 
from Keynesian inspiration, A preliminary plotting of the 
P 
ratio of 3^^ to GDI, given the relatively low magnitude of direct 
taxes (T^) and its considerable stable relation to the level 
of GDI, is sufficient to indicate that a good fit could be ob­
tained by using hypothesis 1, Figure 2 presents a plotting 
of the ratio ojj/GDI from 1950 to 1964, It is clear that the 
P 
ratio exhibits considerable stability. The ratio S^/GDI, or 
the average propensity to save out of GDI, did experience a 
r:harp decline in 1955 and did not recover to its former levels 
until i960, The behavior of 3^/GDI during 1955-59 cannot 
be satisfactorily explained by the aggregate income variable 
and, therefore, it can be expected that the "goodness of the fit" 
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Figure 2* The average propensity of private national savings 
to gross domestic income (in millions of I963 Soles) 
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will suffer ûm to this phenomenon. 
The estimation procedure, simple least squares, yields 
the result, 
8^ = 4395.9 + .234 (GDI - T°) if = ,875 
(.029) 
where the item (.029) is the standard error of the marginal 
savings coefficient and the coefficient of determination (R') 
is ,875» Hypothesis 1, therefore, results in a statistically 
P 
acceptable explanation of the level of The plot of the 
P 
recorded levels of 8^, and the estimated levels of are 
recorded in Figure 3$ 
As would be expected from the Figure 2, the estimated 
p p 
line (Sj^,) underestimates the recorded level of from 1950 
to 1954, overestimates it after 1959. This result is due to 
the drop in the average propensity to save during 1955-59 
that must have been influenced by factors other than the 
level of real income. 
Although hypothesis 1 is theoretically satisfying and 
statistically acceptable, knowledge of the Peruvian economic 
p 
structure suggests that private national savings composed 
of corporate and private savings, should be highly influenced 
by export earnings. As a preliminary indication of the relation 
P P between 3^^ and export earnings, the time series of and 
export earnings, defined as the sum of exports as {K) and the 
terms-of-trade effect (Z) is plotted in Figure 4, The plot of 
Millions 19^3 of Soles 
16,000 ^  
17,000 
16,000 
15,000 
14,000 
13,000 
12,000 
11,000 
10,000 
9 ,000  
8, 000 
7, 000 
6, 000 
5,000 
4, 000 
3,000 
2,000 
1,000 
0 
1950 
p 
Figure 3. Private national savings (S,^) and estimated private national 
p 
savings Caccording to saving hypothesis 1 (in millions, of 
1963 Soles) 
21000 
20000 
19000 
13000 
17000 
16000 
15000 
14000 
13000 
12000 
11000 
10000 
9000 
8000 
7000 
6000 
5000 
4000 
3000 
2000 
1000 
0 
'iffure 
Millions of 1963 Soles 
/ (E+Z) 
t\3 
OS 
'  •  •  •  •  '  i  . . . . .  A  ,,,i • I J 
1 2 3 ^ 5 6 7  8 ^ 9 6 0 1  2  3 ^ 5  
Diagram of Exports plus terms-of-trade effect ( E - hZ )  and private p 
national savings (S^J (millions of I963 Soles) 
247 
The plot of the two time series over 1950-64 indicates a 
considerable degress of correlation between the two variables, 
p 
The post-1956 period, particularly, indicated that has 
followed the behavior of export earnings very closely. The 
apparent change in the propensity to save during the immediate 
post-1954 period that has been indicated ih Figure 3, is not 
explained by the behavior of export earnings either as can be 
appreciated from the divergent behavior of and (li+Z) which 
appears to mark a structural break from the 1950-54 period. 
The estimation procedure, simple least squares yields the 
results : 
= 852,5 + .79 (E+Z) = .91 
( . 078 )  
with a standard error of the marginal savings coefficient 
of (,078) and a coefficient of determination of ,91, Hypoth­
esis 2 is also statistically acceptable. The plot of the 
P P time series of and the estimated levels of 3^ derived from 
the estimated relation is presented in Figure 5. It is clear 
from Figure 6 th^t the explanatory variable (i.';+Z) does not 
F provide a highly accurate estimate of 3^ during the 1951-55 
period. This divergence between the actual and the estimated 
P levels of is a reflection of the previously referred to 
structural break in the average propensity to save in 1955 
which is explained by neither the level of real income nor 
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the level of export earnings,- 'On the other hand, the esti­
mated values follow the recorded values very closely during 
p 
1956-62, The recorded decline of 8^ in 1958 and its recovery 
in 1959 are accurately reflected in the estimates. The 
stagnation export earnings in I963 while rose results 
in a substantial underestimate of in I963. However, the 
1964 estimate is again highly accurate, 
E, Comparative Analysis of Savings 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 
The attempt to explain the level of private national 
savings (S^) has given rise to two savings hypotheses, both 
of which are statistically acceptable. For the purposes of 
this study, a choice between the two hypotheses needs to be 
made. The criteria by which this decision is made are (1) 
the statistical properties of the estimated relations and 
(2) how well the respective hypotheses reflect the structural 
characteristics of the Peruvian economy. 
The statistical criterion lends support to the accep­
tance of hypothesis 2, The coefficient of determination 
for hypothesis 2 is ,91 while only ,875 for hypothesis 1 
and the standard error, of, the marginal coefficients, while 
being highly acceptable for both hypotheses is relatively 
greater for hypothesis 1 than for hypothesis 2, While these 
differences are noticeable, they do not constitute a conclusive 
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basis for choice as both relations are statistically highly 
significant. 
Theoretically hypothesis 1, the "real income hypothesis", 
is more acceptable than hypothesis ?. on an a priori tesis. 
However, general theoretical constructs must "bend" to 
specific structural economic factors when economic analysis 
is being focused upon a selected economy. The most evident 
specific structural fact about the Peruvain economy is that 
real income growth is "exportpropelled". The relatively 
large and dynamic export sector which is the most efficient 
productive sector of the economy has been found to contribute 
heavily, both directly and indirectly, to real income expansion. 
Furthermore, it is in the export sector that the large corpo­
rate enterprises are found and as corporate savings consti­
tute a high percentage of provato national savings it could be 
P 
expected that would be strongly related to export earnings. 
The extensive dependence of income growth on the 
earnings of the export sector is reflected in the simi-
P F larity of the plot tings of and under the two savings 
P hypotheses. For example, both hypotheses underestimate 
during the pre-1955 period, overestimate during 1955-59, and 
underestimate during 1962-64, However, the estimation results 
indicate that hypothesis 2 yields a slightly better explanation 
P 
of and it is reflective of the economic structure. Hence, 
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hypothesis 2, which explains Sj^ in terms of (E+Z), is 
accepted as the preferable private national savings expla­
nation, 
F, Tho .1 nvo.stmon1.-.'.avin/^.i Cnt' llndor 
GlJl Growth Alternative 
The analysis of Chapter VI indicated that the GDI growth 
alternative A^ is feasible providing that the anticipated tax 
reform was Implemented in I968, The feasibility of attaining 
the S% GDI growth target from the basis of the /y growth 
alternative was subsequently analysed. The preliminary con­
clusion of the analysis in Chapter VI was that the GDI growth 
target could not be attained even from basis of the A^ growth 
alternative, A check to this preliminary conclusion is nro-
vlded in this section through an analysis of the potential 
investment-savings gap. 
The complete projection of the A.^ GDI growth alternative, 
as presented in Appendix B, yields the annual level of total 
investment (l,p) and the annual level of net long-term foreign 
savings as is equal to net long-term foreign capital 
Inflow, Given that (1^) = the basic equilibrium condi-
T tlon, and knowing the annual levels of Sp, and assuming 
short-term capital and credit equal to zero, the annual 
level of national savings () can be derived as 
r% Q O — O 
"N - -Ï - '"F - -C 
The remaining problem is to separate 3^ into its components, 
p Q 
private (Sj^) and public (S^^) national savings as 
= 4 + 4 
G The annual levels of the difference between current 
revenue and current expenditure of the public sector, can 
be obtained from the public accounts profection that Is con­
sistent with the growth alternative, Furthermore, the 
annual levels of 0^, can be adjusted for the revenue affects 
C X p 
of tax reform. Knowing 8^^, the annual levels of 3^ can be 
Q 
obtained as the difference between and 8^, or 
4 = 3,. - 3= 
A preliminary check of the investment-savings gap can then 
be made by comparing the residually determined annual levels 
P P 
of with the annual levels of 3^ which are projected through 
the use of the behavioral relation 
= 852,5 + ,79 (K+Z) 
P p [f the residual exceeds the behaviorally projected Oj^, 
then we have an indication of a potential investment-savings 
gap. 
The annual levels of the residually derived private na­
tional savings is presented in Table 44 together with the other 
major components of total savings. It is clear that the 
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Table 44 : Residually derived private national savings 
(in millions of I963 Soles) 
Year Total Net long Net National Public Private 
savings term short savings national national 
foreign term savings savings 
savings credits 
St s? Sc 4 < 
1967 26,562 3311 —  —  24,152 1692 21,559 
1968 29,828 2537 — —  27,291 2639 24,651 
1969 33,436 4817 — —  28,619 2614 26,005 
1970 37,120 4484 — —  32,636 2012 30,624 
1971 41,091 5993 — —  35,098 1592 33,506 
1972 45,837 5770 —  —  40,067 1083 38,984 
required level of private national savings increases very 
rapidly under the effort to attain the S% GDI growth target 
from the GDI growth alternative. The comparison between the 
residually derived and the behaviorally estimated private 
national savings is presented in Table 45, 
It is clear from Table 45 that the residually derived 
annual levels of private national savings not only consistently 
exceed the behaviorally estimated levels, but that the gap 
becomes increasingly large throughout the projection period. 
The 1967 and 1968 levels of the calculated investment-savings 
gap might be covered by inflows of loans made to the government 
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Table 45 ; Comparison between the residually derived and the 
behaviorally estimated annual levels of private 
national savings (in millions of 1965 Soles) 
Year' Residually derived 
private national 
savings ^ ^  j 
Behaviorally estimated 
private national 
savings ^ p ^ 
The 
difference 
(1) - (2) 
1967 21,559 20,8]6 - 723 
1968 24,651 21,516 -  3135 
1969 26,005 22,121 -  3884 
1970 30,624 22,761 - 7863 
1971 33,506 23,391 - 10115 
1972 38,984 24,060 - 14924 
by private foreign banks to cover budget deficits and by short 
term credit inflows, however, it is highly unlikely that such 
sources of savings would be able to close the accelerating gap 
in the post-1969 period. On the basis of the indicated large 
investment-savings gap and recalling the fact that the debt 
servicing capacity of the economy is already overburdened, 
which limits the prospects of obtaining enlarged long-term 
foreign savings, a conclusion can be drawn that the Peruvian 
economy will not be able to attain a S% GDI growth target 
during 1967-1972, 
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VIII, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Peruvian economy has experienced a period of sustained 
expansion during the 1950-66 period. Gross Domestic Income 
grew at an average annual rate of 5.3#, which results in a 
2,5# average annual rate of per capita income expansion in 
view of a 2,8# annual increase in the population. The 
balance of payments maintained a generally strong position 
while the rate of domestic inflation was limited to an average 
annual rate of 8,6%, 
It is clear thiat the successful growth of the Peruvian 
economy over the last decade-and-a-half derived, in large part, 
from the strength of the export sector. Not only has the 
export sector contributed approximately 20# of the annual 
Gross Domestic Income, but it also has had a large indirect 
impact on the level of Gross Domestic Income as is evidenced 
by the relatively large income multiplier for exports obtained 
in the reduced form of the model in Chapter IV. The restraint 
of domestic inflation to a rate that has been modest by Latin 
American standards was facilitated by the existence of ample 
foreign exchange earnings from the export sector which were 
available to finance imports to supplement domestic supply. 
Furthermore, the rapid expansion of export earnings has enabled 
Peru to avoid a balance of payments restraint on its growth 
process. The expansion of the domestic industrial sector, 
which has been substantial in the last decade, required large 
2$6 
Imports of capital goods for its establishment and intermediate 
goods for its continued operation. In ^ addition, the strong 
export position of the Peruvian economy made Peru a good credit 
risk for long-term public capital inflow which has been used 
to finance a large part of the public investment program. 
It is an appreciation of these significant contributions 
of the export sector to Peruvian economic growth that has 
prompted the observation made in Chapter III with respect 
to the importance' of the successful management of the export 
economy to the development prospects of Peru, Although signif­
icant economic expansion could be achieved by the develop­
ment of the internal market, it is quite evident that the 
achievement of long-term economic growth, in view of the 
population size and resource structure, depends upon the 
continued expansion of the export sector. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the role of the export 
sector in Peruvian economic development indicates that the 
successful management of the export economy is a necessary, 
but not a sufficient condition for Peruvian economic develop­
ment, Economic development requires more than simply income 
expansion within the existing structure of economic relations. 
As emphasized in the Charter of Punta del Este, structural 
reforms are essential to the development effort. With respect 
to Peru, one of the structural reforms required is the widening 
257 
of the distribution of gains from the export economy. The 
analysis of personal income distribution, although incomplete, 
yields no evidence of a tendency towards a more equal income 
distribution during the export-propelled growth of the economy 
in the last decade-and-a-half, whereas evidence of a worsening 
of the lowest income group's position is available. Existing 
data on the state of the distribution of incme indicates that 
Peru has one of the most unequal income distributions in Latin 
America, Nor is there any evidence that export-propelled 
income growth has tended to reduce the extensive regional 
imbalance in Peru, Rather, it is probable that the benefits 
from income growth have been highly concentrated in the 
coastal region thereby accentuating the regional imbalance. 
The analysis of the medium-term development prospects for 
the Peruvian economy indicates that the rate of income growth 
can be expected to decline, the balance of payments situation 
to deteriorate, and that inflationary pressure will rise which 
will probably increase the difficulty of achieving a tolerable 
employment situation and, moreover, reduce the prospects for 
improving the distribution of income, both personal and 
regional. 
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The level of Hross Domestio Income was projected via the 
econometric model presented in Chapter IV, A set of three 
alternative income projections was constructed by combining the 
hypothesis: with respect to export expansion with throe Ktypobh-
er;es reRardin# the rate of expansion in the level of public 
expenditures, A range of annual average income growth rates, of 
2,5# to 3,5# per year was obtained over the 1967-72 period. 
The results of the projection procedure indicate that the rate 
of income growth will be substantially less than the 5,3# 
annual average rate achieved over the I95O-66 period during the 
medium-term. The recovery of the economy is not foreseen 
until a substantial increase in export earnings can be attained, 
which by current esbimate is approximately 1973. 
The capacity of the public sector to improve the growth 
prospects of the economy, while restraining the rate of domes­
tic inflation, appears to be distinctly limited. In recent 
years public expenditures have expanded much more rapidly than 
public revenues. The ratio of public expenditures to Gross 
Domestic Income has Increased from 18,4# in I96O to 25,7# in 
1965 while the ratio of tax revenue to Gross Domestic Income 
has increased from 12,6# in i960 to l4,4# in I965, The rapid 
increase in public expenditures in view of the relative 
inelasticity of tax revenue to Gross Domestic Income has led to a 
situation of continuing deficits in the public sector in 
recent years. The ambitious program of public investment 
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undertaken by the Belaunde regime has come to be heavily 
dependent on foreign loans as current account savings have 
disappeared due to a rapid rise in current expenditures and 
slowly increasing current revenues. The high level of 
existing foreign debt and the large amounts of projected 
inflow during the projection period as included in the pro­
jection procedure, yields debt servicing charges that exceed 
the nominal debt servicing capacity of the economy. It is 
unlikely, therefore, that the income growth prospects can be 
improved via increased external public debt formation above 
projected levels. The analysis of Chapter IV indicates that 
in the absence of tax reform, public expenditures can increase 
at more than 3,0% but less than S% in real terms if strong 
inflationary pressure from excessive public deficits is to 
be avoided. The principal opportunity for improving the 
growth contribution of the public sector while avoiding exces­
sive public deficits is to increase the level of public 
revenues through tax reform. The analysis of the OAS/BID 
tax reform proposal indicates that public expenditures under 
tax reform could increase at a rate of per year over the 
1^67-72 period without excessive inflationary pressure being 
generated. The subsequent more rapid rate of public ex­
penditure expansion under tax reform would allow an increase 
in the annual average income growth rate from 2,5% to somewhat 
more than 3,5%, 
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It might be possible to obtain significant additional 
income growth by stimulating the private sector. An estimate 
of foreign private capital inflow has been included as a 
determinant of income growth. Domestic private investment has 
been presented as a function of the level of commercial bank 
credit and enterprise profits. The level of business of en­
terprise profits has been explained as a function of the level 
of exports and the terms-of-trade effect. It is evident that 
there is a greater scope for affecting the level of commercial 
bank credit than there is in affecting exports and the terms-
of -trade effect in the effort to increase domestic private 
investment. The level of commercial bank credit can be 
directly Influenced by monetary policy. However, given the 
objective with respect to monetary stability, monetary and 
fiscal policy are strongly inter-connected. If the public 
sector is expected to continue to incur deficits, then a 
stringent monetary policy that restrains the rate of Increase 
in private credit must be implemented. The implication is 
that it will be difficult to stimulate private investment via 
commercial credit availability as long as a meaningful tax 
reform is not obtained. 
The anticipated 3,1^ rate of growth of the population 
means that there is not much possibility for per capita 
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income increased during the next five years given the low 
rate of projected income growth. However, the regional growth 
rate of population indicates that the coastal and selva 
regions will grow faster than the sierra region and that the 
urban population will increase significantly faster than the 
rural population. These figures reflect the continuing trend 
of out-migration from the sierra region and the shift of pop­
ulation from rural to urban centers. In recent years the sat­
isfactory growth of the Peruvian economy generated employ­
ment for the low skilled migrants to the coastal urban areas 
in construction activity, public services, private services 
and marginal commercial activities. Large numbers of these 
people are living in the marginal housing areas around the 
urban centers under unsatisfactory conditions and supported 
by marginal and/or seasonal labor. It is anticipated that 
the projected slowdown in the economy will unfavorably affect 
their employment situation. In particular, a decline in con­
struction activity and a budgetary restraint on public 
employment expansion may mean that the opportunity for 
employment will fall well short of the supply of labor. The 
combination of a reduced demand for labor and a rising cost 
of living may mean that the Government will face a more 
difficult task in the attempt to maintain an adequate degree 
of social stability. 
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It is clear fron the analysis of the medium-term develop­
ment prospects of the Peruvian economy that the economic 
policy situation will be considerably more difficult in the 
next few years than it has been in recent years. The policy­
makers are faced not only with the carry-over need for widen­
ing the distribution of gains from the economy, but also with 
the problem of an anticipated unsatisfactory rate of income 
expansion. In addition, the current financial crisis further 
complicates the policy situation. The financial crisis 
has illuminated the fact that the public sector is faced with 
the choice between accelerated inflation or severely restrain­
ing the expansion of public expenditure. Tax reform could 
provide a means for escaping the horns of this dilema, how­
ever, political difficulties make this route unceratin. It 
is believed, however, that institutional forces will effec­
tively restrain a movement towards accelerated inflation, 
Nevertheless, substantial energy must be expended in the 
effort to liquidate the financial crisis before serious atten­
tion can be given to the more long-term problems of economic 
development. 
From the policy point of view, it appears reasonable to 
focus the short-term policy effort on the solution of the 
public sector financial crisis. It would be preferable, how­
ever, if the policy measures undertaken to handle the finan­
cial crisis did not jeopardize the longer-term development 
prospects of the economy, It is a readily acceptable fact 
26] 
uhât the role of the public scctor expands diirins the 
development process. However, the means by which the activ­
ities of the public sector are financed and the efficiency 
of their use are of considerable consequence to the develop­
ment prospects of the export economy; The effort to solve 
a financial crisis could give rise to revenue and expendi­
ture reforms that would not only relieve the financial crisis, 
but improve development prospects. The analysis in this work 
indicates that a significant tax reform would not only be of 
substantial aid in relieving the current financial crisis, 
but that it would also support the expanding role of the 
public sector in Peruvian development. It is noteworthy, 
however, that reform on the revenue side must be complemented 
by reform on the expenditure side. The impact of public 
expenditures on the development prospects of the economy are 
related to the profitability of their uses. Increased tax 
revenues may be the answer to the short-term financial crisis, 
but the longer-term impact of increased revenues must be 
judged on the efficiency of the expenditure pattern. 
Expenditure reform must involve improved expenditure 
planning. Expenditure planning involes the analysis of the 
impact of the level and composition of expenditures on the 
behavior of the economy. Investment planning highlights 
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the nssd. for IsprovGd feasibility studies for projects while 
overall budget planning naturally entails the analysis of 
the level of public expenditures and tax policy on the 
behavior of the economy in the shorter-term period. The 
study of the role of fiscal policy leads to an appreciation of 
its interrelation with monetary and commercial policies which 
might foster the concept of using alternative fiscal, mone­
tary, and commercial policies for the purpose of Influencing 
the behavior of the aggregate economy in desired ways. 
The establishment of a sound financial basis for the 
public sector would lay the foundation of its expanding role 
and help to relieve the credit restraint on the private sector. 
Even though the public sector has expanded significantly 
in recent years, the Peruvian economy remains dominated by 
the private sector. It is important, therefore, to facili­
tate its expansion, A tax reform that would Improve the 
public sector*s financial position while maintaining invest­
ment incentives would permit a relaxation in the current 
stringent commercial credit policy which could be expected to 
facilitate private investment and thereby favorably Influence 
Income growth prospects. 
Commercial policy in Peru has been serving diverse 
interests. Tariff Increases have been expected to help main­
tain equilibrium in the balance of payments, to Increase 
public revenue, and to protect the domestic industrial activi­
ties from foreign competition. Apparently, there does exist 
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extensive ihcrt-run complGmentarity among these objectives 
with reopect to tariff increases, although the price elasti­
city of demand for imports may create problems for the anti­
cipated increase in public revenue. Although tariff increases 
have been defended on these grounds, by Peruvian public 
authorities, the wisdom of this course is open to serious 
question. 
The short-fall in public revenue and the strong increases 
in import demand are related to the lack of an active fiscal 
policy that should be acting to shape the pattern of income 
distribution and demand. Tax reform, particularly to increase 
the level of direct tax revenue, would relieve the dependence 
of the public sector on the revenue effect of tariff policy 
while relieving the pressure of import demand on the balance 
of payments through its impact on the pattern of income dis­
tribution and demand. The management of the revenue problem 
and part of the balance of payments problem by fiscal policy 
would permit a greater focus on the management of tariff 
policy for the stimulation of the domestic industrial sector. 
On the other hand, the use of tariff policy to serve 
the objectives of balance of payments policy, revenue for 
the public sector and industrial protection has led to the 
creation of a highly protected domestic industrial sector. 
The lack of provisions in the import substitution policy to 
create incentives for greater productive efficiency has 
encouraged a condition of productive Inefficiency which 
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"tx'analatôa Into hifih px"ic6s to ths consumer and a closing 
of the external market. Furthermore, the lack of a well-
founded selection criterion for the granting of tariff protec­
tion under the provisions of the Industrial Promotion Law has 
Impeded the development of an integrated productive structure. 
The tendency for import substitution industries to Import a 
large percentage of their raw materials and Intermediate 
goods tends to increase the rigidity of the import structure 
which makes the management of the balance of payments more 
difficult. In addition, the efficacy of tariff Increases for 
restraining Import demand has been seriously Impeded by the 
policy of a constant exchange rate in face of relatively 
ineffective fiscal policy which permitted significant domes­
tic inflation. Under such conditions, the restraining impact 
of a tariff Increase on Import demand is being constantly 
erroded. The efficacy of the tariff Increase policy has also 
been erroded by the income effect. The relatively rapid rise 
in Income combined with an inelastic tax system has permitted 
substantial increases in the purchasing power of those income 
classes which are known to have a preference for imported 
goods. The lack of a fiscal policy that could shape the 
pattern of income distribution and demand has accelerated the 
Income effect on import demand by allowing this continued 
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concentration of purchasing power in the import oriented 
consumer groups and has restrained the expansion potential of 
the domestic industrial sector by the restriction of the 
purchasing power of those income groups that represent the 
potential market for mass-produced consumer goods. 
The suggested use of fiscal policy to shape the pattern 
of income distribution and demand which in the process would 
release the public sector from dependence on the revenue 
effect of tariff policy and also tend to restrain the expan­
sion of import demand while the management of tariff policy 
was focused on the stimulation of the domestic industrial 
sector would yield substantial returns for the development 
effort. It would improve the financial position of the public 
sector, relieve the restraint on commercial credit to the pri­
vate sector, contribute to balance of payments equilibrium, 
help to Increase the domestic market, be a step toward a more 
equitable income distribution, and permit a concentration of 
attention on the use of tariff policy to stimulate the domes­
tic industrial sector. The Increased flexibility Implied for 
the management of tariff policy might permit an improvement 
in the selection criterion for the granting of tariff protec­
tion and the Implementation of provisions for the gradual re­
duction and eventual elimination of protection to those indus­
tries which have been granted such protection from foreign 
competition. 
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While the iiiediiîm-^term development prospects of the 
Peruvian economy do not appear bright, the longer-term 
prospects for income expansion are reasonably favorable. 
Income growth is expected to receive a large impetus in the 
post-1971 period from thé exploitation of known copper 
reserves. In general, Peru is a country that is rich in 
minerals of commercial value which are yet to be fully 
exploited. 
The potential for income growth and broader economic 
and social development, however, may well be impeded by 
the lack of an efficient public administration and the 
apparent difficulties of achieving structural reform. The 
analysis of the medium-term development prospects indicates 
that the attainment of an income growth rate that would ful­
fill the objectives of the Alliance for Progress would 
require substantially more foreign economic aid than the 
currently projected levels. Is it possible that an agree­
ment could be reached to provide additional foreign economic 
aid at the price of an effective program of "self-help" de­
signed to achieve the needed structural reforms in Peruvian 
economic organization? 
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APPENDIX k 
Table 46. Nîacroeconomic data 1950-1966 (in millions of 19b3 Soies) 
Year :< C cP C9 I iP I9 E Z 
1950 45,848.U 37,206.1 34,159.8 3,046.j 7,386.5 6,412.9 973.6 5,662.3 1,737.5 
1951 50,378.2 39.856.2 36,723.6 3,132.6 10,050.8 8,119.5 1,931.3 5,541.9 3,229.7 
1952 51,453.6 40.969.0 37,453.2 3,515.8 11,564.6 9,209.0 2,355.6 6,473.5 1,655.5 
1953 53,248.8 42,398.2 38,816c. 3 3,581.9 12,675.5 10,147.4 2,528.1 7,158.7 1,038.1 
1954 56,424.8 45,290.8 41,173.3 4,177.5 10,942.8 9,146.5 1,796.3 7,677.r6 1,296.2 
1955 58,732.1 49,057.7 44,950.4 4,107.3 11,241.6 7,993.0 3,248.6 8,225.9 1,475.1 
1956 61,070.9 49,738.1 45,434.9 4,303.2 13,586.7 10,930.4 2,656.3 9,123.4 1,839.3 
1957 64,290.0 53,095.7 47,928.7 5,167.0 14,926.9 12,293.6 2,633.3 9,502.5 1,542.2 
1958 63,268.3 53,403.0 48,303.6 5,099.4 12,836.9 10,905.6 1,931.3 9,681.6 24.1 
1959 65,365.8 55,239.0 49,607.4 5,631.6 10,188.7 9,161.6 1,027.1 11,179.3 -403.0 
1960 72,800.8 57,228.1 50,650.6 6,577.5 14,029.2 12,793.3 1,236.7 14,188.0 347.1 
1961 75,845.2 60,094.3 52,112.8 7,981.5 15,005.9 12,296.5 2,710.3 16,379.8 -828., 9 
1962 80,504.8 62,853.0 54,321.2 8,531.8 17,334.8 15,309.4 2,026.0 16,974.8 -428.6 
1963 85,031.0 66,291.8 56,576.6 9,715.2 19,483.7 16,628.5 2,855.8 16,538.2 
1964 92,737.8 71,531.3 60,660.0 10,870.4 19,254.3 15,184.7 4,069.2 17,928.2 2,^71.6 
1965 97,551.6 76,720.2 63.539.1 13.181.1 22.526.7 18.564.6 3.862.1 17.855.0 1,710.2 
^Sources (3), (18), (20). 
Table 46 (Continued) 
Year M T Td Ji Xd TS Af if 
1950 6,144,4 1,840.7 1,840.7 2,513.7 44,007.3 3.8 45.5 55.0 
1951 8,300.6 5,256.4 2,342.1 2,904.3 48,036.1 26.2 63.2 46.2 
1952 9,209.0 5,774.2 2,373.1 3,400.9 49,080.5 112.4 58.8 501.6 
1953 10,021.7 5,640,2 1,498.9 4,141.3 51,749.9 486.3 71.8 112 ,.4 
1954 8,782.6 6,505.0 2,499.0 4,006.0 53,925.8 47.6 79.1 114.8 
1955 11,268.2 6,924.7 2,627.1 4,297.6 56,105.0 1,871.4 278.2 96 „0 
1956 13,216.6 7,050.0 2,693.0 4,357.9 58,377.9 841.6 557.6 172 ,,0 
1957 14,777.3 8,193.9 2,806.1 5,387.8 61,483.9 812.0 593.8 176,2 
1958 12,677.3 7,424.7 2,575.3 4,852.4 60,693.0 703.5 555.5 197 ,.0 
1959 10,838.2 7,776.6 2,762.2 5,014.4 62,603.6 486.2 601.5 214 „0 
1060 12,99 .6 9,148.8 3,505.0 5,644.8 69,296.8 402.1 790.0 181,1 
1961 14,805.9 10,542.0 3,700.2 6,841.8 72,145.0 724.1 898.2 178,, 5 
1962 16,230.2 10,671.2 3,660.2 7,011.0 76,844.6 1,450.1 972.7 168,8 
1963 17,283.1 12,137.1 4,044.2 8,092.9 80,986.6 2,192.0 807.9 2061,0 
1964 18,547.6 13,361.6 3,621.0 9,740.6 89,116.8 2,812.9 826.7 332,, 3 
1965 21,160.5 14,049.1 3,498.2 10,550.9 94,053.4 2,706.9 618.7 685 ,5 
Table 46 (Continued) 
Year îd^. jTr II TP* If D W Gt Get 
1950 571 5,835 5,808 34 5,145.4 25,342 6,254.0 
1951 631 7,190 6,806 683 6,307.1 27,914 7,425.4 
1952 698 5,738 7,473 1,038 7,250.6 27,257 8,438.5 
1953 772 5,575 7,733 1,642 7,732.0 28,644 8,535.7 
1954 854 6,323 8,278 15 7,219.7 32,448 8,708.9 
1955 945 6,110 6,794 254 7,794.8 34,241 10,871.6 
1956 1,044 7,153 8,321 1,565 7,915.7 35,733 11,587.6 
1957 1,155 6,593 8,206 2,932 7,946.3 36,208 12,141.1 
1958 1,278 5,213 6,925 2,703 7,038.3 38,796 12,420.2 
1959 .1,413 5,506 6,194 1,555 6,057.8 40,379 10,975.7 
1960 1,563 8,529 10,428 802 7,880.4 40,911 13,416.8 9,538.6 
1961 2,283 8,480 9,060 945 8,807.2 44,029 17,828.3 11,429.7 
1962 1,516 10,194 12,624 1,169 9,919.9 48,863 17,105.8 12,260.9 
1963 1,861 10,263 13,864 904 10,729.3 51,315 19,957.9 14,058.9 
1964 2,526 11,708 951 11,797.3 23,394.2 15,290.4 
1965 13,245.4 24,844.9 16,771.1 
Table 46 (Continued) 
Year UBEP Y T" T^^ 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1060 3,878.2 1,146.2 1,346.3 208.7 13,416.8 2,907.1 774.5 30U.6 
1961 6,398.6 1,290.5 1,562.5 129.1 17,828.3 3,381.7 2,6l6.8 352.'J 
1962 4,844.9 1,410.2 1,725.8 224.6 17,105.8 3,381.9 -118.5 367.0 
1963 5,899.1 1,699.6 1,983.8 276.5 19,957.9 8,703.5 1,447.2 557.3 
1964 7,759.4 l,812.o 2,300.2 133.6 23,394.2 3,853.7 2,721.6 592.3 
1965 7,881.9 2,687.1 2,020.1 125.5 24,844.9 3,648.3 3,384.3 1,124.6 
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XII. APPENDIX B 
This appendix contains the detailed export projections 
according to volume, unit price and value as well as the 
basic balance of payments projection required for the pro­
jection procedure described in Chapter IV, 
Ao Rxport and Terms-of-Trade Effect Projections 
In 1967 approximately 88% of merchandise export earnings 
were generated by nine products, Tliree agricultural pro­
ducts (sugar, cotton, and coffee) generated |1^3 million, 
fishmeal exports earned •ijsi65 million^ and mineral exports 
(copper, iron ore, lead, zinc, and silver) earned another 
$378 million. Detailed projections of export volume, ^rice, 
and value for each of the major products are presented in 
Table 47 along with the recorded data for recent years, 
The detailed export projection for the years I968 to 
1972 indicate a 5,0/^ cumulative annual growth rate of current 
export earning in dollars, Export volume is expected to 
expand at approximately 3,4% per year while prices continue 
an upward trend at 1,6% per year. The sum of the value 
of exports and of the terms-of-trade effect is projected to 
increase at approximately 5,0% annually in contrast to the 
12,5% cumulative annual increase recorded from 1959 to I966, 
It is clear that the anticipated performance of the Peruvian 
export sector over the next five years if substantially below 
bhat of the recent past, -
280 
Table 4-7, Export of goods and services (I96O-I967) and 
projections (1968-1972) 
Year Millions of 
constant 
iv6'j union 
Deflator Million of 
current ooler; 
Million of 
U.o. iJollarr; 
i960 14,188,0 96,3 13,663.0 500,5 
1961 16,379.8 93.8 15,364.3 573.1 
1962 16,975.8 96,5 16,381,6 611,0 
1963 16,538.6 100,0 16,538,6 616,7 
1964 17,928.2 112.4 20,151.3 751.4 
1965 17,855.0 114,3 20,408,3 760,9 
1966 17,722.2 133.2 23,606,0 880,1 
1967 18,370,6 145,8 26,784,4 897.3 
1968 19,050.7 191,4 36,463.1 942,2 
1969 19,826.9 193.1 38,285.9 989.3 
1970 20,851.4 192.8 40,201,6 1,035.8 
1971 21,275.2 198,4 42,210,1 1,090,7 
1972 21,661.3 204,6 44,319.2 1,145.2 
^Source: (18), 
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The outlook for agricultural export products is not 
bright. The income elasticity of demand in the developed 
world is very low for all three of the main Peruvian 
agricultural export products, ougar export volume and average 
export price are expected to increase moderately through an 
expanding United States quota for Peruvian sugar. Coffee 
export volume is expected to increase slowly under a larger 
quota within the International Coffee Agreement, The new 
price policy of the International Coffee Agreement should 
permit export prices to hold firm at slightly above the I967 
level. The export volume of cotton has declined significantly 
due largely to drought conditions which have cut cotton pro­
duction by at least ?.S%, The drought appears to have affected 
the production of high-priced Pima cotton most severely, A 
steady recovery in Pima production and export is expected from 
1969 to 1972. However, cotton exports are not expected to 
attain pre-1967 levels because cotton production is antici­
pated to be less profitable than during the early 1960*8, 
The export earnings of the fishmeal industry are expected 
to increase moderately over the next five years. Export 
volume will continue to be limited by the supply of anchoveta. 
The 1967 record catch of 9,82^,000 metric tons of anchoveta 
ir; not expected to be repeated, A catch of 9,000,000 to 
8,500,000 metric tons is anticipated for I968, Current fish-
meal stocks exceed 500,000 metric tons, approximately one-
third of the annual production level. Export volume is 
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expected to ihorease as the industry disposes of current 
stocks and.moderately Increases current production. Some 
further gains in export volume should be obtained from 
productivity increases (i.e., more fishn.eal per unit of 
anchoveta) as more plants acquire the new capital stock to 
permit utilization of "stickwater", until recently a waste 
product. The expected export price, $98 per metric ton in 
1968, wil] probably recover to approximately ^115 per metric 
ton by 1970 due to an anticipated faster Increase in world 
demand than in supply, 
World demand for minerals is generally very favorable, 
but Peruvian exports will be determined primarily by 
capacity considerations. Copper exports are expected to 
increase in I968 as production from small-and-medium-sized 
mines is expanded in response to high world copper prices 
and the favorable impact on production costs of the I967 
devaluation of the Peruvian sol. Copper prices are expected 
to decline from present high levels due to the settlement of 
the United States copper strike. Plans for doubling Peru­
vian copper exports by the opening of the new large-scale 
mines (Gerro Verde, Michiquillay, and Cuajone) will not 
affect export projection through 1972, If work is begun 
soon on these new mines, then copper exports will approxi­
mately double after 1972, leading to a large increase in total 
export earnings. Iron ore export volume is expected to 
increase considerably in latè I969 due to the expansion of the 
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Marcona mining operations. The export volume of lead will 
expand slowly while the average export price is expected 
to decline in I969, New lead mines-^ln the United States are 
expected to produce enough additional lead to cover U.S. 
demand. Silver prices are expected to increase approximately 
50^ above the I96? level, although production and export 
volume will not increase much, Silver is obtained as a 
by-product of lead and zinc mineral concentrates, which 
means that its output fluctuates in more or less direct 
proportion to lead and zinc .production. Furthermore, it 
appears that the silver content in the mineral concentrates 
has been declining, 
A projection of the tbtal value of exports during 1968-
1972 together with the historical series for I96O-I967 is 
presented in Table 4?, Projections of the terms-of-trade 
and the terms-of-trade effect for 1968-1972 together with the 
historical series for I96O-1967 are presented in Table 48, 
B, Balance of Payments Projections 
The historical balance of payments data for I96O-I967 
and projections for I968-I972 are presented in Table 4-9, 
Transfer payments have been arbitrarily projected at :$P.5 
million per year, roughly the same order of magnitude as the 
past three years. Private investment income payments Iriave 
been assumed equal to 10% of export earnings about the same 
percentage as the average over the I96O-I967 period. The 
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Table 48, The terms-of=trade and the terms=of=trade effect 
(1960-1967) and projections (1968-197%) 
Year Export price 
1 nd ex 
Import price 
index 
Terms-of-
trade 
index 
Torms-of-
trade offeet 
(in millions 
of 1963 
uoles) 
i960 96.3 94,0 
0
 
1—1 
347.1 
1961 93.8 98.8 94,9 -828,9 
1962 96,5 99.0 97.5 -428.6 
1963 100.0 100,0 100,0 — — 
1964 112.4 98,3 114,3 .2,563.7 
1965 114,4 97.1 117.8 3,178.2 
1966 133.2 96,1 138.6 6,840,8 
1967 145.8 105.9 137.7 6,925.7 
196t 191,4 139.4* 137.3 7,105.9 
1969 193.1 142,2* 135.8 7,098,0 
1970 192.8 145,0* 133.0 6,880,9 
1971 198.4 147.9* 134,1 7,254,8 
1972 2 04.6 150,9* 135.6 7,711.4 
2% Annual increase in import prices assumed, 
^Source (18), 
Taoie 49. Actual and projected volume, price and value of major Peruvian exports^ 
i%0 l%i 1%^ i%4 IVfeb i%6 1%/ iVÙW iV/U jy/i —[97IT 
Sugar Vol. 526 557 479 496 425 300 430 471 463 48U 500 520 540 
Price 90 115 112 127 149 102 108 113 123 125 129 129 131 
Vol. 47 64 54 63 63 37 46 53 57 60 64 57 71 
Coffee Vol. 26 34 37 40 42 35 35 42 43 44 43 46 47 
Price 702 670 646 638 875 840 806 698 700 700 700 700 700 
Vol. 18 23 24 26 37 29 29 29 30 31 52- 32 33 
Cotton Vol. 100 114 139 125 115 114 114 76 78 90 92 95 97 
Pri ce 730 697 696 731 792 759 748 805 796 806 307 810 811 
Vol. 73 79 97 91 oi. A7 85 61 62 73 74 77 79 
Fishmeal Vol. 507 708 1054 1038 1426 1415 1304 1504 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 
Pri ce 76 70 95 101 101 101 139 110 98 110 115 115 115 
Vol. 39 50 100 105 144 156 182 165 162 187 201 209 213 
b 
Iron Ore- Vol. 3125 3382 3149 3580 3710 4594 4859 4809 200 200 210 210 210 
Price 10.47 10.89 10.38 10.18 10.48 10.22 10.99 13.0 970 950 950 950 950 
Vol. 33 37 33 36 39 47 53 63 194 190 200 200 20-0 
Volume is in 1,000 tons, price in US$ per ton (FOB), and value in millions of US$ (FOB). 
^Volume is in terms of iron content. Price is average price per unit of iron content, and 
price increase is due to increasing proportion being exported in the form of peliats. 
TaDie 49 (Continued) 
19bO 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 19*72 
Copper Vol. 158 199 172 163 179 180 176 187 5000 5400 6500 6500 6500 
Price 564 529 537 534 575 674 1057 1018 13 13 13 13 13 
Vol. 95 105 92 87 103 121 186 190 65 70 85 35 8'i) 
Lead Vol. 118 142 135 121 167 151 151 148 150 J.55 160 170 1/0 
Price 184 157 120 136 198 251 229 200 200 186 186 184 186 
Vol. 22 22 16 16 33 38 35 30 30 29 30 32 32 
Zinc Vol. 158 207 182 187 275 264 282 289 293 300 310 510 310 
Price 106 92 87 85 142 134 121 146 134 140 140 145 145. 
Vol. 17 19 16 16 39 34 34 34 42 43 43 45 45 
c 
Silver Vol. 927 1035 1070 983 1152 1027 1100 1028 978 1000 1050 1050 1050 
Price 26.10 26.62 30.87 36.40 39.27 38.02 37.47 51.4 70.0 88.0 88.0 83.0 88.0 
Vol. 24 28 33 36 45 39 41 53 68 88 92 92 S)6 
Phosphates Value - - - - - - - - - - - 20 
Total Value 368 427 465 476 394 590 691 686 707 770 321 837 874 
Volume is in thousands of kilograms, price in US$ per kilogram (FOB). 
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following estimates of the future gross private capital inflow, 
amortization, and net private capita] inflow are used in the 
projections: 
Cross Amortization 
inflow outflow Net 
1968 57 25 32 
1969 65 30 35 
1970 130 30 100 
1971 185 35 150 
1972 240 40 200 
The extensive gross private capital inflow in the years 1970-
1972 reflects the planned investment in new copper mines 
(i.e., Cerro Verde, Michiquillay, and Guajone) which is 
expected to reach approximately $500 million. 
Gross public capital inflow is expected to decline in 
1968 and 1969, but to rise again in 1970 and reach approxi­
mately •;ji200 million per year in 1971 and 1972, Public capital 
inflow from AID and other lending institutions is projected to 
more than double the present level by 1972 while suppliers 
credits are expected to decline from the high levels experi­
enced in 1966 and I967, The reduction in gross public capital 
Inflow in I968 and I969 combined with a rapidly rising trend 
in debt servicing charges means that debt servicing charges 
are expected to exceed gross public capital inflow during 1969 
and 1970. 
l''or kl'ie projocl;ion purposou, net short-term capital 
inflow, errors and omissions and changes in reserves are 
assumed equal to zero. The resulting capacity-to-import 
entered below the line for total import value in line A,?. 
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XIII. APPENDIX C 
This appendix contains the exogenous projections used 
in the projection procedure of Chapter IV, the resulting 
projections of the endogenous variables, and complete 
statements of the public expenditure and revenue accounts 
and the balance of payments accounts consistent with each of 
the GDI growth alternatives , I'w,, and 
Taoie 50. Balance of Payments i9bu-i9b7 and projected balance of payments, 1968-1972 
(in millions of U, S. dollars) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Current account 
( 3 + 4 +  5 )  
7.9 12.4 -37.2 -81.8 14.1 -142.6 -147.3 
1. Exports 
Goods (fob) & 
Services 
50U.5 
444.4 
56.1 
573.1 
510.2 
62.9 
611.0 
556.1 
55.0 
616.7 
555.1 
61.6 
751.4 
684.6 
66.8 
771.8 
686.6 
85.2 
880.1 
788.5 
91.6 
2. Imports 
Goods (FOB) & 
Services 
447.3 
341.0 
106.3 
545.6 
428.6 
117.0 
599.3 
478.4 
120.9 
644.5 
518.U 
126.5 
679.8 
517.7 
162.1 
852.2 
659.7 
192.5 
934.9 
746.2 
188.7 
S o  Consnercial 
Balance 
(i - 2) 
53.2 27.5 11.7 -27.8 71.6 -80.4 -120.4 
4. Transfer 
Payments 20.6 26.8 18.2 19.0 14.8 24.1 28.5 
5. Investment 
income 
Private 
Public 
"65.9 
-58.7 
-7.2 
-66.7 
-60.1 
-6.6 
-67.1 
-60.8 
-6. 3 
-73.0 
-65.3 
-7,7 
-86.3 
-60.1 
-12.2 
-121.0 
-61.5 
-24.8 
—104.3 
-91. é 
-29.4 
Table 50 Continued) 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Current account 
(3-^4 + 5) 
-196.9 
1. Exports 
Goods (FOB) & 
Services 
397.3 
779.5 
117.3 
942.2 989. J i,U33.3 i,u9u.7 1,145.2 
2. Imports 1,017.7 
Goods (FOB) & 798.5 
Services 219.2 
952.7* 1,U46.4* i,u75.8* 1,179.5* 1,230.7-3 
Commercial 
Balance 
( 1  -  2 )  
-120,4 
4. Transfer 
Payments 27.8 25.0 25. u 25.0 25.0 25.0 
5. Investment income -104.3 
Private -72.2 
Public -32.0 
-135.9 
-89.9 
-46.0 
-144.9 
-94.4 
-50.5 
-155.0 
-99.1 
-56.9 
-165.2 
-104.1 
-61.1 
-174.5 
-109.3 
-65.2 
* 
Capacity-to-import assuming no change in international reserves. 
Taole 50 (Continued) 
196U 1961 1962 i9&J 1964 1965 1966 
3. Capital account 22.7 15.3 63.7 46.6 40.4 172.9 196.7 
1. Long term 
Public (net) 
Inflow 
Outflow 
13.7 
-13.4 
13.8 
-27.2 
1.7 
-6.4 
26.7 
-33.1 
36.7 
17.6 
53.5 
-35.9 
50.3 
51.6 
81.7 
-30. 1 
36.0 
72.8 
103.1 
-30.3 
128.6 
75.6 
98.0 
•22.4 
219.1 
185.4 
220.6 
-35.2 
Private (net) 27.1 8.1 19.1 4.7 13.2 53.0 33.7 
2« Short term (net) 9.U 13.6 27.U -9.7 -45.6 44.3 -22.4 
C. Errors & omissions 2.1 31.2 "20.1 53.7 -29.5 - 15.6 -81.6 
D. Changes in reserves -32.7 -34.3 -36.3 -17.5 -25.0 -14.7 22.2 
Table 50 (Continued) 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Capital account 122.9 131.4 177.0 168.U 229.0 235.0 
1« Long term 128.5 131.4 177.0 168.0 229.0 235.0 
Public (net) 106.4 99.4 87.0 28.0 59.0 55.0 
Inflow 169.5 154.4 130.0 160.0 200.0 200.U 
Outflow -63.1 -55.0 -43.0 -132.0 -141.0 -145.0 
Private (net) 22.1 32.0 90.0 140.0 170.0 170.0 
2» Short term (net) -5.6 
C. Errors & omissions -2.8 
C. Changes in reserves 76.8 
Taole 5i. Exogenous variable projections for GDI growth alternative 
Year I- i Z D 7/ 1^ 1°  ^
1966 4,042.9 12,973.3 17,722.2 6,840.8 14,106.5 62,222.2 1,535.0 2,842.9 
1967 3,398.3 12,390.0 18,370.6 6,925.7 15,023.4 63,837.3 1,324.0 2,923.2 
1968 2,078.1 13,791.7 19,050.7 7,105.9 15,999.9 65,995.2 1,582.0 3,016.1 
1969 3,735.6 14,263.8 19,826.9 7,098.0 17,039.9 69,238.4 1,769.0 3,106.6 
1970 1,353.0 14,721.8 20,851.4 6,880.9 18,147.5 71,225.3 4,671.0 3,199.8 
1971 1,317,0 15,194.j 21,275.2 7,254.8 19,327.1 72,844.8 5,495.0 3,295.8 
1972 1,247.8 15,682.0 21,661.3 7,711.4 20,583.4 75,030.1 5,514.0 3,394.6 
Table !j2. Projections of the endogenous variables for 
CiUi GROWL/TI Â-X i/Gx'ilii Oi V 0 /in 
1966 196? 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
X 110,313 112,204 114,185 118,369 121,602 135,213 128,284 
C 84,301 85,695 87,0^4 89,797 91,997 94,404 96,493 
T 26,250 26,204 26,056 28,756 30,108 31,967 33,072 
M 24,814 24,999 25,130 27,118 28,244 29,698 30,664 
cP 71,328 72,305 73,302 75,533 77,275 79,310 80,811 
iP 22,207 22,806 23,978 25,020 28,755 30,650 31,824 
I^* 17,829 18,554 19,380 20,144 20,884 21,859 22,915 
105,943 107,550 109,413 113,334 116,397 119,797 122,611 
T* 4,370 4,544 4,772 5,035 5,205 5,416 5.673 
TT 19,710 20,239 20,915 21,403 21,772 22,541 23,395 
Table 53» Projected public expenditures by major categories : hypothesis 
(in millions of 1963 Soles) 
Expenditure categories 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
G : Total expenditures 26694.1 27494.9 28319.7 29169.3 30044.4 30945.7 31874„.0 
Gc = Current expenditures 18595.4 19230.2 20238.4 20931.5 21706.2 22407.6 25200,,, 3 
c9 : Public consunption 12973.3 13390.0 13791.7 *14263.8 14721.8 15194.3 15682.,, 0 
: 
Current transfers 2055.4 2117.1 2180.6 2246.0 2313.4 2382.8 2454,, 3 
V3EP îGross value added of 
public enterprises 
2642.7 2749.5 2832.0 2946.1 3034.5 3125.5 3251 „.l 
i" : Interest on internal debt 103.5 72.2 157.1 101.2 117.9 106.2 140.3 
if : Interest on external dent 820.5 901.4 1277.0 1374.4 1518.6 1598.8 1672.1 
Gk : Capital expenditures 8098.7 8264.7 8081.3 8237.8 8338.2 8538.1 8672.7 
: Public investment 4042.9 3398.3 2078.1 3735.6 . 1353.0 1317.0 1247.8 
: Development banks 2776.2 2859.5 2945.3 3033.7 3124.7 32.8.4 3314.0 
Capital transfers 66.7 68.7 i 70.8 72.9 75.1 77.4 79.7 
: Amortization of internal 
debt 230.5 160.8 349.7 225.3 262.4 236.3 313.5 
Af : Amortization of external 
debt 982.4 1777.4 2637.4 1170.3 3523.0 3689oO 3718.7 
Taole 54. Projected revenue of the public sçctor by major sources: nypothesis 
(in millions of'1963 Soles) 
Revenue categories 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Total revenue 26694.1 27494.9 28319.7 29169.3 30044.4 30945.7 31874.C 
Current revenue 
3 Direct taxes 
: Indirect taxes 
s Non-tax revenue 
18945.7 
3773.0 
11323.7 
3849.U 
20810.4 
4544.0 
12355.4 
3911.0 
21289.7 
4772.0 
12533.4 
3984.3 
22407.5 
5035.0 
13313.5 
4059.0 
23166.8 
5205.0 
13826.7 
4135.1 
24071.1 
5416.-0. 
14442.5 
4312.6 
24863.C 
5673.C 
14898./ 
4291. 
Capital account 
I' Î Internal financing 
Tg : External debt 
Tg s Capital income 
7748.4 6684.5 7030,0 
924.4 1222.6 2034.8 
6156.6 4774.5 4286.4 
667.4 687.4 708.8 
6761.8 6877.6 
2494.6 1856.2 
3538.0 
729.2 
4270.3 
751.1 
6874.6 7011.C 
868.0 1090.c 
5233.3 5129»:; 
773.6 796.': 
Taoie 55« Balance of paw.ents projection consistent with Hypothesis 
(in millions of U, 3, dollars,) 
A. Current account 
i« Exports 
Goods (FOB) 
Services 
2. Inports 
Goods (FOB; 
Services 
3. Commercial oalance 
4. Transfer payments 
5. Investment income 
Private 
Public 
B. Capital account 
1. Long term 
PuDlic (net) 
Inflow 
Outflow 
Private (net) 
2. Short term 
Errors & ommissions 
Changes in reserves . 
* 
C. 
D. 
i9fcb 196/ i9fc8 1969 l97u 1971 1972 
147.3 -196.9 -68.7 127.0 -149.4 -184.4 -200.0 
880.1 897.3 942.2 
I 
989.3 . 1U36.8 1090.7 1145.2 ^ 
934.9 1017.7 900.0 996.«4 1058.2 1134.9 1195.7 
962.7* 1046.4* 1075.8* 1179.5* 1230.7* 
-54.d -120.4 42.2 -7.1 19.4 -44.2 -5U.5 
28.5 27.8 25.9 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
-121.U 
-91.6 
-29.4 
104.3 
-72.3 
-32.0 
-135.9 
-89.9 
-46.0 
-144.9 
-9414 
-50.5 
-155.0 
-99.1 
-56.9 
-165.2 
-104.1 
"61.1 
-174.5 
-109.3 
-65.2 
196.7 122.9 131.4 177.0 168.9 229.0 235.0 
219.1 
185.4 
220.6 
-35.2 
138.5 
106.4 
169.5 
-63.1 
131.4 
99.4 
154.4 
055.0 
177.0 
\ 87.0 
130.0 
-43.0 
168.0 
28.0 
160.0 
-132.0 
229.0 
59.0 
200.0 
-141.0 
235.0 
55.U 
200.0 
-145.U 
33.7 22.1 32.0 90.0 140.0 170.0 170.0 
-22.4 
-81.6 
22.2 
5.6 
-2.8 
76.8 
- -
— -
Calculated capacity-to-import, assuming no change in Reserves» 
Table 56. Exogenous variable projections for GDI growth alternative 
Year E Z D W 1^ 
1966 4,042.9 12,9/3.J l7,/22.2 6,«40.8 14,106.5 62,222.2 1,535.0 2,842.9 
1967 3,610.9 13,560«0 iW, J'/U.b 6,925.7 15,023.4 63,837.3 1,324.0 2,985.0 
1968 2,254.0 14,332.5 19,050.7 7,105.9 15,998.9 65,005.2 1,582.0 3,134.3 
1969 3,958.8 15,110.9 19,826.9 7,098.0 17,039.9 69,248.4 1,769.0 3,291.u 
1970 1,629.6 15,898.9- 20,841.4 6,880.9 18,147.5 71,225.3 4,671.0 3,455.6 
1971 1,647.1 16,727.9 21,275.2 7,254.8 19,327.1 72,844.1 5,495.0 3,628.4 
1972 1,630.9 17,600.1 21,661.3 7,711.4 20,583.4 75,030.1 5,514.0 3,809.9 
300 
Table 57. Projections of the cndo^oHouK variables for 
GiJi //TOWLi i cil. UUTiiclul V C 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 197% 
Z 110,313 112,699 115,303 120,076 123,948 128,244 13?,045 
C 84,301 86,146 88,165 91,616 94,509 97,662 100,554 
I 26,250 26,473 26,351 29,164 30,640 32,630 33,869 , 
M 24,814 25,294 25,483 27,637 28,878 30,588 31,756 
cP 71,328 72,586 73,833 76,505 78,610 80,934 82,954 
iP 22,208 22,862 24,097 25,205 29,010 30,983 32,239 
iP' 17,829 18,553 19,381 20,145 20,883 21,860 22,915 
105,943 108,155 110,531 115,041 118,743 122,828 126,372 
4,370 4,544 4,772 5,035 5,205 5,416 5,673 
TT 19,710 20,239 20,915 21,403 21,772 22,541 23,395 
Table 58. Projected public expenditures 
(in millions 
by major categories s 
of U. 3. dollars) 
hypothesis 
*2 
Expenditure categories 1966 1967 1968 1969 197U 1971 1972 
G : Total expenditures 26694.1 28023.8 29430.2 30901.7 32446.8 34069.1 35772.6 
Gc ^ Current expenditures 18595.4 19494.7 21000.2 22139.5 23393.1 24612.2 25966.4 
C9 : Public consunction 12973.3 13560.0 14332.5 15110.9 15898.9 16727.9 17600.1 
: Current transfers 2055.4 2158.2 2266.1 2379.4 2498,4 2623.3 2754.5 
VBEPs Gross value added of 
public enterprises 
2642.7 2802.9 2943.0 3121.1 3277.1 3441.0 3648.8 
i^ î Interest on internal debt 103.5 72.2 181.6 ,153.7 200.1 221.2 290,9 
if : Interest on external debt 820.5 901.4 1277.0 1374.4 1518.6 1598.8 1672.1 
°k : Capital expenditures 8098.7 8534.1 8430.0 8762.2 9053.7 9456.9 9806.2 
19 : Public investment 4042.9 3610.9 2254.0 ,3958.8 1629.6 1647.1 1630.0 
s Development banks 2776.2 2915.0 3060.8 3213.8 3374.5 3543.2 3720.4 
Capital transfers 66.7 70.0 73.5 77.2 81.1 85.2 89.5 
: Amortization of internal 
debt 230.5 160.8 404.3 342.1 445.5 492.4 647,6 
: Amortization of external 
deot 982.4 177.4 2637.4 1170.3 3523.0 3689.0 3718., 7 
Table 59. Projected revenue of the public sector by major sources s hypothesis A,. 
(in millions wt 1963 Soles) 
Revenue categories 1966 1967 1968 1969 197U 1971 1972 
Total revenue 26694.1 28028.8 29430.2 3U90X.V 32446.a 34U69.1 357/2. 
Current revenue 18945.7 20943.3 21488.2 22724.9 23580.7 34515.4 35430. 8 
T*^ s Direct taxes 3773.0 4544.0 4772.0 5035.0 5205.0 5416.0 5673. -
T^ : Indirect taxes 11323.7 12463.7 12602.0 13575.2 14168.4 14899.7 15463. 6 
T^ : Non-tax revenue 3849.9 3935.6 4024.2 4114,7 4207.3 419917 4294. 2 
Capital account 7748.4 7085.5 7942.0 8176.8 8866.1 9553.7 10341. 3 
Ti : Internal financing 924.4 1610.3 2919.9 3866.3 3784.4 3469.3 4318. 3 
T^ 3 External debt 6156.6 4774,5 4386.4 3538.0 4270.3 5233,3 5129. 2 
T^ : Capital income 667.4 700.7 735.7 772.5 811.1 851.1 894. 3 
lable 60. Balance of payments projection consistent with hypothesis A 
(in millions of 1963 Soles) 
1966 1967 1968 19b9 1970 1971 ' 1972 
Current account •- 147. 3 196.9 . 63.7 •146.1 -173.2 -217.5 -242.5 
1. Exports 
Goods (FOB) 
Services 
880.1 897.3 942.2 989.3 1038.8 1090.7 1145.2 
2. Imports 
Goods (FOB) 
Services 
934.9 1017.7 900.0 
962.7* 
1015.5 
1046.4* 
1032.0 
1075.8* 
1168.0 
1.179.5* 
1238.2 
1230. 74^ 
3. Commercial balance -54.8 -120.4 42.2 -26.2 -43.2 -77.3 -93.0 
4, Transfers 28.5 27.8 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
5. Investment income -121.0 -104.3 -135.9 -144.9 -155.0 -165.2 -174.5 
3. Capi tal account 196.8 122.9 131.4 177.0 163.0 229.0 235.0 
1. Long terrr. 219.1 128.5 131.4 177.0 163. C 229.0 235 oO 
Public (net) ^ 
Inflow 
Outflow 
185.4 
200.6 
-35.2 
106.4 
169.5 
-63.1 • 
99.4 
154.4 
-55.0 
87.0 
130.0 
"43.0 
23.0 
160.0 
-132.0 
59.0 
200.0 
-141.0 
55.0 
200.0 
145.0 
2. Short term -22.4 -5.6 — —  
1 
— —  
— —  
c. Errors & Omissions ••81.6 -2.8 — —  — — —  —  — —  
3. !"-hanges is reserves 22.2 76.8 — — 
Calculated capacity-to-inport, assuming no change in Reserves. 
Table 61. exogenous variaoie projections for GDI growth alternative Aj 
Year 19 C9 E Z D W If id ^ jTr 
1966 4U42.9 12993.3 17/22.2 6840.8 14106.5 62222.2 1535.0 2842.9 
1967 3642.8 1391U.U l837U.fc 6925.7 15023.4 63837.3 1324.0 , 3041.9 
196b 2434.2 14S83.7 19050.7 7105.9 15999.9 65995.2 1582.0 3254.8 
1969 4193.5 15991.U 19826.9 7098.0 17039.9 69248.4 1769.0 3482.6 
1970 1925.5 17145.3 2U841.4 6880.9 18147.5 71225.3 4671.9 3726.4 
1971 2U1U.Ô 18382.9 21275.2 7254.8 19327.1 72844.8 5495.0 3987.2 
1972 2U43.4 19709.« 21661.3 77114 20583.4 75U3U.1 5514.0 4266.3 
J05 
Table 62, Projections of the endogenous variables for 
GDI growth alternative /y 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 3 972 
X 110,313 113,340 116,443 121,853 126,433 131,520 135,696 
G 84,301 86,863 89,470 93,515 97,170 101,182 105,017 
I 26,260 26,562 26,651 29,590 31,207 33,352 34,738 
M 24,814 25,388 25,844 28,177 29,685 31,553 32,695 
cP 71,328 72,953 74,586 77,524 80,025 82,799 85,307 
iP 22,207 22,919 24,217 22,396 29,381 31,341 34,014 
17,820 18,553 19,380 20,144 20,884 21,849 22,915 
105,943 108,796 111,671 116,818 121,228 126,104 130,023 
4,370 4,544 4,772 5,035 5,205 5,416 5,672 
TT 19,710 20,239 20,915 .21,403 21,772 22,541 23,395 
Table 63. Projected public ejcpenditures by major categories s hypothesis A3 
(in millions of 1963 Soles) 
Expenditure categories 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
G : Total expenditures 26694.1 28562.1 30562.1 32701.4 34990.5 37439.8 40060.6 
Gc : Current expenditures 18595.4 19939,2 21776.5 23393.5 25178.5 26989.2 29011.4 
C9 : Public consumption 12973.3 13910.0 14883.7 15991.0 17145.3 18382.9 19709»3 
Tr : Current transfers 2055.4 2199.3 2353.3 2518.0 2694..3. 2882.9 3084.7 
VBEPs Gross value added of 
public enterprises 
2642.7 2856.3 3056.2 3302.8 3534.0 3781.4 4086.2 
ii : Interest on internal 
debt 
103.5 72.2 206.3 207.3 286.3 343.2 458.6 
if , Interest on external 
debt 
820.5 901.4 1277.0 1374.4 1518.6 1598.8 1672.1 
Gk : Capital expenditures 8098.7 8622.9 8785.6 9307,9 9812.0 10450.6 11049,2 
I9 : Public investment 4042.9 3642.8 2434.2 4193.5 1925.5 2010.6 2043.4 
: Development banks 2776.2 2970.5 3178.4 3400.9 3639.0 3893.7 4166.3 
: Capital transfers 66.7 71.4 76.4 81.7 87.4 93.5 100,, 0 
A^ : Amortization of internal 
debt 
230.5 160.8 459.2 461.5 637.1 763.8 1020,, & 
: Amortization of external 
debt 
982.4 177.4 2637.4 1170.3 3523.0 3639.0 3718.,.7 
Taole 64. Projected revenue of the public sector by major sources s hypothesis A3 
(in millions of 1963 Soles) 
Revenue  ca teao r i es  1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Total revenue 26694.1 28562.7 30562.1 32701.4 34990.3 37439.8 40060.6 
Current account 
s Direct taxes 
: Indirect -taxes 
: Non-tax revenue 
18945.7 21033.6 31711.2 23043.8 Î24035.3 25192.2 ,26479.3 
4370.0 4544.0 4772.U 5035.0 5205.0 5416.U 5673.0 
12168.2 12539.6 12855.5 13848.7 14561. U 15394.8- 16:^)9.9 
3849.U 395U.U 4U53.7 416U.1 4269.3 4381.4 4496.4 
Capital account 
External deot 
Tk Repayment of development 
Dank loans 
Internal financina 
7748.4 
6156.6 
667.4 
924.4 
7529.1 
4774.5 
714.1 
2040.5 
8850.9 
4286.4 
764.1 
3800.4 
9657.6 
3538.0 
817.6 
5302.0 
1U955.U 
4270.3 
874.8 
5809.y 
12247.6 13581 .,3 
5233.3 5129., 2 
926. U 
6U7S.3 
iUOl.,5 
7450.,, 5 
Tacie Balance of payments projection consistent with hypothesis A„ 
(in millions of U. 3. dollars) 
19bb 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972, 
A. Current account -147.3 -196.9 -68.7 165.9 -203.4 -250.4 -344.6 
1« Exports 
Goods (FOB) 
Services 
dâU.l 897.3 942.2 939.3 1038.8 1090.7 1145.2 
2. Lnports 
Goods (FOB; 
Services 
934,9 1017.7 900.0 
962.7* 
1035.3 
1046.4* 
1112.2 
1075.6* 
1205.9 
1179.5* 
1342.3 
1230.7* 
3. Commercial balance -54.8 • 120.4 42.2 -46.0 -73.4 -110.2 -195.1 
4. Transfers 28.5 27.8 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
5o Investment income "121.U -104.3 -135.0 -144.9 -155.0 -165.2 174.5 
Private 
Public 
-91.6 
-29.4 
-72.3 
-32.0 
-89.9 
-46.0 
-94.4 
-50.5 
-99.1 
-56.9 
104.1 
-61.1 
109.3 
-65.2 
3. Capital account 196.7 122.9 131.4 177.0 168.0 229.0 235.0 
1. Long terrr. 219.1 128.5 13i.4 177.0 168.0 229.0 235.U 
Public (net/ 
Inflow 
Outflow 
185.4 
22U.6 
-35.2 
106.4 
169.5 
"63.1 
99.4 
154.4 
-55.0 
87.0 
130.0 
-43.0 
28.0 
160.0 
132.0 
59.0 
200.0 
141.0 
55.0 
200.0 
-145.J 
Private (net) 33.7 22.1 32.0 90.0 140.0 170., 0 170.0 
2. Short term 
Errors & ommisions 
Changes in reserves 
22.4 
-81.7 
22.2 
-5.6 
-2.6 
76.3 
— 
— — 
- -
* 
Calculated capacity-to-irrport, assuming no change in Reserves. 
